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List of conventions and abbreviations
All  words  appearing  in  bold typeface  are  the  present  author’s  emphasis  except  where
appearing in quotations.
All use of [brackets] are the present authors additions to quotations, except for Bhaskar’s use
as  quoted  on  page  111,  and  his  enumeration  as  quoted  on  pages  63  and  133  of  this
dissertation.
The present author uses italics to indicate emphasis
Abbreviations  of  concepts  and  publication  titles  are  respectively  conventional  amongst
contributors to critical realism and may thus appear in the dissertation as follows:
CR = Critical Realism
TR = Transcendental Realism
PDM = Philosophical Discourse of Modernism
TDCR = Transcendental Dialectical Critical Realism 
RTS = A realist theory of science (Bhaskar [1975] 2008)
PON = The possibility of naturalism (Bhaskar [1979] 1998)
SRHE = “Scientific explanation and human emancipation” (Bhaskar 1980)
RR = Reclaiming reality (Bhaskar 1989b)
DPF = Dialectic: The pulse of freedom (Bhaskar 1993)
FEW = From East to West (Bhaskar 2000)
RMR = Reflections of meta-reality (Bhaskar 2002a)
FSE  = From science to emancipation (Bhaskar [2002b] 2012)
PMR = Philosophy of meta-reality (Bhaskar, 2002c, 2002d)
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Summary
Seldom are  we  privileged  to  witness  an  international  philosophical  movement,  which  in
addition to being a philosophical revolution, vindicates the values and concerns of a critical
anthropological approach in Spirituality from the analytic tradition.  The work of critical
realists  is  potential  remedy for the ills,  dichotomies and lacunae inherent  in the Western
philosophical and spiritual traditions. Critical realism and philosophy of meta-reality, it is
claimed,  not  only  emancipate  philosophy  but,  science  and  society  as  spiritual.  This
dissertation explores the many points of confluence and exposes dimensions of living and
studying  spirituality,  which  challenge us  to  think  of  ontological  realism,  epistemological
relativism and rational (reflexive) judgement in a mode, which cautions against the naive
relativism, tacit irrealism and other mistakes which tend to over-characterise our academic
discourse with social linguistification, to the detriment of humanity and our utopian freedom
and flourishing.
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Chapter One: Introduction, overview, argument, intentions and review
1 The general argument and intention: the emancipation of philosophy and spirituality
as a grounding framework
There  exists  a  natural  epistemological  confluence  of  interests  and  themes  between  the
philosophy  of  Critical  Realism  (hereafter,  not  in  capitals)  and  the  critical  approach  to
academic Spirituality. Bhaskar ([1975] 2008, [1979] 1998, 1980, 1989, 2000, 2002a, [2002b]
2012, 2002c, 2002d) has sought the emancipation of philosophy, science and society, whilst
Kourie (2000, 2006a, 2006b, 2009) with numerous others, just to mention here Schneiders
(1989,  1993,  2003,  2005a,  2005b,  2005c,  2006,  cf.  Kourie  2009),  has  celebrated  the
emancipation of Spirituality in its recent incarnation in the academy and noted an air of “eye-
brow  raising”  (Kourie  2009:148),  suspicion  and  antimony  amongst  other  scholars.
Spirituality as academic discipline bares a burden of marginality. Perhaps most telling is the
critique  of  consciousness  implicit  in  the  common ground  of  critical  realism and  secular
spirituality. De Villiers (2006:102, cf. Kourie 2009:167) has for instance criticised theology’s
lack of conceptualisation of transformation,  whilst  philosophy has suffered a similar lack
with regards to the person as agent, midst a legendary anti-spiritual attitude amongst analytic
philosophers. Bhaskar’s analysis (1993:2) points to the lacunae within that tradition:
To  put  this  is  a  nutshell,  most  philosophical  aporiai  derive  from taking  an
insufficiently,  non-anthropocentric,  differentiated,  stratified,  dynamic,  holistic
(concrete) or agentive (practical) view of things. More generally, philosophy’s
current anthropomorphizing, actualizing, monovalent and detotalizing ontology
acts ...  as a block on the development of the social sciences and projects of
human  emancipation  –  for  this  ontology  currently  informs  much  of  their
practice. 
This  state  of  affairs,  Bhaskar’s  diagnosis  blames  on  a  philosophical  irrealism pervading
philosophy,  epistemology and the sciences.  This  dissertation deploys  Bhaskar  here in  his
“disruptive”  element.  The  philosophy of  meta-reality  in  conjunction  with  the  categorical
realism, upon which it is founded, is used synthetically in keeping with that philosophy. The
“confluential”  Bhaskar  is  presented  as  a  more  complete  “telluric”  and  realist  partner
providing useful conceptualisation, amidst a resonance of critical explanatory power for the
secular/anthropological  argument  and  liberation  of  the  practical  mystic.  The  critical
component  in  this  dissertation  at  one  level,  rides  on  Bhaskar’s  “coat-tails”.  At  the
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constructivist level it introduces (as far as I am aware for the first time) Bhaskar into the part-
world of Spirituality theory, where confluence is most easily read between Bhaskar, Bailey
(2001) and contributors in du Toit & Mason (2006).
It is for this dissertation (a) to present this critical development in Bhaskar’s critical realism,
(b) to deploy this and other sub-critiques against both religious and epistemic hegemony and
(c)  to  argue the necessity of  retaining definitions of  spirituality in  Spirituality theory.  At
another  level,  the  dissertation  also  seeks  to  accomplish  a  description  of  conceptual
developments  which  characterise  Bhaskar’s  philosophy  of  meta-reality.  These  contribute
much to what Waaijman (2001:135-136) would describe as a “critical theory of spirituality”
and what Bhaskar (2000, 2002a, [2002b] 2012, 2002c, 2002d) and Bailey (2001) might agree
is a  practical mysticism or with Heelas’ (2012:5) “ultimate spirituality”. Whatever the case,
this ontological spirituality is implicit in every-day life and  may account for the “principle”
of lived spirituality naturally availing itself to “unitive” experience, states, stages (cf. Tassi
1994:21-33)  well  described  by  the  Spanish  Carmelites,  who  depended  on  Eckhart’s
mysticism,  Aquinas’  scholastics  and  categories  of  earlier  monastic  wisdom),  but  here
deployed  as  spirituality  “come  of  age”  (Mayson  2006:1-23),  indicating  maturity  in
Spirituality  study.  This  dissertation  serves  to  “underlabour”  for  the  emancipation  of
mysticism,  spirituality  and  religion  as  separate  and  distinct  categories,  whose  elision  or
glyphing to “spirituality” though “Marking the transition from the language of religion to the
language  of  spirituality...”  (Heelas  2012:4)  is  a  “megatrend”  (Naisbett  1982  cf.  Heelas
2012:5) in the social realm and “distinctive construct” (Zinnbauer, Pargament & Scott 1999
cf.  Heelas  2012:4)  in  the  realms  of  academia.  The  process  indicates  the  emergence  of
important ontological distinctions to be made between mysticism, religion and spirituality, for
example. Many who theorise on the nature of ontological spirituality are somewhat exposed
to either under playing distinctions or failing the test of conceptual enrichment. The implicit
and  agentive  categorical  realism necessary for  the  epistemological  move  to  a  distinctive
construct  (in  non-atomist,  non-monist,  non-individualist  manner)  may  not  be  adequately
described. Without such it is largely difficult to target the ontological basis for “the most
elemental of all spiritualities” (Heelas 2012:5) which argued here, constitutes the realm of
mysticism where the depth of being is felt to be “of the sacred” and where epistemologically
“the sacred is ‘taken’ to come into evidence” in  alethic “knowing” and whose presence as
“lighthouse” constitutes,  or so Bhaskar  argues,  is  the non-dual  ground-state  reality of all
Spirituality (as knowledge) and the concretely singular diversity of spiritualities in the world.
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Much in Heelas (2012) is interpretable from a critical realist stance. However, from purely
Bhaskarian conceptions Heelas’ lacks a total commitment to ontological realism, possibly
because of the author’s ambivalent closeness to Plato, or so I believe. Whilst attempting to
accommodate transformation, the author claims: “those who make contact [with the sacred]
take experience itself, as the transformative” (Heelas 2012:5-6). Implicitly transformation is
reduced to experience, and ontological depth reduced to epistemology. It seems that Heelas
(2012) falls into the inescapable dichotomy and consequential (and purposeful, consciously
theorised) alienation of a “transformative middle” which is heir to Plato and more latterly the
Kantian tradition. Bhaskar would undoubtedly accuse Heelas of a category mistake, which
may expose Heelas’ theory as a move against emancipation by suspending ontology into
epistemology and thereby oppress our intuitions and actions with self-doubt. One certainly
discerns a palpable “discontent” in the struggles which Heelas presents.
Heelas  (2012:5-6)  begins  with  an  attitude  of  ontological  realism:  “Ultimate  spirituality”
exists  as  lived  “sacred  ...  presence  which  motivates”  and  is  “the  ground  of  ultimate
spirituality”.  Experience  is  transformative  and  the  gnosis transforms  “worldviews”  and
“judgements”.  In  the  realm  of  the  sacred  we  experience  “the  perfect”  and  “the  true”
(Bhaskar’s  “alethia”?):  “true  love”,  “true  vitality”,  “true  freedom or  equality”  and  “true
bliss”, wherein ideals fail. The “sacred” is the ontologically real ground for epistemological
targeting  and  “zoning”.  Spirituality  of  the  “ultimate”  type  could  be  described  as
“intransitive”, whilst descriptive (perhaps overly deterministic in Heelas?) epistemological
zones are transitive and relatively mutable. Zones and their social realities are embedded in
the realm of “value clash” where cultures and selves “are not coherent”, we experience “the
uncertainty of  science”  (Feynman 2007,  cf.  Heelas  2012:7)  and Braudillard’s  (1994:116)
“end-ism”, and which spirituality is seen to either accommodate or overcome.  
Heelas identifies three taxonomic zones or “homes” of Spirituality, each possessing a polarity
or “if you like the cultural-cum experiential extremity” (Bailey 2001, cf. Bailey 2012:10): (1)
Theism is constellated around the sacred transcendent, it is dichotomous: holding to strong
transcendent/immanent split in which the latter is dependent on the former and the “sacred”
permeates reality but is not reliant “on the here and now” but on “experience”. This zone
“contains more than spirituality” or the experience of sacred agency. It is worth noting that
Heelas’ use of “sacred” is very much in-line with the transcendentalised divinity of traditional
(theologised)  ascription.  It  transgresses  all  and  any  secular  accommodation.  (2)  The
transformative  is  polarised  around  an  indwelling  sacred  and  which  is  accommodated  in
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“theistic  ultimate  spirituality”  but  equally  available  to  “variations”  of  the  ontologically
ultimate spirituality in diverse social setting. This zone stands in “transgressive” relationship
to the others.  Transformation transgresses theistic ideology, because it  regards religion as
transgression. The secular is seen to transgress the inner sacred and the transformational zone
recoils at secular imperfection. (3) The secular is polarised by atheism and rejection of “the
sacred”.  Ultimate ontology is prone to materialist reduction and spirituality devoid of the
sacred becomes “emblematic of what is best in human and/or nature”.  The conceptualisation
here consists in categorically “hard” distinctions at the epistemological level but less so in
culture. What keeps the polarity and the zone together, are continua. Heelas claims (2012:10-
11): 
The three zones are best conceived as located on the apexes of a triangle, not
along some sort  of  spectrum which locates  theistic  tradition at  one end,  the
secular  on  the  other,  with  the  transformative  in  the  middle  ...  creating  the
misleading  impression  that  people  might  have  to  pass  through  the
transformative zone if, for example they give up the theistic to become secular.
In  my view,  Heelas  stands  too  closely  to  “the  perspective  of  those  who  believe  in  the
[theistic] sacred”: he draws a telos of transformation towards Platonic virtue but developed in
a derogated and dirempted secular realm. The implicit dualism makes for agonising reading
at times. The secular realm as presented by Heelas is in my opinion frighteningly “torn”,
“dys-topic”  “irredeemably  flawed”  and  in  which  realm  the  author  claims,  the  vanity  of
humanity “is required for the virtues of the humble”. The pilgrim’s progress is necessarily
located  in  the  vale  of  tears  of  Platonic  diremption.  For  Heelas  there is  no possibility of
sacred-secular overlap. Non-duality is espoused in “ultimate spirituality” but irredeemably
absented in the social  realm. Transformation is  central  to only one zone necessarily.  One
wishes then to ask: are not the other two zones reduced pseudo-spiritualities in consequence?
The presentation here is sometimes a painful reminder of Christian-Platonic dichotomisation
of the sacred and secular and the concomitant war on being that has characterised the history
of Spirituality in the West. The author’s reduction of spiritual “knowing” or noesis to “radical
empiricism”, derogation of the secular to “imperfection”, one suspects, blinds the author to
the  secular  as  rejection  of  traditional  dichotomy.  Hard  conceptions  of  alterity  in  the
comparative zones, are not spectrum-processive and where transformation is given treatment,
it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  “indwelling”  sacred  is  truly  transformative.  Not  only  is
transformation  excluded  on  two  counts  of  the  taxonomy  but  even  in  its  own  zone,  is
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dubiously justified in my opinion. The transformation inducing necessities of life seem to be
inadequately described and one wonders then how Heelas can claim that the secular is not
transformative.  I  suspect  inconsistencies  and  poverty  of  conceptualisation  make  Heelas’
contribution, a torture to sustain. Nevertheless Heelas provides insight into the transgressive
and transformational intention of critical theory and secular spirituality (despite himself?) as
transformative.  Argument  could  at  this  point  become  protracted  but  is  here  purposely
truncated.  
In  Bhaskar’s  analyses,  critiques  and  explanations  of  philosophy,  the  philosophies  of  the
natural and social sciences (far in excess of Wittgenstein, Anscombe, Von Wright, Feyerband,
Popper  and Kuhn),  modernism (exceeding postmodernism),  ideology (transcending Hegel
and  Marx),   he  has  proved  that  conceptual  revolution  is  possible.  It  is  clear,  from
contemporary literature that the study of Spirituality finds itself located in the gap between
the old and the new: dissatisfied with the traditional and epistemic past, but uncertain about
the  future.  Proof  of  this  growth  stage  is  detected  in  the  explicit  questioning  of  past
epistemological  commitments  and traditional  hegemony.  Amongst  his  achievements  most
pertinent to Spirituality study Bhaskar is able to account for the reality of ontology, for the
relativity of epistemology and then vindicate  rational/moral  judgement,  thus re-theorising
agency and transformation, the “two-cultures” of science and dialectic. Consequently he re-
situates  spirituality  as  a  philosophical  and  ontological  good  in  an  “emancipatory”  (sic)
axiology (Bhaskar 2012:xxiii,129-131, 218). The points of confluence and counterpoint are
both myriad and momentous for the contemplations of Spirituality scholars. An exploration
of and justification of this claim characterises this dissertation’s philosophical and spiritual
trajectory.
1.1 Exploring the confluence of interest in the character of the literature field
The literature under review here is on one hand, predominantly that of critical realism, which
re-frames  many  of  the  tacit  assumptions  within  epistemology and  its  Spirituality  theory
partners.  The  primary  interest  here  is  to  deliver  a  philosophically  derivable  critique  of
Spirituality in the university from Bhaskarian inspiration, in order to perhaps anticipate the
“after the fact” critiques which must necessarily arise in the field of epistemology, but have
partially  shaped  the  critical  philosophy  of  religion  in  the  past.  Here  particularly  the
contemporary  academic  interest  in  secular,  “telluric”  (Kourie,  2006:79-80)  spirituality  is
accompanied  by  and  contextualised  (or  “contexted”)  in  an  anthropological  and  critical
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approach. Such it is argued here, benefits from an open attitude to naturalism (under certain
limits)  and is  informed by critical  realist  analysis  and critique  in  philosophy of  science.
Former  conceptions  of  natural  religion  are  exceeded  in  consequence.  A predominating
interest in the social dimensions of spirituality well represented in Spirituality literature is
potentially enriched in  Bhaskar’s  exposition of  the “four  planar  being” or  “social  cube”,
which  amongst  other  achievements  casts  critical  light  on the past-bound nature  of  social
explanation in the relatively enduring complex of relations of social facts and their realm. 
Methodological  implications  arise.  The  epistemological  prominence  afforded  to  three-
dimensional  taxonomies  of  socio-historical  phenomenology  and  doing-better-by-one-
dimension descriptions of dualistic experience, especially those of the Kantian tradition1, may
be  misguided  as  are  any  expectations  that  they  elicit  an  adequate  conceptualisation  of
transformation, agency and intention. Furthermore within these “de-agentised” taxonomies
the possibilities for dialogue are remote since their descriptive content lacks a coherent theory
of  ontological depth. These claims expose a fallacious ideological trend in philosophy and
methodology which Bhaskar discerns as a “primal squeeze” to our reality, depth, power to
transform and emancipate ourselves from a deeply dichotomous, hegemonic, heteronymous
reduction-effect on being. Methodologically our tri-angulated taxonomies tend to follow suit.
Numerous authors have employed such epistemological strategies: Mouton (2011), Waaijman
(2002),  McGinn (2001),  Bailey (2001),  Heelas  (2012) – to  name a few.  Any number of
scholars  in  the  realm of  Spirituality  theory  may be  accused  of  a  tacit  irrealism in  their
epistemological assumptions to some degree or another, after reading Bhaskar. 
Some content  of the Western Christian spiritual  tradition and religious milieu,  which has
come to hegemonise (ontologically implicit) spirituality receives critical attention in attempt
to rein in its religious overreach and bring to light its implicit secular and anthropological
assumptions, thus exposing fallacy and inconsistency in its religious self-explanation. Such
critique  implicit  in  critical  realism and  here  built  on  those  programmatic  critiques,  add
philosophical  derivability  to  arguments  by  Bailey  (2001),  the  contributors  to  du  Toit  &
Mayson  (2006)  and  to  Heelas  (2012),  yet  may  remain  obviously  critical  of  their
epistemological and philosophical assumptions and unconscious participation in “irrealism”
1Both Bailey (2001:31-99) and Heelas (2012:1-69) offer and struggle with various problematic issues in the
Kantian Tradition and its pre-suppositions. Heelas’ longing and diagnostic insight into methodology is “that
progress from the tortuous to the simple was being made: and this on a global compass” (2012:1).
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and hegemony. Bhaskar’s commitment to categorical realism is analytically developed as a
critique  of  Western  epistemology.  Whilst  adding  more  than  a  token  of  superior
conceptualisation of science, social reality, dialectic, transformation and transcendence, the
philosopher constructs an a priori argument for “non-dual” spiritual ontology diversified in
social  context  (and  in  his  opinion,  epistemologically  misread)  and  demonstrates  the
analytically  derivable  conditions  for  such  ontology  in  his  philosophy  of  meta-reality.
Religion, in this conception is a special and limiting case of spirituality which latter, emerges
constantly  into  the  categorically  distinct  realms  of  the  “real”,  the  “actual”  and  the
“empirical”.   These realms, set in an axiology of intelligible and emancipative progress of
being, are reflected in relative (and transitive) epistemological expansion towards a totality of
intransitive  alethically knowable  causative  tendencies  cohering  in  a  cosmically-enfolded
ground-state,  conceptually  and  really  expanding  as  a  sui-generis  open  system.  The
background reading required to appreciate Bhaskar is therefore conceptually and critically
rich.
Intelligible spirituality or “practical mysticism” for Bhaskar arises out of a natural need for
trust, reflexivity and the unavoidable transcendence implicit in everyday acts, even if they be
overtly  religious  acts.  Religious  acts  are  possible  under  the  necessary  (philosophically
derivable)  causative  conditions  for  all  actions  which  present  their  dualist-social  face  in
pluralism, diversity and relative endurance of societal relations: each undergirded by a non-
dual ground-state in which spirituality and emancipation of society (“the free flourishing of
all”) are enfolded. Critique of religiosity and the adoption of an emancipative axiology make
Bhaskar, Bailey (2001), the contributors to du Toit and Mayson (2006) though unfamiliar to
each other, partners in a confluence of interest, namely the liberation and re-conceptualisation
of spiritual ontology in us (so claim critical realists) that breaks the tradition of irrealism
within  the  philosophical  discourse  in  which  our  epistemology  and  methodology  are
embedded. If our current epistemology targets “surfaces”, critical realism targets “depth”.
A common  trend  in  the  contributors  to  du  Toit  and  Mayson  (2006)  and  critical  realist
conceptualisation relocates spirituality away from religion. A reading of Bhaskar’s appealing
meta-theory empowers the critical,  emancipative and transformative interest in Spirituality
literature sometimes occluded or reduced in the all too common socio-historical taxonomic
descriptions. 
Presenting Heelas (2012) or Hense and Maas (2001) in any great detail, is not a manageable
option within the current argument here. However, some comments (as for Heelas (2012)
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above) may be pertinent, to demonstrate a greater epistemological context and also to suggest
that,  if  critical  realism  ever  gains  the  ground  it  promises,  much  re-working  and  re-
conceptualisation of Spirituality theory will be required. In their alternate volumes, Heelas
(2012)  and  Bailey  (2001:31-98)  address  themselves  to  a  wide  gamut  of  methodological
concerns. The presentation is undeniably and philosophically interesting, for instance Heelas’
(2012:1-37),  insight  into  how  inconsistently  we  apply  our  realist  dispositions,  partly  an
inadequacy of conceptualisation and certainly for Bhaskar,  “wanting” categorical  realism.
Heelas’ (2012:23) conception of spiritualities as “continua” or thematic strings originating
from  a  basic  pole  but  extending  into  taxonomic  zones  makes  sense  and  constitutes  an
enrichment of the Bhaskar-Bailey nexus, and the critical concern which must arise: “why has
secular  spirituality  been  so  ‘hidden’  or  hard  to  track  among  ‘family  resemblances’?”
Furthermore  his  description  of  “items”  (Heelas  2012:24)  may  be  read  as  Bhaskarian
“relations” and “mediations”, and complement an appreciation of Bhaskar’s “social cube”
and beyond it, the mystery towards which it must necessarily expand.
Nevertheless, some conceptual confusion in Heelas’ (2012) usage of relativised “ontologies”
illustrates  a  fundamental  fallacy  with  which  he  explicitly  struggles,  namely  in  his
conceptualisation  of  spirituality  as  tripartite  social  derivation  of  taxonomised  “zones”,
dirempted of a strong sense of a transformative middle. The history of category mistakes in
our  epistemology  and  methodology,  one  realises  after  reading  Bhaskar,  are  ubiquitously
resplendent in a general confusion between spirituality,  mysticism and religious realms in
theories  of  Spirituality.  Waaijman  (2001:123)  writes,  “Using  the  notion  ‘theoretical
approaches’ we are entering into the field of foundational positions, attitudes, motivations,
steering all further scientific operations.” The foundational position of critical realism is that
greater  categorical  realism liberates  our  primary epistemological  motivations  and without
which,  it  might  be argued,  Heelas  (2012) and Bailey (2001) remain somewhat  confused.
However, some of their conceptualisation enriches an already problematic secular spirituality
talk.  For  instance,  Heelas’ description  of  “zones”  of  spirituality  is  committed  to,  in  my
opinion, an implausible “golden triangle” (?) implying a prismatic reduction: the dimensional
facets of which possess distinct “grounds” and “teleology” on the one hand, and on the other,
share intermingling middles with their neighbouring zones (as “continua”) perceptibly part of
a life pattern but, nevertheless axiologically committed, to deterministic end. Somehow one
suspects  some  intellectual  puppetry.  However  the  description  of  the  possibility  of
transformation  is  confusing  if  not  contradictory  without  an  adequate  description  of
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ontological depth and agency. Nevertheless Heelas (2012:23) contributes a useful explanation
of the process of “de-traditionalisation”. By this is meant the movement of spirituality away
from religion.
The concept of de-traditionalisation is very much of import to the methodological focus in
Hense  and  Maas  (2001),  in  which  the  contributors  are  at  odds  about  whether  to  retain
definitions of spirituality in the light of similar social processes. The tragic outcome of such
reticence denies us any ontology of spirituality (as real transformative praxis) and also a
targetable epistemological definition-field to speak of: committing us to epistemic fallacy by
extension, the Bhaskarian elucidation of which we must temporarily look forward to. The
conceptualisation in Hense and Maas (2001) is not widely representative, coming from the
more  traditional  hegemony,  but  it  is  a  meaningful  contribution  nonetheless.  Clearly
Spirituality  theorists  here  are  divided  in  their  opinion  on  realism  of  any  sort  after  the
methodological  debates  of  postmodernism.  Yet  Waaijman  (2001:123)  explicitly
acknowledges  a  requirement  for  “methodological  principles”  to  guide  methodological
“vision”, in agreement with Schumpeter (1954:41). Essentially for Bhaskar realism liberates
the use of relatively enduring (epistemic)  definitional  ontologies.  It  is  clear  that  Bhaskar
intends to displace the resonance of irrealism many of us (falsely) slip into, across the multi-
disciplinary gamut of “approaches” in which sociological taxonomies have come to be well
represented also with the conception spread (falsely, in my opinion) that these are capable of
dialogue apart from a limited though important social dialectic. Epistemological infatuation
with ontological relativism is seen by critical realists to be the major lacuna in social theory
and  hermeneutic  tradition  which  fail  to  describe  “ontological  depth”  and  (for  Bhaskar
typically) “co-presence”. Although critical realism in the Bhaskarian sense is different from
that  of  the  Frankfurt  School  and  its  later  Oxford  beginnings,  Waaijman’s  description  of
critical  theory (2001:135-136)  fits  a  description  of  Bhaskar’s  interests  well  and  neatly
contexts Bhaskar as spirituality theorist. Reading McGinn’s (2001:291-326) “philosophical
approach” we understand the traditional ties critical theory and philosophy have had with
Spirituality  study.  Bhaskar  fits  the  bill  here  too:  as  critical  meta-theorist  no  principle  or
approach  is  beyond  consideration.  Bhaskar  would  however  feel  equally  at  home  in
Waaijman’s (2001:138) “holistic approach”: 
In holistic approaches, on the level of theories, we may distinguish three main
lines, which are complimentary. (1) The presumption, that all entities belong to
one  encompassing  reality  ...  (2)  The  presumption  that  the  whole  of  reality
19
internally  belongs  together  ...  (3)  characterized  by  integration,  coherence,
complimentarity.
Bhaskar theorises these things but from an attitude of categorical realism. Perhaps of all the
Spirituality  theorists  Waaijman  (2002)  and  Heelas  (2012)  are  the  worthiest  targets  for
Bhaskarian critique. Notably in the first case Waaijman’s heurism and hegemonic idealisation
of  the  “forms”,  in  particular  his  view  of  the  “counter-movement”  lies  contrary  to  the
historical pattern of being co-opted, so it may be argued. In my opinion Waaijman (2002:425-
482)  displays  a  special  and  vastly  limited  (religion  bound)  conceptualisation  of
transformation,  agency  or  emancipation  outside  of  theistic  and  traditional  religious
anthropology including here,  questionable  intentions  in  co-opting  Buddhism into  theistic,
polar-centric  conceptualisation.  The  author’s  argument  (2002:427-430)  in  defence,  is  to
attack the presumption that God is open to theological reduction, arguing that the term God is
probably the earliest and most evolved conceptualisation and that the author’s view of theism
here  incorporates  its  philosophical  diversity  and  plural  polarity  including  its  mystical
apophasis: in the sense of believing in God “atheistically” or as “the source of the [radically]
questionable”. Ultimately Waaijman’s point is this: “The notion of ‘God’, on the other hand,
has  gone  through  so  many  divergent  experiences  that  it  has  acquired  the  desired
inclusiveness”. “God” takes dialectical centrality in the space of epistemological realism of
Waaijman’s choosing here: “We are cautioned by the fact that secular forms of spirituality are
found especially in Western (Euro-American) culture, and within that culture especially in
urbanized and industrialized milieus”. I think things have changed rather dramatically since
Waaijman wrote this. Taking cautions about regional privilege seriously poses a challenge to
which Bhaskar is well able to construct a secular spirituality of universal flourishing. Much is
accomplished by the latter in “Achilles’ heel” critiques and superior explanation if one takes
the view of ontological realism, in which we are “stratified”, have abundance of depth and
reflexivity  and  operate  in  a  duality-mediated  open  system  of  interconnectedness.  An
appreciation of which complexity in the midst of which both authors’ reach for ontological
realism but from which ontological spirituality, Waaijman slips in my opinion, perhaps in fear
of naturalistic explanation.   
Bhaskar,  it  is  maintained  here  underlabours  as  critical  theorist  for  the  emancipation  of
spirituality by affirming its everyday ontological necessity, indicating a telluric re-owning of
transcendence. In comparison, I suspect Waaijman (2002) pales: his diremption of spirituality
into  theistic  past,  conceptually  presented  as  foundation  for  the  future  feels  alethically
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superficial despite the superb scholarship and erudition which is characteristic of this author.
Critique  of  Waaijman (2012) is  not  directly my intention  and is  reserved for  a  creeping
footnote for the most part. Detailed critique of Heelas in this presentation is likewise limited
to this introduction for management purposes.
The ultimate critique in this dissertation belongs to Bhaskar who inspires. The deployment of
Bhaskar as critic is aimed at the epistemological and methodological assumptions to which
Spirituality theory is variously prone and comfortable in irrealist ambience, against which
Bhaskar is set as decidedly contrary and enlightening. In this dissertation Bhaskar’s position
speaks for itself, when summarised or commentary and argument are called for.     
1.1.1 Compliance and character of the introduction
It should be noted that because of my primary philosophical and epistemological interest, the
institutional expectations of an introductory section in dissertation building, delineated in the
various guidelines provided by the University of South Africa, posses a specific character
here. It is not satisfactory merely to fill the expectations without thinking philosophically
about their implicit values and the epistemological formation they prescribe. Consequently,
my presentation in this dissertation is layered and on occasion argumentative. This is not
because of some lurking recalcitrance but because I believe, like Schneiders (2005c:31, cf.
Kourie 2009: 167) and the contributors to Mezirow (2000), that the values of knowledge
should be appropriated and the writing of a dissertation should be transformative.   
1.2 Reaping where others have sewn: a contemplative moment
As Schumpeter (1954:41) says: “In practice we all start our research from the work of our
predecessors, that is we hardly ever start from scratch.” The implications of this comment
perhaps now rather unremarkable after nearly a century or so of historicist thought, in which
epistemology and the introductions to so many publications have participated almost to the
point of ubiquity,  I still  find rather inspiring in its simplicity.  Firstly it  acknowledges the
profound historical  context  amidst  which academic  writing  takes  place:  the long train of
conceptual  development  and  building  (Bildung)  on  the  work  of  predecessors  who  have
inspired and challenged us and in the light of their insight, much academic writing contains a
recursive and perhaps rehearsing content. Neither of these two elements is insignificant for
our present field of interest and multi-layered task of dissertation writing, for implicit in them
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are the material questions of what should be shed, appropriated, integrated, restructured and
argued.
As synthetic moment this dissertation requires that we borrow elements from and embellish a
vision. The contemplative dimension requires a meta-epistemological “balcony-view” on the
principal  vision.  Here  the  vision  is  a  value,  namely  emancipation.  Emancipation  and  its
corollary “transformation” are the reasons and intentional  cause of the dissertation and a
personally  appropriated,  desired  end  for  the  author,  as  for  others.  The  unavoidable
consequence of which desire effects transformation however meagre, to that desired state of
emancipation. It seems to me as a matter of rational judgement that transformation has some
sort  of  rightful  (evaluative)  priority  in  Spiritual  meta-theory,  the  edges  of  which  are
wonderfully mysterious. Perhaps too spiritual and epistemic “formation” emerges in a new
light as a result of mediating the vision into intelligibility and which thus emerges as “item”
into the descriptive (epistemic) past of society. Knowledge is dualistic: as product it is always
in the past and yet it looks to the future emergence of concepts and realities we want and
need.  Between  these  two  poles  of  knowledge  is  a  rather  under-described  process  of  the
transformative  present:  the  conceptual  and  traditional  absence  represented  here  is  an
adequately accounted ontology. The question of ontological realism is one that the human
sciences have generally shied from. Yet without it one asks, how can a dissertation exhibit
character as a personalised, appropriated, social product?
There is something in the internalisation of the questions we have to ask which is vocative,
inviting a response or an appropriation which also inspires and provokes a transformation.
Therefore  the  material  response  of  producing  this  dissertation  is  encased  by  a  more
existential, internal vocation in the form of an argument at various levels of consciousness,
noted  by  Schumpeter  above.  Working  with  knowledge  under  its  more  formal  title
“Epistemology”, transforms the scholar in the service of which, s/he hones his/her skills. The
originality  of  response  is  obviously  contextualised  and  limited  by  recursive  content  or
reproductions  of  knowledge  in  which  we  embed  or  imbricate  ourselves.  All  of  these
dimensions constrain and identify the zoned character of an academic interest.
As intimated, historical inspirations do not emerge purely from what one has read, but must
necessarily come from part of an intellectual (“trans-) formation” and empowerment of an
academic agenda. So what one reads here is hopefully part of a part-whole relationship, a
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Hegelian  “moment” in  an  intellectual  development  whose  whole  is  never  certain  or
determined or open to reduction. 
1.3 A personal agenda
A second point I wish to make is that former inspirations are not always positive experiences.
The  dialectical  nature  of  development  is  often  riddled  with  problematic  tensions,
disagreement,  oversight  and mistakes  and sometimes  a  constraining  inadequacy of  either
material or cognitive determinate absences, each of which need to be given some voice. How
then do I understand what I have said? Let me explain. Firstly, let me mention a life interest
in spirituality, variously ill-conceived attempts at monastic life and more lately a translated or
re-negotiated quest amongst the books and authors of academic Spirituality which is also an
academically contextualised but nevertheless “lived” spirituality and whose “second coming”
as Spirituality (much altered from its first (Lombaard 2013)) to the university, during the hey-
day of postmodernism, embroiled it in a “torrid affair” with epistemology and methodology.
Consequently  my Honours  paper  was  an  investigation  entitled  “On the  epistemology of
postmodern spirituality”, later published in altered form (Schreiber 2012). 
Among the more inspiring writers in the later postmodern period, Roland Benedikter (2007)
stood out as did the contributors to Berry & Wernick (1992), in particular their implicit claim
that postmodernism exhibited an ontological turn - a return to being. This signalled for them
evidence of a spiritual surge in philosophy and epistemology, not to mention the flourishing
of a more popular publications industry.  One of the authors mentioned by Benedikter,  of
whom I knew nothing, is Roy Bhaskar, the most prolific representative of the international
philosophical movement called “critical realism”. It is my investigation of this philosophy
which gives the present dissertation much of its material content. 
1.3.1 The inspiration of dissatisfaction
Not all inspirations are positive or can be defined exactly: niggles and absences often context
our progress. During the phase of research which characterised the Honours essays and this
dissertation, my affair with methodology left me with a profound dissatisfaction. For all that
has  been  written  by  the  most  profound  minds  to  inhabit  the  arenas  of  philosophy  and
epistemology in the last centuries, especially in the Kantian tradition, fail to clarify for me the
essence of a unified or workable methodology for the human sciences and (ergo) Spirituality.
As a  former philosophy student,  this  was an untenable situation.  Four issues  featured as
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dissatisfactory:  1.  The  gap  between  nomothetic  and  ideographic  methodologies,  whose
adoption  of  either  positivist  or  heuristic  stop-gap  solutions  to  methodological  problems
appeared  inadequately  conceptualised,  implying;  2.  a  lack  of  an  intelligible  account  of
knowledge, which put both interpretive hermeneutics and the interdisciplinary matrixes in a
perilous “linguistified  irrealism” (Bhaskar 2012:xxvi,171) ; 3. in this twilight who could
possibly take Spirituality seriously as a science, even when it continued to reproduce article
upon article (some indeed profound) on methodology?; 4. If then these doubts were to persist,
how could  the  spiritual  voice  be  applied?  The  failure  of  this  spiritual  voice  to  provide
concepts  apart  from (a) reified conceptions  of  faith, (b)  positivistic notions  of traditional
doctrine, and (c) theologically limited notions of “apophatic” negative discourse from the
mystical tradition, gave us little new to propose by way of ontology or critique.  Without this
ontology or critique not only is Spirituality denied dialectical power, but also is denied any
chance of deriving a truly spiritual emancipation (discernment) or mode of transformation for
modern people. The latter is a project which for me implied a critique of consciousness and
some level of engagement with naturalism, perhaps even posing some naturalistic theory of
spiritual  development.  Previously  I  had  felt  comfortable  with  something  like  an
anthropological frame for spiritual transformation, from an Aristotelian and later Thomistic
metaphysical  stance,  so  severely  and  successfully  critiqued  by  Kant  and  Hume  in  past
centuries. 
So  how  to  proceed  from  these  “hotch-potch”  clues,  emanating  from fields  of  disparate
disciplines such as biology, quantum mechanics, emergence theory, systems theory, positive
psychology and emotional intelligence, set against a pervasive phobia of naturalism   (Benton
2001) within the social and personal fields, including theology? 
1.3.2 The emancipative agenda: driving a hard bargain?
With these dissatisfactions in mind, I set about to “underlabour” (in the Lockean sense) for
remedy in the emancipation of academic Spirituality: its methodology, science and relational-
transcending-transformative impulse – an ambition which left me profoundly nervous, to say
the least. In rephrase of Heelas’ terminology (2012:3) the question which required an answer
is:  how to  offer  simplicity out  of  the  tortuous route of  past  epistemology? It  was rather
fortuitous then that I became aware of critical realism, since it had fastened onto these very
issues (dissatisfactions and absences) within philosophy as a whole, thus adding another level
of  inspiration  to  my  endeavour.  Little  did  I  know  that  the  work  of  Bhaskar  was  so
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sophisticated that it out-played any naive ambition of mine, extending beyond my wildest
conceptions for advancement of the personal project. This too made me uneasy. Although as I
have acknowledged, a certain recursive reproduction is implied in all reports on knowledge,
Bhaskar’s arrival knocked the wind out of my sails and I felt my academic voice ebbing into
a gasp for air. A mounting panic was exacerbated by a veritable proliferation of critical realist
literature which had to be engaged if I were to do justice to the field, all the while keeping on
a manageable track for a Master’s dissertation on Spirituality.  Three challenges presented
themselves: Firstly since critical realism is only coming to these shores rather late, a burden
of recursive presentation of critical realist literature had to take some priority, and the critical
or dialectical distance, so important in institutional expectations would have to take a lesser
place if the project were to remain manageable. The best I could do below was to point out
the  criticisms  and  disagreements  within  critical  realism itself,  and  then  only  in  cursory
fashion for space reasons. The originality of critique offered by this dissertation would then
have  to  be  deployed  from  critical  realist  perspective  and  insight,  targeting  implicitly
hegemonic  assumptions  in  the  Western  tradition  of  Spirituality.  This  I  could  live  with  -
however since critical realism develops into a philosophy of meta-reality or Spirituality, the
recursive  question  does  not  completely  disappear.  However  it  did  strike  me,  again
fortuitously, that the very critique of consciousness implied both in critical Spirituality and
critical realism was of great confluential benefit.
Secondly, although critical realism is a progressively international philosophical movement,
literature in the libraries of South African institutions of higher learning remain fairly under
represented and sometimes in short supply. This challenge luckily did not prove the hurdle it
might have, despite postal strikes in 2012 and 2013 which took some months to resolve. The
third consideration was implied by the first,  the problem of reception: how would a now
necessary riding on Bhaskar’s coat-tails, be usefully deployed in a purposeful contribution to
the Department of Christian Spirituality, Church History and Missiology, subsumed as it is
under  a  Calvinist  heritage  of  theological  Zeitgeist at  Unisa,  and  receive  sympathy?  The
question must be raised because critical realism does require of us to think in a new way,
which challenge then requires that we re-situate our conceptions of science, methodology and
Spirituality,  their  debates and dialectics,  from a new perspective without invoking further
tyranny.  There  is  then  the  risk  that  my  under-labouring  be  viewed  as  a  preposterous
impertinence.  Since  many  influences,  operative  under  the  level  of  consciousness,  have
produced a  split  epistemology,  not  just  dialectically  playful  but  indeed war-like  postures
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where  confirmed  positions  and  projected  pre-suppositions  have  produced  a  history  of
antimony  between  philosophy  (science)  and  theology  (spirituality)  which  are  not  easily
overcome, this constitutes a  problem of ideology. I resolved to meet the challenge with the
only internal  resources  at  hand:  not  too  much  humility  and  a  bit  of  bravery.  I  am also
convinced following the history of Spirituality and philosophy, that to reflect on Spirituality
in the contemporary sense means an inevitable engagement with the dialectic of philosophy
itself, and that it is only a matter of time before critical realism becomes a standard feature in
the problematic of research in our sub-continent. 
1.3.3 Epistemological hegemony: a many-layered thing
Historical and epistemic consciousness empowers a certain acknowledgement of constraints
and limitations which are operative at many layers in the production of knowledge, a state of
affairs  that  is  much targeted  in  critical  theory.  Thinking about  the  paradigmatic  facet  of
dissertation  writing,  though in  this  case  problems of  periodising  and other  questions  for
instance are much reduced, all sorts of pre-conscious, conscious pre-existing and pre-existing
pre-conscious agendas are operative (Schumpeter 1954), and their academic causality is only
occasionally  and  partially  mapped  by  reports  on  knowledge  et  cetera.  Addressing  the
problems of epistemology from a meta-critical stance is much needed, as a reading of Heelas
(2012) and Bailey (2001) indicates. The problem of recursively re-producing knowledge in
the hope of effecting a meaningful transformation of knowledge seems seldom to succeed. In
the academy growing acknowledgement and value for transformation features in the work of
epistemologists and learning theorists, in psychology and in political theory. One is reminded
that  the  idea  of  transformation  is  a  core  constitutional  and  legal  value  enacting  the
transformation of South African society. This is an episteme to which Spirituality has much to
offer.  However, the epistemological quagmire of mistrust which in post-structural mode has
so influenced the recent past of knowledge making, casts so severe a doubt on “knowing” that
authors are often at an impasse, uncertain where to ground their arguments. Sometimes we do
not appreciate our responsibility to respond to dialectic and the critique of consciousness
required. Likewise, any neat resolution to the limits of originality within the process of this
dissertation  is  not  easy.  What  this  dissertation  accommodates  is  partially an  introduction
between Bhaskar  and academic  Spirituality;  “partially”,  because  the  dissertation  also has
something to contribute to the conversation. It is therefore hoped that the novelty or emergent
importance of the content and subject matter itself enlivens engagement. 
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1.3.4. Philosophy and the problematic
Setting a problematic in the epistemological realm, as we do, requires that we embed our
small  parcel of concerns in the mediations of structures  which give epistemology certain
features, which are constantly changing. We are it seems to misshape enquiries, to suit an
established set of rules and interest. What are some of the symptoms? And does Bhaskar offer
a solution? If we have dirempted ontology, do the symptoms support the conclusion at the
practical  level  of  dissertation  writing?  Do our  heuristic  conventions  mask the  disease of
Bhaskar’s irrealism, thus diagnosed? 
1.3.4.1 Expanding personal “niggles” to philosophy and epistemology
Sharing a certain democratic value which holds as an ideal, that the profound thoughts of
academia should be made more approachable to the everyday world is problematic. The use
of  colloquialism,  expressly taboo and frowned on in  dissertation  guidebooks,  even when
speaking  of  profundities  has  a  certain  impact,  much  deflated  by  the  terminology  of
philosophy and academia in general.  Democratic values, some would say imply that the
language of academia should avail  itself  of easier reading. It  is  an ambition that I  share.
Regrettably however, complexity of terminology and language when engaging philosophy,
especially if that philosophy has epistemological consequence, cannot be avoided. 
Furthermore, the language of critical realism is profoundly difficult, since it comes from the
tradition of analytic philosophy. I feel there is little point in naively challenging an academic
discipline’s right to a lexicon of accumulated wisdom and the terminology in which it  is
encased nor  whose  presence  nevertheless  adds  a  characteristic  dimension  to  a  particular
intellectual  remit  and  whose  availability  in  the  interdisciplinary  matrix  may  allow  new
emergence of knowledge. 
1.3.4.2 Lexicons and epistemic complexity
Lexicons are, in my opinion somewhat existentially intransigent, even when they need not
essentially  be  so.  They  exhibit  a  personality  as  text:  there  is  always  something  real  to
interpret. One of the frustrations I have often felt is that the postmodern relativising of text
has left us little to make friends with, it has resulted in an ontological inadequacy: infecting
subjects, being and ultimately denying possibilities for transformation. In the interdisciplinary
matrix however lexicons meet.  Spirituality not only meets and uses terms from tradition,
sacred text, theology, mysticism and philosophy, but also from social theory, economics and
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even quantum mechanics, perhaps in more sophisticated fashion to critique modernism and
its hegemonic consciousness.
Spirituality is much engaged with fellow travellers. However, although my instinct is that a
condoned  interdisciplinary  matrix  might  have  added  impetus  to  a  terminological  cross-
pollination  amongst  academic  disciplines,  I  have  not  researched  the  phenomenon  and
therefore cannot come to any certainty on the matter. We can at this stage merely make note
of the trend in academia, journalism and social media. Two terms which are used a great deal
in  the  dissertation,  “emergence”  and  “cosmic  envelope”  bare  thinking  on:  “emergence”
generally refers to conceptual and ontological novelty and has an established presence in the
philosophical and scientific lexicon, although it has been theorised on differently at different
times. The “cosmic envelope” is less established, although similar notions appear amongst
philosophical theorists who contemplate the limits of big bang or creation and the problems
of thinking “nothingness” (Wilber 2000:444-449) beyond these limits. The term as it stands
might have roots in Eastern mysticism to conceptualise the inter-connectedness of all things,
nevertheless in the realm of Western philosophy, it seems to be original to Bhaskar (?). So
although  “cosmic  envelope”  brings  together  and  implies  the  philosophical  cosmological
thought and former metaphysical conceptions of “the great chain of being” or for that matter
Wilber’s great “holarchy” of being (Wilber 2000:16-21) for instance, the official acceptance
of the term “cosmic envelope” remains uncertain. However, it must be noted that it gains
popularity  amongst  world-wide-web  users,  and  thus  indicates  the  makings  of  a
democratically endorsed “resonance”. 
1.3.4.3 Word counting and being: a problem for method
Paradoxically,  the introjection of  suspended ontologies  into epistemology in post-Kantian
tradition,  has often inflated the academic ego-space where size and word numbers matter
more  because  “after  all”  some  would  say,  reproduction  is  “in”.  I  understand  increasing
specialisation amongst the academic disciplines often requires invention of jargon to describe
new concepts far  in  excess of academia’s  absorption rate.  To some extent  then scientific
progress, if one has an opinion of realism about such, transforms or displaces the priority of
the language-game. Whereas, if one is convinced of the existential intransitivity (realism) of
language games, scientific progress makes little sense: transformation of knowledge is pre-
closed. This is very much the insight which troubles Heelas (2012), Benedikter and Molz
(2012) for example. These opinions are opposed in their consequences for methodology and
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without a review of epistemic values produce an amount of frustration for thinkers at this
level.  For  instance,  when  we  speak  of  interdisciplinarity,  are  we  talking  about  a  real
possibility (Hense 2011:5-14) considering that on one hand progressive specialisation makes
the language less accessible across disciplinary boundaries, and on the other hand, the tacit
reduction of knowledge value to a language game presupposes that such a game bares no
rational grounds for interpretation at all? 
If  this  conundrum  poses  a  problem  for  methodology  within  the  human  sciences,  it  is
compounded  by  an  engagement  across  the  two-cultures  of  nomothetic  universals  and
idiographic singulars. Multi-specialisation no doubt makes it harder for individuals to keep
up  with  the  language  and  can  disempower  the  process.  Perhaps  in  the  still  emerging
multidisciplinary matrix we sometimes imply some encyclopaedic ability, but we often fail to
ask “to what level?” Often,  deeper questions about the terms and conditions which make
“interdisciplinarity” a valid option, are glossed over and surrendered to the market forces at
play in the selling of our “rules of thumb” and other heuristic wares. There is no alternative,
or so it seems. Academic writing perhaps can only participate in and add value to a human
resonance or trend which it in turn affords a deepened conceptual emergence. In order to
understand  more  about  the  process,  we  need  some  growing  account  of  where  and  how
methodological limitation is to be set,  in other words what conditions and limitations are
appropriate for the possibility of hermeneutic and interdisciplinary matrixes, hence require
development.  The  problem  of  methodological  limits  affects  not  only  the  institutional
guidelines for dissertation development, but the work of epistemology (science) itself in the
conducting of research. 
The zoning of my argument here, and providing ideological and philosophical context of my
inspiration (critique of consciousness), is to make manifest the triangulated problematic at the
disintegrated heart of postmodern epistemology and what Bhaskar throughout has referred to
as the “philosophical discourse of modernism” and “ideology of late capitalism”. That project
has secreted a particular “empirical realism” that tolerates no alternatives and has resulted in
ontological  monovalence:  a  flattening  and  squashing  of  beings  and
precluding/marginalising/nullifying any rational discourse on transformation without which
Spirituality, despite its most obvious appeal is not viable, unless we are content merely to be
game  players  and  epistemological  gamblers.  Spirituality  as  critic  can  enter/engage
with/interact with ever expanding field of targets.
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1.3.4.4 Appropriation of philosophy
I  think the above analysis  demonstrates an appropriation and understanding of epistemic,
philosophical and historical problems which should occupy one in an introductory section,
and  applied  here  to  an  introspection  of  dissertation  building  in  a  personal,  social,
institutionally obedient context, yet challenging them nonetheless. Moreover, if this particular
introduction be judged eccentric  insofar as it  does not  refer to  the usual presentations of
historicism we have all become used to, it is because the material of the dissertation resets
and expands those very questions. What is left for us to achieve then is, in summary form to
flesh  out  the  philosophical  context  by  presenting  a  particular  and  perhaps  eccentric
(dissertation limited) Bhaskarian view of the history of philosophy as it relates to the material
of the dissertation: transformation and the critique of our world. My intention thus far has
been to set up a philosophical resonance for the reception of the material to follow. 
1.4 The role of philosophy: “contexting” the problematic
If philosophy is about thinking, what makes it different from any other academic discipline?
What question does philosophy ask, that is special yet makes for the philosophical enterprise
in all sciences? How does such a question ground philosophy and justify philosophy to it-
self? It seems to me that what philosophy has asked consistently from the pre-Socratics on is;
“Under what conditions, necessary and sufficient, do phenomena, including intellectual ones,
arise?” It  is  a  question which can be asked of  anything,  lending philosophy a  pervasive
application  to  any science.  Examination  and identification  of  conditions  (causality)  is  of
course  the  nature  of  science  and  speaks  of  science’s  philosophical  inheritance.  It  also
indicates  the  philosophical  preoccupation  with  nature,  its  conditions,  elements,  atoms,
quantums and structures which exceed, but nevertheless began with Thales. However, when
philosophy  (notably  post-Socrates)  has  not  asked  about  the  nature  of  the  cosmos,  it
investigates the nature of Man, or in less sexist language our humanity, problems of existence
and our relationship with the cosmos. 
Traditionally philosophy of “metaphysics” (from Parmenides onwards) has begun with the
questions:  “Who  are  we?”  or  “What  are  our  origins?”:  “ontology”  and,  “What  can  we
expect?” or “How do we know?”; “epistemology” and, “What should be expected of us?”;
“ethics” and “What is our destiny?” or “teleology”. Essentially Plato’s conceptions consisted
in  a  form of  idealism (out  of  this  world),  in  which  the  conditions  of  man  were  highly
dichotomised. We should note that the term metaphysics is merely a term used to catalogue
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the works of Aristotle that had followed his Physics. The resonance distinctive of Aristotle’s
metaphysics in opposition to those of the Platonic or Parmenidean tradition, are encapsulated
by Gilson (1952:52) thus:
Aristotle  turned  away  from  Platonic  idealism  because  man’s  kingdom  is  a
kingdom of this world, and because above all else we need to know something
of the world in which our lot is cast. 
During the time of  the Christianisation of Rome’s  empire,  both Platonic and Aristotelian
traditions featured in Christian Philosophy as regional imbrications: (1) From Hellenism, at
the  inception  of  Pauline  theology;  (2)  the  neo-Platonic  categories  in  the  Alexandrian
catechists (McGinn 1991:23-61), so influential in the early Church councils (Davis 1990:33-
50,140-152); (3) the  writings of Augustine of Hippo (Portalié 1960:95-119) and Plotinus; (4)
the  transposition  of  this  philosophical  tradition  into  the  mystical  teachings  of  the
Cappadocian  fathers/mothers,  upon  which  the  Desert  (Spidlík  1986:55-150)  and  later
Medieval traditions were to find their monastic grounds (Healey 1990:137-163); (5) not to be
ignored,  Thomistic  neo-Aristotelianism  (O’Meara  1997:41-86);  (6)  the  latter  whose
continued influence in the Catholic tradition under the auspices of the Leonine Commission
presents  a  pre-Copernican  account  of  spirituality  in  Systematic  Theology,  which  is  still
evident today and (7) against which metaphysics yet whose scriptural target is unquestionably
pre-scientific, so much Bible exegesis finds its hermeneutical interests in post-critical theory
(philosophically)  and in  the postmodern academic context.  Gilson (1952:12)  continues  to
explain the shift from Plato to Aristotle during the medieval period thus:
Christians  turned  away  more  and  more  resolutely  from  Platonic  idealism
because the kingdom of God is not of this world, but because the world, on the
other hand is necessary as a starting-point from which to rise to the kingdom
of God.
Of course today we may laugh at such a conception, since the “reign of God” in no way
indicates a space other than that which we know, namely amongst us.
It should be noted that both traditions operated under Ptolemaic cosmological assumptions:
human  centrality  in  a  (flat)  world  which  had  a  fixed  place  in  the  universe.  All  was
hierarchically  structured  for  eternity.  We do  not  need  to  dwell  on  the  upheaval  that  the
Copernican revolution caused for Gallileo and the Church; however, what it implied was a
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scientific decentering which conceptually tumbled hierarchy and fixity and which took the
Christian world many centuries to acknowledge and forgive (if indeed it yet has). Insight
from critical realism suggests that philosophy has still not caught up with the full impact of
the Copernican revolution, especially on the position of humanity. The logic is simple: Since
Copernicus, we have scientifically noted a progressive decentering of the world, sun, galaxies
and indeed possibly universes from their former positions in the expanding Cosmos. It might
be noted that to describe this new reality, Wilber (2008) coins the term Kosmos. In line with
these cosmological insights, Bhaskar proposes that contemporary humanity ought to decentre
itself from its Descartean ego, its individualised place in society, and society’s place in the
eco-system, in other words: resign from conceptions of our-selves as dominant. This I think
parallels a reading of the ego-debunking “dying to self” metaphors in traditional mysticism.
It  is  easy  to  see  that  put  together,  new  conceptions  of  humanity’s  placement  in  the
philosophical  landscape  has  had  a  number  of  consequences  for  so-called  metaphysics,
especially for Bhaskar who claims (2008,1998): (1) we know nothing about an otherworldly
destiny and therefore questions of “teleology” (destiny) are abandoned for a more favoured
“axiology” (movement);  (2)  older  conceptions  of  metaphysical  privilege  or  priority  for
humanity are untenable and (3) “metaphysics” as a privileged philosophy of the “unseen
causes”  is  unjustified.  Consequently  metaphysics  is  resituated  amongst  the  philosophical
disciplines  as  a  necessary  but  equal  partner  in  philosophical  reflection  on  the  sciences.
Hopefully  also,  metaphysics  may  resign  its  position  as  hegemonic  underpinning  for
essentialist  and “physicalist”  dimensions  in  ecclesiology (the  maleness  of  priesthood,  for
instance), a point of critical confluence in post-patriarchal contemporary Spirituality. 
In summary, it may be argued then that from the beginning of the “enlightenment” period
onwards,  philosophy  of  science  should  have  consistently  moved  towards  decentred  and
descended  (Adorno  & Horkheimer  1944),  (non-reified  or  non-supra)  conceptions  of  the
world. Essentially it is critical realism’s claim that this has failed to be the case. It is this
explanation that forms a great deal of the philosophical discourse, material to the dissertation.
Fleshing out the philosophical background to the formation of this dissertation, firstly we
refer  to  the  fact  that  in  previous  research  (Schreiber  2012:1-8)  this  author  conducted  an
analysis of postmodernism whose partial critiques of modernism inspire the current interest in
critical realism. These together constitute the philosophical zone upon which a reflection and
critique of Spirituality literature are here located. To give greater conceptual clarity on how
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modernism and postmodernism relate in the philosophical discourse of modernism and which
Bhaskar (2002c:167-169) critiques, five phases of reaction and critique are each successively
set against the preceding phase: (1) The classical discourse of modernism (1640-1789); (2)
high  modernism  (1848-1917);  (3)  the  theory  and  practice  of  modernization  from  1945
onwards;  (4)  postmodernism from 1968 onwards  and (5)  Western  triumphalism after  the
collapse of the Soviet bloc. Cumulatively these phases constitute an ideology (consistent with
pre-modern premises) with hegemonic resonances and heteronymous effect2. 
Since Bhaskar’s periodisation is situated here within an introduction, a place where we not
only introduce ideas pertinent to the dissertation in the form of a rounded argument,  but
indulge ourselves in the problematic of historical and epistemic consciousness for their own
sake, we must note that dates do not make history or epistemology. Usually dates are used
roughly to convey a period (epoche) when certain things of significance to the argument
happened. Here Bhaskar’s dates are memorable and specific: the dates of factually occurring
revolutions or public disturbance large enough to be noticed and publicly recorded. This does
not mean that either Bhaskar or the reader should ignore the contexts and confluence of ideas
and forces which resulted in their ultimate enactment. Quite the contrary, these revolutions
are contextualised by a representation of history that is highly cognisant of historical realities
and  which  make  up  a  critique  of  philosophical  discourse  in  which  emancipation
(transformation) are expressly denied, but (partially) happen anyway: that is their socially
(need I say, historically) “real” and ontological point. 
Bhaskar (2002c:33) summarises the main features of modernism as: egocentricity, false and
abstract universality, incomplete totality, lack of reflexivity, judgemental-ism combined with
unilinearity, “formalism in those multiple senses and materialism”. Postmodernism, explained
as a partial and partaking (reaction to) modernism, promoted: epistemic relativity, pluralism
and  difference,  linguistic-ism,  ontological  irrealism  (life  as  a  pastiche),  judgemental
irrationalism, lack of totality (dualism and dichotomy), lack of a conception of emancipation,
a heightened (but un-sustained) sense of reflexivity, proximity of the politics of identity and
difference and traces of suppressed discourses, for instance on the emotions. The combined
failure  of  this  discourse  resulted  in  an  inability  to  account  for  ontological  realism,
2The  most  evident  examples  of  which  are  Lyotard’s  description  of  the  postmodern  condition  as  living  in
Dachau/Auschwitz and whose martyrdoms of Bonhoeffer and Weil et al. set the scene for a fuller appreciation
of the emancipative impulse in philosophy and spirituality.
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epistemological relativism and rational judgement, without which any talk of transformation
(including spirituality) has no basis. Critical realism is set against these flaws and lacunae, as
curative. 
1.4.1 Problematising spirituality and methodology
Having described the pertinence of philosophy and its contemporary problematic, it is now
necessary  to  describe  the  epistemological  consequential  framing  of  Spirituality  and  its
methodology  in  terms  that  further  the  dissertation.  For  this  reason  I  will  focus  rather
selectively for the purposes of the introduction, on spirituality as a loosely systematic, multi-
faceted  process  of  transformation,  implying  a  critique  of  consciousness.  So  too  for  the
moment I shall isolate the interdisciplinary matrix as its methodology, again bracketing for
the  same  reasons,  the  interpretive  tradition  (as  if  they  can  or  should  ever  be  treated
separately). The artificial and engineered presentation filled with holistic absences here, will
be remedied later. This remedy must be accomplished for two reasons: (1) the introduction
and  framing  of  the  problematic  is  an  institutionalised  requirement  as  part  to  a  whole
dissertation,  including  a  more  satisfactory  presentation  of  conceptual  totality,  and  (2)  if
consistent  and  valid  the  argument  presented  here  will  have  consequences  for  those
ontological and totality-oriented absences, here acknowledged. 
This  goes  some  way  in  acknowledging  that  the  totality  of  knowledge  is  always  either
temporarily  foreclosed  or  uncertain,  and  that  science  progresses  (including  humble
dissertations) towards a real totality which in itself may be advancing and expanding and is
merely reflected in our conditioned/layered system of interactive conditions for knowing. I
believe that such insight is incipient in the 1996 Gulbenkian Commission (Wallerstein 1996),
for  example.   Its  report  is  characterised  by a  deeply pervasive  historical  consciousness,
without  which  conditions  for  knowledge  must  remain  opaque  and  unavailable  to
epistemology (science).  It  appears  therefore,  that  historical  consciousness  itself  is  a  non-
reductive  condition  for  any philosophical  reflection  on  being  or  knowing3.  If  this  is  so,
continual progress (fear of planetary cataclysm aside) is theoretically possible. It therefore
follows  that  knowledge  presented  a-historically  without  acknowledgement  of  its  inherent
polity, cosmology and Weltanshauung is knowledge not worth having. 
3Also for the empowering of mysticism: See the philosophical development in Bonhoefer and Weil for instance
Astell (1994:1-18).
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More materially if the threat of total ecological collapse is to be avoided, the “sutured” (Finn
1992) presentations of knowledge (including theological ones), often hegemonically endorsed
but intimating closure have to be replaced by emancipative and “joined-up” models (Bhaskar
2010). If then a truly rational judgement is to be exercised, we require a philosophy which re-
vindicates ontology and accommodates epistemic relativity as part of the ontological totality.
In  the  light  of  this  belief  a  philosophically  grounded  academic  study of  Spirituality  and
critique of consciousness must be afforded its right of voice.
Furthermore it should be noted that since the rise of empiricism and positivism in the natural
sciences  under  the  ideology  of  modernism,  the  relationship  between  philosophy  and
spirituality has been fraught with suspicion and acrimony (Beattie 2007:76-113), and which
has often found us battling against illusions and shadows. If Sheldrake’s (2005b:38) question
“whose story is told?” has any relevance, we must admit that it is quite difficult to tell stories
about spirituality since the advent of Western Christianity without implicating the story of
Philosophy. 
1.5 Argumentative intentions
My more contemporary intention in this essay is to demonstrate how an understanding of
philosophy, including and after postmodernism can help us overcome some serious doubts
that although not often acknowledged and hence (sometimes unconsciously) approached with
a resigned apathy,  nevertheless pose a serious flaw for the methodological component  of
contemporary academic  Spirituality and which  ought  to  be  accounted  for  and addressed,
should Spirituality at this level accomplish its scientific and emancipative ambitions. These
flaws  are  epistemic  and  have  infected  the  world  of  epistemology  generally  and  whose
irresolution, have had the effect of blinding, constraining, oppressing and martyring.
1.5.1 Entering the fray on coat-tails
This dissertation underlabours by “fastening onto coat-tails”, “sailing under another’s flag”
and hopes to “reap where others have sewn”. However recursive reproduction of knowledge
is never sufficient in itself, if a somewhat original argument is to be presented.  I mention this
not  to  enforce  an academically normative  expectation,  but  to  point  out  that  a  personally
appropriated vision or inspiration is just that: an opportunity (under a pre-existing flag) to
have  one’s  say,  to  make  a  contribution,  however  humble  and  in  so  doing  impart  an
undeniably original “something”. This dissertation is no different. The “something” which is
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original  here  lies  in  our  underlabouring  for  spirituality  as  a  real  and empowering social
alternative.
Two related  complexities  of  un-clarity  related  to  science  in  our  time  stand out:  (1)  The
cleavage of science into two cultures of nomothetic universals and idiographic singulars, the
effect of which has seen an anti-naturalistic fearfulness amongst the interpretive tradition,
largely I suspect because the former has failed to account for the methodologies of the latter
out  of  an  ill-gotten  snobbery,  exacerbated  by;  (2)  postmodern  relativism  whose
deconstruction of history and the history of science suspended ontologies (scientific targets)
and failed to justify any possibility of rational judgement in the world of science generally,
but more particularly and in the face of which, despite the brilliance of Gadamer, Ricoeur and
the  like,  interpretive  theory failed  to  account  for  itself  in  coherent  terms:  the  failure  of
critique. For instance reading the plethora of authors on interpretive philosophy to have come
out  of  the  past  century, one  may  justifiably  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  strictly
interpretive moments of method are about the best way to proceed in “making friends with”
text. The value of making friends within the neo-Aristotelian tradition requires a reasonably
developed sense of what the world must be like, ontologically. The failure to provide a clear
account of ontology debilitates our theorising on emotional intelligence, rational judgement
and transformation, all of which are squashed and sundered under modernist epistemological
hegemony because  we lack  description  of  what  it  “is”  that  is  proposed as  having  these
interpretable  aspects:  very  little  can  ultimately  be  made  epistemologically,  without  a  re-
vindication of ontology. In postmodern suspension or absence of ontology theory makes any
confluence between philosophy and spirituality including obvious methodological concerns,
dubious.
The  upshot  has  been  a  narrowing  of  the  field  of  interpretations  to  traditional  text  and
individual accounts (regardless of their intentions) on the one hand, and on the other highly
unsatisfactory and positivistic phenomenological accounts and other sociological taxonomies,
between which little enough meaty (heuristic) glue is theorised. The only refuge from this
dichotomy has  been to  adopt  and tacitly justify the type of  Kantian categorical  idealism
(internal  reasons,  meanings  and  relations)  held  together  by  an  implausible  heurism  (in
empiricist terms of experience) which has hoped to cohere, the plurality of interests. In this
context  because  rational  judgement  is  suspended,  tragically  talk  of  transformation  is
unfounded. Without the possibility of rational transformation, the entire project of spirituality
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is a pipe-dream and our interdisciplinarity is a shallow affair, without a sincere critique of
epistemological consciousness.
1.5.2 Choosing representatives
To problematise Spirituality and place it within a workable and recognisable (pre-existing)
dialectic  or  dynamic  we  can  accept  a  distinction  (for  the  moment)  already  made  by
Schneiders (1989:678, cf. Kourie 2009:152) between: “theory” (i.e. “Spirituality”); and the
practice of spirituality as “lived experience ...  of  a fundamental dimension of the human
being” perhaps then to theorise their unity, contra the distinction in an exposition of agency.
The task now is to identify concepts that are in some way intrinsic to theory and practice
respectively. This is not to dismiss the other facets, aspects and dimensions of a discipline
that are equally intrinsically deep, operating in an open field and many-layered ontology of
humanity. Secondly both chosen concepts (the representatives of theory and practice) must be
in some way, reciprocal. The theoretical concept must be available to practice in some mode
and likewise, the practical term must be available to knowledge. Thirdly both of these terms
and  their  dialectical  positioning  must  enlighten  or  enliven  the  grander  concern  of  this
dissertation that is, to render a critique of consciousness.
For  the  practical  representative,  I  will  argue  for  transformation  and  for  the
theoretical/methodological,  one  could  choose either  interdisciplinarity or  hermeneutics. It
matters not much which of the latter we choose since they are both recognised and accepted
methodologies, both exhibit problematic elements and both are within the theoretical matrix
reciprocally  self-insinuating  in  each  other.  It  is  namely  difficult  to  think  of  an
interdisciplinary study that does not require interpretation or of a purely interpretive exercise
without an open mindedness to foreign insight. Nevertheless whatever the choices here, they
require  some  justification.  There  seems  to  be  some  agreement  in  the  literature  that
transformation from interdisciplinary perspective is an “intrinsic” value in the fields of theory
and  practice  of  Spirituality.  In  more  academic  speak  the  term is  already indicative  of  a
recognised  and  established  problematic  in  the  social  sciences  requiring  a  critique  of
consciousness, either in the personal or general deployment of the concept. To understand
what  is  being  achieved  in  posing  any  problematic,  the  philosophical  backdrop  and  the
literature to hand must account for the relevance of ontology,  agency and transformation in
contemporary debate with some epistemological fluency. In order to argue fluently we need
an analysis or narrative that embraces the epistemic complex (issues of history, philosophy
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and knowledge) which grounds our targeted problematic in a coherent way. Such attempted
coherence characterises the intention of critical realism.    
Obviously such philosophical reflection should be more than acquainted with (1) the advent
of critical theory (inter alia the Frankfurt school culminating in Habermas, Gadamer et al.);
(2) a knowledge of historical  consciousness (Sheldrake 2005:38-43; le Roux 1993:35-63;
Burns 2000:1-29;  and other significant  philosophers of history);  (3) the cultural/linguistic
turn  from Kant’s  categorical  idealism,  through  the  later  Wittgenstein,  Rorty  and  Taylor,
onwards. In other words, those ideas which support the pre-existence of culture and language
games, (4) post-structural thoughts from the post-Marxists characterised by awareness of the
deep  structures  of  knowledge  and society (Foucault,  and others  of  the  French school  of
Continental philosophy, et cetera. (5) the rise of paradigm/systems-talk (Kuhn [1962] 1996;
Luhlman  1982;  Kornai  1971;  Bhaskar  2002a,  [2002b]  2012,  2002c,  2010)  inclusive  of
critiques of Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Newton and Smith, and (6) familiarity
with  the  evolution  (emergence)  of  cross/multi/inter/intra/trans-disciplinary  methodology
(Wallerstein  1996;  Appelby  1969),  (7)  the  wider  trans-regional  context,  constituted  by
Western engagement in trans-Pacific philosophy and spirituality (i.a. Wilber 2005; Johnston
2000) in a geo-political scenario characterised by rapid technological globalisation, and (8)
the steady rise of naturalism and the social sciences. Hence my reference to earlier research
upon which insights this dissertation can progress without too much repetition.
1.5.3 A short argument for interdisciplinarity and transformation
Here I will present the required problematic in its shortest possible form by explicitly joining
up the philosophical as well as the more narrow epistemic dimensions in historical context.
Since  the  rise  of  historicism in  philosophy and  in  Biblical  studies  (ergo Spirituality)  is
concurrent  in  their  relative  research  fields  during the  late  nineteenth  and early twentieth
century’s (Waaijman 2006:54) and insofar as this historical consciousness, appropriated by
the  Gulbenkian  Commission  explicitly  endorses  interdisciplinarity,  this  interdisciplinary
endorsement being the traceable progeny of historical consciousness, Berling (2006:35-52) is
able to conclude that spirituality is inherently, “intrinsically” interdisciplinary. In short form,
the  case  for  my  choice  of  interdisciplinarity  as  intrinsic  to  the  epistemology  and
methodological  level  of  Spirituality  rests  upon  a  traceable  historical  development.  The
availability of interdisciplinarity as a personally appropriable attitude in the transformational
context of a multi-dimensional “whole life” therefore, is self evident. 
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The case for human transformation as a viable representative describing practical spirituality,
acknowledges the matrix of values and practice in the content of Spirituality literature insofar
as the moral, emotional and mystical development of the human subject is never absent of
metaphors of transformation. Without advancing upon an unnecessary detour, I think we can
make a general case (without discounting the complexities) that there is reasonable reference
in literature describing a movement from a less valued state, stage or realm, to a more perfect
one. Thus regardless of the variety of ascriptions whether: from “Sin to Grace”, “Beast to
God”, “Illusion to Enlightenment”, “Dark to Light”, “Separation to Union”, “Duality to Non-
duality” and “human to Human” or indeed the medical metaphor “Disease to Health” adopted
in the more secular Freudian tradition, an axiology of transformation is implied.
Even  as  I  have  contended,  the  Gulbenkian  Commission  opened  the  social  sciences  by
endorsing  interdisciplinary  co-operation  in  the  human  sciences  generally,  thereby
compounded the multiplication of theories of human being. The central problem shared by
naturalism, behaviourism, sociology, history, psychology and indeed Spirituality is a failure
to account for the phenomena of transformation coherently, namely ontologically. So in order
to  problematise  the  question  of  Spirituality  within  the  epistemic  matrix  of  the  human
sciences,  in  accordance  with  an  arguably consistent  literature  and constancy of  concerns
shared by practical spirituality, it is useful as far as I can see to accept that the content of
Spirituality  is  “about”  transformation,  in  a  progressing  epistemology of  that  term in  the
human sciences, which has in recent years sought transformation. I also suspect that placing
Spirituality  into  transformative  matrices  may  usefully  bridge  Hegelian  “shells”  or
phenomenologically taxonomic “surfaces” and the much desired grounding of “interiors”,
through a critique of consciousness.
1.5.4 Restating the problematic
However returning to the philosophical concerns above, these things cannot be achieved if
the two cultures of science remain at suspicious odds with each other, obeying schizoidal and
ambiguous conceptions of causal relations (“in nature” as opposed to “in human) as totally
unrelated  to  each  other,  voiding  ontology  (things-in-themselves),  avoiding  the  prickly
problem of epistemic relativity and thereby defeating the only basis of transformation which
relies on rational judgement, choices, beliefs, human agency and discernment (the Christian
critique of  consciousness,  par excellence).  The simple philosophical  problem restated for
Spirituality  here  follows  thus:  we  have  to  re-establish  ontology (the  reality  of  being)  to
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answer the question “what transforms?” The alternative relativist ontology would hold “There
is  nothing  to transform”.  We have  to  establish  the  place  of  epistemology to  answer  the
question:  “How  do  we  rationally  describe transformation  as  a  term?”  An  ungrounded
epistemology (“irrealism”  (Bhaskar  2012:xxvi,171))  would  hold  that:  “The  possibility  of
transformation is merely subjective and therefore talk of it is illicit.” We have to establish
rational judgement to answer the questions about what are the proper objects of our moral
choices and transformations, loves and attachments. Without an answer to these questions,
the intellect, will and moral choices have no real objects and remain in mental suspension.
Why is it important to overcome these taboos, dichotomies and riddles? The possibility of
interdisciplinary study must presuppose a matrix of human life, knowledge and choices as
existing in a set of relations perhaps similar to what Bhaskar (1998:25-43) terms the “social
cube”, that is: (1) material transactions with nature; (2) intra- and inter-personal relations; (3)
attitudes towards social structures and the choices we make in reproducing, producing and
transforming them and in addition, I would pose the option of abandoning or refusing them,
and (4) intra-subjective engagement with interior stratifications and structures of personality.
The reflexive aspect of spirituality, operating within these bounds, also requires a critique of
consciousness about these dimensions of human life. In excess of Bhaskar I would comment
that this  cube of relations implies a  fifth dimension:  accommodation or relationship with
unspeakable and unanswerable cosmologically total mystery. These relations then become for
us, real (however limited) objects of knowledge in the multi/inter-disciplinary matrix. They
also describe or pre-scribe the limited available field (as part of a potentially unlimited open
field), in which we act as real transformative agents in a real world. Underlying the argument
is an intuition that the dichotomy between theory and praxis no longer stands, since they
share similar (but stratified) objects and targets in all rational activity.  
1.5.5 Theory to practice: a demonstration from reality
How might such conceptions form a useful critique in the dialectic of Spirituality study? I
have often heard in the academy the claim that the job of the academic is not to make a
difference (usually meant as social activism): that what we do in our huddles of conversation
need not be expected to be applicable or practical to the “outside world” at all. Purely for the
demonstration of argument, I must confess the comment does feel empty and disparaging of
the scientific endeavour. Let us, for a moment of argument assume that this claim features as
a minor premise in some clever, anti-academic theory of transformation whose hegemony has
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by some mischance vastly infected our epistemology. Such a position may propose that social
activism is  the  only  way of  transformation  and that  “there  is  no  ideational  alternative”.
Consequently  human  and  social  ontology  is  conceived  of  as  monovalent  and  materially
unaffected by academia!
Immediately it might occur to the more reasonable stance, that while it may be impossible to
expect that we can substantively measure what difference it is that academics make, it cannot
be  argued  that  no difference  is  made.  Reason,  it  may be  proposed  must  object  to  such
statements on the basis of logic and a failure on our part to see the reflexive transformation or
spirituality in the “lectio scientia” of our practice. The moral lacuna, it may be held is that by
which we fail to reflect on how we might plant truly emancipative ideas in the soil of culture,
for  which  we  are  existentially  accountable.  To  paraphrase  Marx  (1876:29,  cf.  Bhaskar
1998:86), “the conditions for the flourishing of one are the conditions for the flourishing of
all”. Deprived of such a value some may ask, “What is the point of Spirituality’s place in
academia?” “Surely” they may go on, “even if our interest is theoretical our value driven
practice  is  a  real  praxis,  a  non-dual  merging  of  theory-praxis  in  the  everyday living  of
academics?” Some might even argue that it is untenable that the Spirituality researcher is
remote to the dialectics of spirituality in social context. It simply will not do for them, that
despite our failure to see the hidden transformations, conversions and personal empowerment
that emerge interiorly, even in recursive learning and insights of colloquia and so on, and as
products of knowledge, let alone the non-recursive transformation of such, that we cannot or
do not effect a difference. Furthermore to entertain the possibility of transformative absence
in our job of contemplating the world and its crises would leave us with nothing to say that is
not merely a restatement of pre-scientific and traditional explananda or of a certain epistemic
problematic then restated. 
If spirituality is to speak truth to epistemology and or to the powerful, it cannot shrink from
scientific  meta-critique  of  reductionist,  linguistic,  materialist  and  actualist  fantasies.  We
cannot  justify  a  hope  that  pre-scientific  theories  of  transcendence  will  deliver  us  into
something  like  a  contemporary  alethia,  somehow  saved-up  for  another  world.  To  thus
presume is to foreclose on science, academic Spirituality and the transformation of humanity
-  and  for  that  matter,  theology  (Stoeger  2009:345-349).  It  is  clear  then  that  in  this
hypothetical  debate  that  there  is  only  one  winner.  The  doubts  of  the  initial  protagonist
(“academics  do  make  a  difference”)  shadow  the  intentions  of  that  dominant  hegemony
(“academics cannot make a difference”) and do more to prove than dismantle it. 
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1.5.6 Critical powers
This hypothetical level of demonstration may well characterise the “cha-cha-cha-like” dance
so reminiscent  of  inter-theory debate  in  the  academy.  Certainly a  more  effective  way of
defeating the shadowy ideology, is a critique of consciousness deployed in two ways. Firstly
we may look for the inner inconsistency of the dominant theory, and from this chip away at
the rest  of the structured argument.  For instance,  we may demonstrate that  the dominant
argument (of social activism) poses an implication that it alone has the right ideology and the
only true options for transformation. That: (1) such an ideology does indeed (according to its
own  values)  so  transform,  and  since  (its)  ideology  transforms,  (2)  the  conditions  for
transformative ideology must imply the same possibilities for academia, which becomes self-
evident  (ipso-facto),  (3)  ergo  academia  transforms.  This  is  what  is  often  referred  to  as
“immanent critique”. 
The second way is to find within the dominant philosophy/ideology a failure to account for
transformation in its own theory. It is important to note that we merely have to establish one
such example where the theory fails  for its  claim (that  no other  alternative exists)  to  be
proven false:  a  method of critique similar to that  of Kuhn’s ([1962] 1996).  We can then
propose a superior argument (as Kuhn did) that transcends the dialectical tit-for-tat by way of
“transcendental  critique”.  Simple  use  of  immanent  and  transcendent  critiques  in
philosophically  traditional  mode,  demonstrates  the  usefulness  of  philosophy  for
contemporary  Spirituality  in  exposing  hidden  fallacies,  inconsistencies  and  foreclosures,
which left to their devices confuse and harm an epistemology of spiritual/noëtic progress and
ergo, Spirituality as academic discipline and spirituality as transformative praxis. 
1.5.7 Joining-up the problematic: philosophy, critique and hegemony
In critique then of a statement made commonly enough, one can bring about dissolution of
false ideas to which we are all  prone on logical and philosophical grounds.  Critique and
dialectic  have  rightful  roles  as  (and  in)  transformative  praxis  and  the  critique  of
consciousness required for the former. The critique used here has two features: on one hand it
exposes a hidden inconsistency in the belief that “I do not/cannot make a difference”, yet do
so with the very word I speak (the nature of discourse). The second is that if it were true,
“academics (discoverers of the new) do not make a difference” (as transformative agents), the
very possibility of new (scientific progress) and transformation (in agency) must be brought
into question for all claims. 
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Denial of these claims is to deny their possibility (falsely) in any part of the world and for all
others. The only fall-back is to be thrown into powerless language games, in which the reality
of spirituality cannot be conceived to arise. The greater pitfall however is the implication of
both fixity (things do not change, evolve or emerge) and irrealism (there is nothing to change,
evolve  or  emerge)  within  the  premise  and  the  shady epistemic  complexes  which  act  as
operative  principles  within  the  dominant  hegemony.  These  false  ideas  can  however  be
overcome if we argue on metaphysical grounds that things like emergence (of new things,
ideas and values) and transformation (towards these) are demonstrably real (a disposition of
realism). I suspect that in both theory and practice of spirituality, we have been fighting a
traditionally held but unconvincing battle against modernist hegemony by appealing to values
about the reified “Unseen”. In critical realism we might find the tools to do so on the same
level-headed ground upon which empirical realism thought it trod. If this is so, there is no
need for the nagging fear of either the Copernican revolution, nor of a “worlded” ground of
agency. Contrarily, a realisation that the individual as truly real, but not the value-centre of
society and that real human society is not the value-centre of ecology, as indeed the world is
not the value-centre of the Cosmos, might elicit celebration.
1.5.7 Facts, values and Hume’s law
A discernible ambivalence towards these philosophical commitments understandably persists
in  the  various  realms,  strata  or  open-field  of  the  academic  Spirituality  world.  Twentieth
century critique has rendered epistemology and methodologies somewhat nervous survivors
clinging  to  perceived  fail-safes,  only  lately  to  recognise  the  quicksand  at  their  base.
Fundamentally epistemology has failed to cohere for itself or for its practitioners, by failing
to relate the content of idiographic human sciences and nomothetic science. Without such a
coherent account of the major philosophical positions of the recent past – ontological realism,
epistemological relativism and rational judgement – has seemed unbridgeable and in the face
of their irresolution, many prefer the easier option (if dangling is easy) which is to cling to
articles of faith in a pre-scientific form only to find themselves having to justify and defend
convoluted distinctions between “rational” (modernist) modes of thought on the one hand and
either “supra-rational”, “above-rational”, “a-rational”, “non-rational” (including “irrational”)
modes  of  heurism,  on  the  other.   This  implies  (whether  as  I  suspect  or  not,  that  these
categories of non-discursive rationality have validity (Bhaskar 2012:37)), the “rational” in
theses modes is occluded. The endorsement of the implied dichotomy is actually a function
and generalisation of the fact-value distinction, held in the modernist hegemony as “Hume’s
43
law”  which  in  its  heteronymous  effect  separates  Descartian-empirical  “rationality”  from
evaluative  rationality,  thus  painting  both  faith  and  ethical  judgement  into  a  corner  of  a
modernist padded cell4. 
The partial liberation which Hume sought to prove: that an “is” does not necessarily presume
a metaphysical “ought” (true), has received a hegemonic generalisation interpreted such that
“is” cannot ever presume an “ought” (false).  The value of justice is an especially pertinent
case in proving the opposite: justice is a rational judgement (even though evaluative and its
social consequences relative) because, although it may be held that not every “is” implies an
“ought”, not all “is’s” prohibit an “ought” - therefore Hume’s law as a law fails. This might
constitute  a  subtle  but  not  a-rational,  non-rational,  supra-rational,  above-rational  nor
irrational, but a rational distinction! Let me demonstrate. If A does not imply B, must it mean
that all A’s must not imply B’s? The inverse corollary, all A’s infer B’s used by the normative
fundamentalists, is that all A’s (majorities) are normative for all B’s (minorities). Oh the wily
ways of power in reducing all B’s to A’s and otherness to likeness fits a wonderful excuse for
us not to tolerate the oughts in “others”, for some! 
1.6 Getting real: reflections on a world-located spirituality
To continue in this vain is my personal quest, by motivating for a philosophical intervention
that understands its ideological commitment to transformation as philosophical, moral and
spiritual, acknowledging that what we need and want is an emancipative spiritual meta-theory
that  speaks  of  transformation  in  a  way  that  affirms  being  and  agency  in  our  secular
“worldedness”, even if our thoughts about such a world be post-secular and therefore are
embedded in postmodern context.
From what premises might such be built? A tradition exists amongst Western metaphysical
thinkers (medieval debates between Dominicans and Franciscans aside) that spirituality exists
necessarily as part of the  intellectus.  Writing contemporaneously it seems to me that in the
phylogenesis and ontogenesis of spirituality (again post-Habermasian doubts about how one
fits the other included (Wilber 1995:153-157)) is based on a post-Hegelian tradition inclusive
of  Freud,  Adler  and  Marx:  that  reflexive  spirituality’s  emergence  coincides  with  an
4Is  not  the  operative  modernist  unconscious  (value-fact  distinction)  assumed  to  be  law,  and  despite  the
intellectual opposition to modernism, evident in Lombaard (2013:2-3)? 
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intellection about our contingency/agency and the limits to power of the human person within
the  cosmos  as  we  understand  it,  explaining  the  trauma  felt  by traditional  institutions  of
spirituality in the face of cosmological revolutions and the like. 
New cosmologies engender philosophical positions which reset the conceptual life or matrix
in which we come to new self-understanding, and in the light of which truths it is possible to
review or  recoup  the  earlier  analysis  of:  material  transactions  with  nature,  interpersonal
relations, attitudes towards social structures and the choices we might make in reproducing,
transforming and/or abandoning them, interior stratifications and structures of personality and
beyond these (in excess of Bhaskar), accommodation or relationship with unspeakable and
unanswerable  mystery.  All  in  all,  what  is  implied  is  a  philosophically  anthropogenic
conception of Spirituality. What is therefore proposed is a re-contextualising of relationality
and the use of power within our manifold complexity of relations, in order to understand how
transformation  is  then  best  conceived.  I  think  for  this  reason  alone  contemplation  on
epistemology is necessary for academic Spirituality at least and for which sake pre-scientific
answers will not necessarily suffice. If as Bhaskar (1998:45) claims the history of philosophy
since  modernism  is  still  trying  to  accommodate  the  consequences  of  the  Copernican
revolution,  resolution  thereof  is  ideologically  pertinent  to  the  corrective/moral  and
transformational intuitions within a truly contemporary Spirituality as science or meta-theory
(programmatic discovery of the new) which must, in my view support a concomitant practical
mysticism.
1.6.1 What next? 
The emergence of the new and radically post-Copernican “worlded” spirituality (perhaps now
absent or shady), must logically be the condition under which spirituality has both a past and
future, and in the academy at least this requires a philosophical commitment as a part of a
necessary critique of consciousness. Spirituality in part a philosophy of transformation, then
should  be  in  a  position  to  contemplate  its  own hegemonies  and implied  heteronomy by
engaging the world of ideas and practices beyond a narrow conception of its remit, thereby
dialectically involving itself in the absenting of sins, ills, mistakes and oversights.
Postmodernism as an ideology of late capitalism has proposed the suspension of morality,
replacing it with confused scepticism bordering on cynicism. The tyrannies of capitalism and
Soviet-Marxist materialism which, in turn hosted and colluded with nationalist dictators to
effect cultural ruin and spiritual devastation amongst the geo-political labour force, left the
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twentieth century with a world society where few could be friends in any real sense: trust was
systematically  mistrusted.  In  the  postmodern  discourse  true  emancipation  (as  holistic,
sustained and reflexive) was reduced to the politics of the revolutionaries, thus completing
what their dialectical enemies had begun. Whilst societies floundered in the maelstrom of
constraint  and alienation,  ideologues  (including philosophers)  busied  themselves  as  usual
either on their speeches and deals for war or amongst the catacombs of knowledge, poring
over their hermeneutics of suspicion, sponsored by a traceable neoliberal political, economic
(replete  with  capitalist  transformation models,  to  sell  it)  sociological  agenda (Wallerstein
1996:33-69):  a  tale  of  woe,  incomplete  against  more  ecological  fears.  Such  narcissistic
emptying achieved devastation of human and spiritual resources5 in the face of which, we
have  had  little  choice  but  to  run  for  the  interior  ghetto  of  individualism and  fear-based
communalism (Bhaskar  2002c:176),  reified notions  of transcendence and magical  realism
(Lombaard 2013:1) to reproduce a recursive absence of goodness. 
I think a valuable lesson from the history of philosophy from the so-called “enlightenment”
on, is how skewed and oppressive it has been and how it must extricate it-self from modernist
geo-political  heteronomy  thus  imposed  (Lyotard  1984:xxi,  1992:78,  cf.  Astell  1994:2).
Postmodernism completes  its  predecessor  by  bringing  a  profound  warning  to  some  and
irrealist stupor to others, but no resolution. 
In some areas principle postmodern thinkers are being reformulated as the contributors to
Joseph & Roberts (2004:199-297) suggest. Much conversation in the multidisciplinary array
is testament to interest in such analysis. The historical reality, from which this dissertation
takes its trajectory are those postmodern events, elements and themes often described in their
contribution to twentieth century epistemic consciousness without claiming a final word on a
work in progress or making a final assessment of postmodernism. However I think it valuable
as Bhaskar has done to see postmodernism as a part of the modernist whole. Thus I believe it
worthy  that  this  dissertation  deploys  philosophy,  meta-theory  and  Spirituality  in  an
emancipative dialectic, constellating around a (for want of more adequate terms) postmodern
5In South Africa, as I write, the scourge of ubiquitous rape and vast under-education are hot topics. Education
and Law reform are often offered as the silver bullet, but no one speaks about source values in the home-life: the
lack of male role models, except to converse on the empowerment of traditional tribal patriarchy in absence of
the equally tribal matriarchal balances!
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critique of consciousness. It implies thinking anew, creating a new cartography of knowledge,
assisted by tools and critiques available from interdisciplinary matrices. 
Philosophically  speaking  interdisciplinary  epistemology  is  specifically  the  context  from
which the expectation of the new (theory and practice) is here deployed (Hense 2011:5-14).
From the context of Spirituality conversation the expectation could be said to be available to
Sheldrake’s  (2005:42)  paraphrase  “whose  narrative  is  told?”  Sadly  the  latter  too  easily
connotes  an  ironic  or  competitive  expectation.  Perhaps  of  some  promise  in  Sheldrake’s
question is the centrality of the subject? 
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Chapter Two:  Postmodernism,  the  philosophy  of  science  and  critical  realism:  the
critical heritage
Introduction
This dissertation presents the philosophy of critical realism and meta-reality, a philosophy of
liberation  from  the  many  dichotomies,  fallacies  and  lacunae  of  accepted  orthodox
conceptions  which  have  bound  our  traditional  thoughts  about  being  and  knowing  to  a
coercive hegemony of categorical errors and obfuscations, the effect of which is to produce a
society and realm of knowledge of heteronymous powerlessness and untruth: a generalised
mis-identity of self  into irrealism.  The axiology of spiritual  and conceptual emancipation
requires  that  we  analyse,  critique  and  re-explain  being away  from  false  consciousness,
through critical realist critique of Western consciousness, to re-identity with Reality that is
truly  enchanted,  connected  and  emancipative  for  the  free  flourishing  of  all.  This  short
description of the architecture of conceptual development in Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy also
describes in the main that of the dissertation presented here. 
2.1 A point of confluence – context
I stated in the introductory section that my previous research into postmodernism provided a
confluence  of  interest  with  critical  realism.  It  is  also a  many-pointed  confluence  for  the
values-driven discipline of academic Spirituality, its methodologies and various critical and
theoretical commitments. Postmodern critique provides context to both a personal academic
programme and this dissertation’s introduction of Bhaskar’s critical realism. These intentions
thus run in a developmental confluence which clears the way for us to examine the issue of
secular  spirituality,  its  critiques  of  religion,  society  and  epistemology.  The  postmodern
critique of modernism mostly familiar to the academy is expanded by critical realism and
forms the central theme here. The common philosophical and Spirituality interests become
obvious as development proceeds. To begin from this context I present a redaction of Roy
Bhaskar’s  summation of  postmodernism as  a  part-whole relationship  within and partially
critical of the many fallacies in the “philosophical discourse of modernism, which he often
has abbreviated to  “PDM”’ (Bhaskar 2002a:167-180):
1. The  classical  philosophical  discourse  of  modernism evidenced in  the
writings of the philosophers of the so-called Enlightenment, was initiated in the
Zeitgeist  of  British  (1640-1660)  and  French  (1789)  bourgeois  revolutions:
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philosophically the period awakened (for Bhaskar), the liberty of egocentricity,
expressed  by  Descartes’  cogito  ergo  sum set  against  a  false  abstracted
universality of others. “Indeed the whole PDM is constituted by the couple of
an ego, be it individual or a group, class, gender, nation state (or some complex
of  these)  objectively  set  against  a  manifold,  described  in  actualistically
universal  terms,  which  is  the  object  of  that  ego’s  action  (manipulation  and
exploitation). This ego (itself purely illusory) is thus set against its (or at least
an) other – but the categories in which the ego and its other are apprehended are
both then so separated and qualitatively differentiated and opposed as to make
the  very  universality  presupposed  by the  discourse  impossible  to  maintain”
(Bhaskar 2002a:168). As a point of contrast from the non-/pre-modern, classical
modernism sets  itself  against  its  contrasting  other  whose  existence  it  must
tacitly presuppose and include (in an exploitation of that same other) below the
level  of  consciousness.  The  partial  critique  of  this  false  and  abstract,  self-
refuting stance, is sustained in the next phase.
2. High  modernism  with  its  hey-day  situated  between  the  age  of
revolutions of 1848 and 1917, reached its zenith in Marx who exposed the lack
of reflexivity, incomplete totality (dualism) in the (for Bhaskar, the emerging
conception of) of 1, above. However, that the intellectuals and critics of the time
did not represent the victims of the ideology produced a discourse of the period
that is characteristically elitist and patronising:  “speaking for the other”.
3. The theory and practice of modernisation after 1945, the Second World
War and 1947, “the symbolically and practically significant decolonization and
partition of India” (Bhaskar 2002a:167-171). “The theorists and practitioners of
modernism  [Westerners  talking  about  Easterners,  including  Africans]  were
concerned to bring up (or down) to their level ... that non- or pre-modern part of
humanity”.  Thus,  under  colonialism  assumptions  of  unilinearity and
judgementalism  abounded.  In  the  internalisation  of  politically  engineered
master-slave relationships, emotions and “higher” or “ground state” selves were
enslaved  by  a  “masculinized”  psychic  master.6
6It  should be noted here  my suspicion that  Bhaskar’s  2002a is  an ironic  twist  of  the abovementioned ‘West  to  East’
movement of modernist social and other engineering. If so, the book also signals  reclamation of the spiritual values (as
‘Eastern’) and a siding-with (in solidarity) with the marginalised (spiritual) self against the dualisms and incomplete totalities
of modernist (Western) hegemony. 
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4.     Postmodernism,  beginning  with  the  revolutionary  upsurges  of  19687,
continued the  Zeitgeist  of disenchantment emerging in phases 2 and 3 above.
Bhaskar  (2002a:171)  mentions  the  themes  of  Nietzsche’s  “death  of  God”,
Weber’s “rationalisation”, the post-structural “end of man” (Foucault), the “end
of history” (Lyotard), and the “end of meaning” (Derrida). “Unfortunately in the
very accentuation in this phase of a new politics of identity and difference [the
politics of feminism, black consciousness and the gay movement, sometimes
characterized in a selfish un-generalized liberation], the interconnectedness and
unity of humanity and indeed [all] living forms was lost. What was missing here
was  any  conception  of  a  dialectical  totality,  with  the  crucial  concepts  of
dialectical universality and concrete singularity absent”. Consequently humans
were described in formalist and functionalist (behaviourist) terms deployed in a
plastic nature, open to a purely instrumentalist mode of reasoning along with its
reductionist  and  mechanistic  materialism  which  exiled  intention, and  the
spiritual values, processes and flourishing of humanity.
5. Western (mostly American bourgeois) triumphalism in the wake of the
collapse  of  the  Soviet  bloc,  1989-1991,  constitutes  the  fifth  phase.  Bhaskar
(2002a:171) suggests that Fukuyama’s  The End of history and the Last Man
(1989) epitomizes the development of modernism with its unconscious intention
to derail ontology and human freedom. 
 
We  will  return  to  the  hegemonic  effects  of  the  latter  phase  in  the  development  of  this
dissertation.
Bhaskar (2002a:33) summarises the main features of modernism as displaying: egocentricity,
false and abstract universality, incomplete totality (description of reality), lack of reflexivity,
judgementalism  combined  with  unilinearity,  formalism  in  those  multiple  senses  and
materialism.  Postmodernism as  partial  and  partaking  (reaction  to)  modernism,  including
epistemic  relativity,  pluralism  and  difference,  linguistic-ism,  ontological  irrealism
judgemental irrationalism, a lack of totality (dualism and dichotomy), lack of a conception of
emancipation, a heightened (but un-sustained) sense of reflexivity, proximity of the politics of
7 Allen (2002:107) notes the profound effect 1968 had on ex-Pope Benedict XVI's conservatism.
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identity and difference and traces of suppressed discourses, on the emotions. However he is
not alone in his interpretation of something programmatic in modernism. Astell (1994), Nolan
(2006) and numerous academic authors allude to its shortcomings, if not to its hegemonic
effect. I am aware that Nolan is particularly drawn to discerning the “signs of the times”, a
deeply  held  gospel  value.  There  is  then  a  mutual  interest  in  this  sort  of  Marxian
deconstruction. Whether or not the same inspiration is acknowledged in academic authors of
Spirituality  generally,  for  instance  Beatty  (2007)  and  considering  the  fear  Marxian
connotations sometime engender8, the value of critique in academic Spirituality is a complex
one which  needs  some investigation.  Although not  all  authors  are  liberation  theologians,
obviously the emancipative inspiration deployed as critique (whether as a deconstruction of
inconsistent targets of immanent critique or as moral-philosophical transcendent critique or in
combination) is an important theme which provides a confluence for Spirituality literature
and critical realism. 
Although  fair  warning  in  Schneiders,  (2009,  1989:689,  cf.  Kourie  2009:157)  against
normative generalisations and prescriptions inherited from Christian moral theology which
cannot serve the comparative and interdisciplinary agenda is taken seriously here, we cannot
in arguing for a confluence of critique afford to overlook the moral and ethical dimension
within Spirituality. Within biblical context for instance, a prophetic mandate to criticise abuse
of power in the name of YHWH who is primarily the emergent God of the marginalised and
dispossessed, is traceable and commonly accepted after the profound reflection of liberation
theologians like Nolan (1976). Since I am not a Bible scholar, I am not going to claim more
than  this.  Furthermore  I  cannot  claim  for  a  similar  theme  in  other  religious  scriptures
although scholars of comparative religion might, namely for similar writings amongst other
religious  traditions.  However  I  can  most  certainly  claim  that  a  point  of  sometime
uncomfortable confluence exists between this biblical value of “liberation”, the Aristotelian
idea  of  “flourishing”, Marx,  and  the  critique  of  consciousness  in  Buddhist  thought,  for
instance. The critique of power is therefore “confluential” most notably in the epistemology
of the last centuries and the rise of humanism. Elsewhere, Kourie (2009:152-153) says: “One
of  the  reasons  for  increased  interest  in  spirituality  is  undoubtedly  postmodernism.”  This
author’s  reflection  on  the  hegemonic  effect  notes:  “a  clear  process  of  secularisation”  in
8Remember “Die rooi gevaar”? The term is translated as “the Red threat”, used in the geopolitics of the Cold
War era  also used by the Apartheid South Africans to denote enemies of the state. 
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reaction to, “fanatical intolerance among some religious groups who are totally committed to
an  ideology”,  “autocratic  systems  of  religious  governance”,  “treatment  of  women”  and
“hierarchical … elitism”, whose combined effect ignored “purely humanitarian feeling and
ethical behaviour” are ignored” (d) “autocratic systems of religious governance”. As a result,
she notes “true spirituality may be the way forward for these contemporary women and men
who espouse a ‘secular spirituality’ ”. 
I am inclined now to reflect that following Bhaskar’s programmatic suspicions and Kourie's
point above, on some social phenomena pertinent to South Africa. On 14 th February, 2013,
President  Jacob Zuma presented  his  “State  of  the Nation” address to  parliament  and the
country. It is based on a policy document better known as “The national development plan”,
the premise of which is dependent on the role of education. Important though educational
development might be one may be inclined to ask if this focus is not a convenient way of not
focusing on the more basic values or relational issues in the family which either scupper or
empower  the  family/cultural  value  of  education.  The  inculcation  of  education-friendly,
humanitarian  values  in  families  including  freedom from abuse,  must  surely take  priority
(hardly  mentioned  in  political  discourse)  before  one  can  usefully  take  advantage  of
institutional structures and provisions (very popular in political discourse)? I can only adduce
from the obvious (parenthesised) dichotomy that we prefer to throw money at a problem,
where a more difficult value choice and appropriation of those values requiring no monetary
input, is somehow dismissed. I would further suggest that this state of affairs is symptomatic
of  our  penchant  for  speaking  from positions  of  power  and  positivistic  styled  (including
religious) discourse in which the discourse of the powerless is marginalised. At another level,
I  am  aware  of  corporate  healthcare  workers  who  question  the  validity  of  corporations
routinely  providing  “employee  wellness  programmes”  which  offer  counselling  on  any
number of adjustment matters, including relocations. A laudable development, but these same
wellness  workers  seem  to  harbour  serious  doubts  about  a  ubiquitous  superficial  molly-
coddling  culture  which  may  ultimately  dis-empower  persons’ inner  resources,  emotional
intelligence  and  resilience9 when  those  same corporates  routinely retrench  workers. It  is
perhaps  wise  to  reflect  that  superficial  piecemeal  signs  of  political  improvement  and
9The  questions  and  concerns  raised  are  contextualised  in a  series  (2012-2013)  of  informal  reportage  and
discussions in cars and in private and not in any interviews of a solicited kind, and unintended for research
purposes.
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transformation are  not  always  the  curatives  they  promise.  As  part  of  the  same  National
Development  Plan various  financial  targets  are  set  as  though these  were  the  key to  our
national flourishing. Again,  although job creation can go a long way a significant debate
around the actual  model  of economy best  suited for “upliftment” of the poor is  omitted,
without  which the same cycle of greed and inequity is  sure to continue.  Are we then to
discern as many do a programmatic disempowerment below the level of consciousness? I
think analysis would suggest its likelihood.  
To continue making the argument for confluence and the role of critique from a completely
different tack yet part of a (philosophical-anthropological) Spiritual analysis in the university
and critical realist philosophy, let us begin with a famous example from the philosophy of
science.
2.1.2 Falsifyability in philosophy of science
Thomas  Kuhn needs  no introduction:  his  1962  The Structure of  Scientific  Revolutions is
probably the most quoted and acknowledged work on the philosophy of science to come out
of the twentieth century. Purely for the sake of summary: his achievement was to place the
philosophy of science as discontinuous or at odds with its own history. Kuhn demonstrated to
great effect that a positive and uninterrupted progress of science, presumed by positivism,
was blatantly false. His study showed that the history of science exhibits periods of stability
and revolution, wherein the latter science undoes pre-existing theory. Along with Feyerband,
Popper and Hemple, he brought to prominence the role of “falsifyability” in the development
of science. In excess of Popper and Hemple (who remained committed empiricists), Kuhn
showed how science agendas resulted from the macro (finance and the politico-scientific
community) and micro (the methodologically designed result of macro) social influences. To
describe  these  influences  he  adopted  the  term  “paradigm” which  came  to  represent  a
postmodern  resonance  acknowledging  the  influence  of  the  socially  constructed  nature  of
scientific discourse,  the target of postmodern critique.  Over his career and in response to
much criticism, Kuhn refined his theory of the macro elements and eventually abandoned the
now famous paradigm for “disciplinary matrix” (Kuhn 1996).
2.1.3 Postmodern scientific incommensurability
In  conjunction  with  Feyerband,  Bhaskar  (2002a)  notes  that  Kuhn  proposed  there  was
essentially no reason to assume a preference for one socially constructed theoretical set over
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another.  The notion of “incommensurability” between theories became the lynchpin upon
which  postmodern  relativity  and  anti-positivism  gained  the  status  of  new  orthodoxy.
Evidence  of  social  construct  in  science  cast  serious  doubt  on  the  post-Humean tradition
exemplified in the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, whose conception of scientific
laws relied on an observable, experiential conjunction of recurring, experimental events. In
this  introduction to  the philosophical  scene of  the  late  twentieth century,  we can  for  the
moment dispense with the critical boon postmodernism and the hermeneutical anti-positivists
made of Kuhn’s work.
2.1.4 Postmodern epistemology: a summary
As López and Potter (2001:4-6) contend, “… postmodernism’s most radical propositions no
longer, seem outrageous.” These authors note: postmodernism’s “discovery” of (1) “social
determinants  of  knowledge”,  (2)  “the  irreducible  complexity  of  natural  and  social
phenomena”,  (3)  “loss  of  hegemonic  meanings”,  (4)  an  enthronement  of  “irony  and
ambiguity” in language – all of which gained purchase across the fields of epistemology,
including  literature  and  social  criticism,  philosophy,  politics,  sociology,  psychology  and
anthropology. It has to be said too that the influence of plural relativism (for Wilber 2000:
745-49, a sign of progress) found its way beyond the constraints of the academy and into the
everyday  lives  of  media  and  society,  often  producing  a  ludicrous  and  contradictory
“rightness”  to  anyone’s   and  everyone’s  opinion.  More  telling  for  me  is  that  strong
conceptions of the boundaries which exist between so-called epistemology and lay worlds of
knowledge, as Mouton (2011:137) would have it, demonstrably failed and often continue to
do  so  especially  in  the  light  of  an  emerging  conception  of  reality  as  an  open-ended,
irreducible  complexity or  stratification  which  is  reflected  in  the  many-layered  worlds  of
knowledge. 
The exploration of Kuhn is purposeful not only to highlight his importance for postmodern
relativism which when conjoined in the linguistic turn from Kant to the later Wittgenstein and
then  to  Rorty  (1983)  and  which  radicalised  the  Kantian  tradition,  but  also  to  note  that
postmodernism and  critical  realism participate  in  a  profound  critique  of  the  history  and
philosophy of science (Archer 1998:x-xii; López & Potter 2001:1-21). It is a critique that has
evidently not escaped academics in the field of Spirituality (Kourie, 2009:165). Apart from
this  similarity  in  critical  realism  and  postmodernism  and  the  value  of  social  influence
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(“construct”) in science noted in both movements,  the two philosophies (as ideologies of
science) however swiftly part company. 
2.1.5. The attitude of critical realism
Critical realism as the name would suggest, favours any number of commitments to scientific
realism (cf. Brock & Mares 2007; Groff 2008; Joseph & Roberts 2004), otherwise an attitude
of  confidence  in  the  intelligibility  of  science.  Far  in  excess  of  postmodern  critique  for
instance Bhaskar’s ) A Realist Theory of Science, building on the work of his tutors Harré and
Valera, is probably the most comprehensive critique of post-Humean conceptions of causality
which the philosopher claims “presupposes an ontology of empirical realism, whereby the
world consists of experience and atomistic events constantly conjoined” (Bhaskar 2008:221-
222), and as Hartwig (Bhaskar 2008:xiv) says, “hence [an ontology] of closed systems and
undifferentiated  depthlessness,  a  view underpinned  by an  atomistic  model  of  the  human
subject  as  a  passive  spectator  of  given  phenomena…”.  The  results  of  this  produced  a
“squashing” of anyone and everything that is not like me and an alienation of both interiority
and otherness - the philosophical “sin” inherited from Parmenides. 
2.1.6 Preliminary comments on management
Some preliminary comments about how I propose to manage the present investigation have to
be made before we go on to the development of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. I should
comment that for management purposes this dissertation is not intended to be a complete
exposition  of  current  philosophy  of  natural  science.  However  it  is  necessary  for  the
dissertation to present the major conceptual framework presented in transcendental realism
(Bhaskar 2008) as encasing his later development, in order to follow more closely Bhaskar’s
(1998) social theory and to further the argument of confluence. Consequently what Bhaskar’s
A Realist Theory of Science (2008) most contributes, apart from the critique of the tradition,
is in Chapter 3 an analysis of the practice of science and engineering which is far in excess of
others’ (Anscombe & Von Wright’s 1950’s work on Wittgenstein, for instance) and for which
Bhaskar might receive most acclaim (this is not presented in any great detail here). However
a limited exploration of Bhaskar’s first publication (1975) refined in its third and developed
edition  (2008),  will  help  an  understanding  of  how  this  philosopher  lays  down  the
foundational concepts upon which his (and this) entire project rests and that, following there-
from a  methodological  basis  for  the  human  sciences,  is  established.  As  such  Bhaskar’s
philosophy and  that  of  this  dissertation  have  important  things  to  say regarding  his  later
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exposition  on  the  human  sciences  and  the  proposal  for  mitigated,  critical,  non-positivist
naturalism.  This  then  culminates  in  his  theory  of  explanatory  techniques  which  has
philosophical  consequences  for  methodology  in  general  and  across
epistemological/ideological/meta-critical fields of interest.
Choosing to manage the proliferation of critical realist literature in this way seems obvious
since in general institutional terms, operating from within the Humanities this dissertation
should  pay  more  attention  to  the  latter  analysis  and  critiques  of  social  science.  It  is
furthermore obvious that such should be the case for there exists an internal, natural affinity
between social theory, philosophy and Spirituality, beyond purely methodological concerns:
the subject matter of these three disciplines often targets individuals and their relations with
groupings not merely as passive objects but as agents who have something creative to say in
their analyses, demonstrating an active and creative ability to target societal relations. Thus
one is able to posit social theories (“sociologies”) of philosophy and spirituality (and  vice
verse) to expose their hegemonies and ideological lacunae. Sociology too might be targeted
in this way by Spirituality and philosophy. In fact it would be remiss of us to suggest that
such critiques and expositions could ever be accomplished without philosophical thinking
and critical theory. It is my considered opinion that sooner or later, such engagement with
critical realism will be recognised as essential for the student of academic Spirituality. That is
to say, an interest in contemporary Spirituality must contemplate critical realism as it has so
evidently postmodernism (Kourie & Ruthenberg 2010). Where Spirituality is taught within
departments of Philosophy, and especially where the metaphysical tradition is given credence
I suspect sooner or later, A realist theory of science (2008) will become prescribed reading in
the  natural  sciences  as  The  possibility  of  naturalism:  A  philosophical  critique  of  the
contemporary human sciences (1998), might well become for students of the social sciences.
2.2 Critical realism
In this section the dissertation presents the foundational critiques and re-conceptualisation in
critical realism.
2.2.1 A realist theory of science
As a transcendental analysis and critique of experimentation, applied science and perception,
Bhaskar’s  analysis  brings  to  light  categorical  differences  between  the  domains  of  “the
empirical, the actual and the real” (Bhaskar 2008:xvi), each in turn being sub-sets of the next,
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respectively. Each field expands and advances on the domain of the larger set in a possible
“totality” of things (cosmos), itself expanding and emerging. For Bhaskar these realms are
categorically dissimilar  and have  to  be disambiguated  and so  too the  “intransitive”  (real
targets, laws etc.) and “transitive” (knowledge making) dimensions of science. The targets of
critique, here conducted in both immanent10 and transcendental11 fashion include the work of
philosophers  of  science  from  Descartes  (individualism),  Compte  (positivism),  Hume
(empiricism), Kant (transcendental idealism), Hemple and Popper (logical-empiricism), Kuhn
and Feyerband (incommensurability)  and others  of  the  post-(later)-Wittgensteinian school
(ontological  relativism  and  linguisticism).  The  analysis  could  if  appropriated,  effect  a
disambiguation of presuppositions if such exist for the student of Spirituality and deepen our
explanation of Spirituality’s science.
2.2.2 Roy Bhaskar and critical realism
It is useful and correct, as López and Potter (2001) contest, to distinguish between critical
realism as  a  movement  (1)  preceding and including  Bhaskar  who is  its  most  vociferous
proponent, and (2) the disagreement that exists in critical realist debate and discourse. Some
of the major differences and agreements will  be noted as we proceed. Nevertheless, it  is
partly because of Bhaskar’s brilliant and prolific work that critical realism has received so
much philosophical attention, and that a critical (mostly indicated in the footnotes) but close
following of his thought is useful in understanding the movement and its concerns in general.
2.2.3 The first movement of critical realism: transcendental realism
The term transcendental realism is a nod to Kant’s transcendental method12, although Bhaskar
employs both transcendental and immanent styles of critique. In other words seldom does he
attack the grander notions of his targets but rather the “minor premises”, there-in (Bhaskar
10Bhaskar, R (1998:120), also Hartwig’s “intoduction”, in: Bhaskar (2008:xv). Immanent critique is described
as: Targeting elements of inconsistency within an original account or in this case a philosophy of science.
11Bhaskar, R (1998:120). Transcendental critique is described as: Demonstrating that the claims of an account
cannot sustain the phenomena it claims to describe, to then propose a superior explanation.
12Whether or not Bhaskar’s deployment is truly “Kantian”, is a matter of some conjecture.
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2008:xiv). Thus Hartwig notes that Bhaskar’s first chapters delineate Bhaskar’s description of
scientific experimentation, from which demonstration Bhaskar then refutes certain traditional
conceptions of science. Transcendental realism as noted above shares some relativist values
with  postmodern  conceptions  of  epistemological  relativity  however  it  transcends  both
modernism in which Bhaskar exposes an implicit ontological relativism, and postmodernism
in which he attacks its explicit statement thereof. Hence both modernism and postmodernism
(Bhaskar is sometimes doubtful if there is such a thing as the latter, preferring the appellation
“high-modernism”  to  denote  its  critique  and  “the  cultural  logic  of  late  capitalism”  its
ideological feature) are guilty of committing “epistemic fallacy”.   
2.2.4 The critique of positivism
Here  follows  the  critical  realist  critique  of  positivism,  based  on  a  series  of  diagnosed
fallacies.
2.2.4.1 Epistemic fallacy
The  positivist  account  of  science  according  to  both  Bhaskar  and  critical  realism  as  a
movement, commits an  epistemic fallacy which is founded in a confusion of epistemology
(knowing) and ontology (being). This entails that, because what we know (epistemology) is
always relative and changing, it was supposed by postmodernism that a similar state of affairs
existed for the objects of knowledge (things-in-themselves, that is - ontology), with the result
that being became suspended and relativised. What critical realism then argues is that this is a
category mistake: things-in-themselves are in converse to knowledge as real and scientifically
intransitive (outside the realm of our knowing them). Reading between the lines, Schneiders
(1989, cf. Kourie 2009:158) seems to have a similar attitude to spiritual reality, but offer no
philosophical account or resolution. To put it more succinctly we may argue about “how” and
“what” we know of a scientific target but in order to so disagree we must tacitly agree, that
this  “something  out  there”  is  real.  This  fundamental  tenet  which  holds  for  all  types  of
scientific realism refers in philosophical terms to the metaphysical necessity of its targets,
that is, their ontology: residing independently of our knowing or in the case of empiricism,
experiencing. The intuition of ontological realism shared by Spirituality and critical realism is
a further point of confluence, coming from the Aristotelian tradition. For scientific realism
and what is often called the primary transcendental move in critical realism, the philosophical
priority of ontology is established. This is essentially Bhaskar’s oft rehearsed claim in critical
realism: the priority of ontology over epistemology or as he and so many commentators like
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Archer, Collier, Lawson and Norrie (1998) have claimed for the philosophical movement in
general, a “re-vindicated ontology”.
2.2.4.2 Actualist fallacy
It is claimed by critical realists that following from its first and fallacious presupposition,
positivism  further  confused  (1)  the  intransitive  dimension  of  independent  things-in-
themselves, the domain of the real, enduring structures of the natural world, with (2) the
transitive production  of  fallible  scientific  knowledge  and  theories  as  discussed  above,
culminating  in  (3)  an  epistemic  mis-identity  of  the  domains  of  the  “empirical”  and  the
“actual” which critical realism calls the “actualist fallacy”. The distinction to be made here is
this: real laws of nature exist independently of our knowledge of them, as do causal structures
in society. What actually is proven to exist at any one time (actuality) does not exhaust that
reality,  because  new  things  are  constantly  made  or  are  naturally  emerging.  Nor  do  the
experiential  facets  of  knowledge  (empiricism)  in  experimentation  produce  infallible
knowledge of reality. We have always presumed that we discover new things all the time, but
empiricist hegemony has assumed that on the one hand the world as it is comes to us through
our knowledge of that world, which advancing knowledge enlightens us about the new. The
newness of things had thus been a function of our knowledge. This is the conception that
critical realism seeks to dispel. Bhaskar says quite categorically and indeed in defence of
categories themselves (an attitude of categorical realism), that the world is not just flatly as it
appears,  but  has  categories  and  strata  and  depth:  critical  realism insists  on  the  need  to
distinguish between the experience of the world (empiricism), the realm of actuality and facts
beyond mere experience, and the realm of reality or “transfactual” causative agencies and
laws which exists apart from the facts it engenders and also beyond what we know of facts
and their transfactual causalities. New things do not come to awareness just because we know
more but really do emerge from the reality of processes existent in reality in the “intransitive
realm”, their resultant facts in actuality and our transitive experience of these. 
Upon reflection the question then has to be asked: are not those social things which cause us
to produce fallible knowledge not real? Bhaskar’s answer comes in his later The possibility of
naturalism  (1998:47),  where  he  distinguishes  between  “causal  intransitivity” in  the
intransitive dimension (natural laws) and “existential” intransitivity in the “transitive” (social)
dimension. The upshot for the human sciences is that social causes are described as causally
“interdependent”: they are real in the social  arena but not as intransitive,  as other causes
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might be in the natural realm. Thus concludes Hartwig (Bhaskar, 1998:xvii), all things which
come into being are intransitive either as natural or social determinants in their respective
spheres  of  operations  (i.e.  not  in  the  same way):  a  “unifying  principle  for  non-positivist
naturalism”. Yet there is always an ontological distinction to be made between beliefs and
what those beliefs are about, including such beliefs themselves.    
2.2.4.3 Scientific individualism
Closely related to this  explanation of actualism is the critique against (a)  “atomism”, the
possibility of the human subject as scientist to separate him/herself from the field of vision as
either  an  isolated  or  passive  recipient  of  knowledge  for  and  in  which  our  objectivity  is
guaranteed and (b) “monism”, the claim that such derived knowledge is of a unitary thing,
somehow separate from the rest of reality. The critical realist objection is that life, reality and
science are not that simple, but rather “complex” or “stratified” and operative in an “open
field”. This requires that to describe laws means to pursue their (1) trans-factual nature in
their operating beyond our experience of empirical instances (facts) and (2) non-empirical
character there-in mostly beyond our experience at all.  Together attitudes of atomism and
monism have shored-up the hegemony of individualism, which (false) reduction13 became a
highly debated methodological issue within the social sciences of the twentieth century. It is
further contested by Bhaskar that the misconceived adoption of empirical realism rests upon
an individualist sociology. Disprove the validity of one and we disprove the validity of all.
2.2.4.4 The critique of positivism’s false opposite: the critique of Kant
Bhaskar’s critique of Emmanuel Kant’s categorical idealism is perhaps easiest to follow, now
that we have some idea of the way critical realism argues for its categorical disambiguation.
The accusation here is that Kant “involuted” the real categories of the natural world into the
mind, making of them purely mental categories. Essentially Bhaskar says of these that they
should be put back into the world where they belong (I certainly concur). This however is a
position which necessitates the development of categorical realism within Bhaskar’s project.
As Hartwig notes (Bhaskar 1998:xvii and in the footnotes 32-34) this development is gradual,
but is eventually explicated in Bhaskar’s (1997) article “On the ontological status of ideas”.
13Critiques  against  reduction  or  reductionism  are  plethora  for  instance  Howard  (2009:141-157),  Murphy
(2009:19-39), Stoeger (2009:229-247), and Van Gulich (2009:40-73) not to mention Kourie (2006:166-167) and
De Villiers (2006:102) 
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Bhaskar’s  development  of  dispositional  realism (causal  things  having  powers)  is  equally
developmental, but present in inception (Bhaskar 2008:20). Certainly no one seems to be in
any doubt that Bhaskar holds that in the realm of the real, the world comprises “enduring and
transfactually active mechanisms” (Bhaskar 2008:20),  even if  these are  tendencies which
may or may not be discerned in the causality of a phenomenon. 
So against both Hume and Kant including the traditions which follow them, critical realism
poses a picture of categories, depths, potentialities and possibilities which are in the nature of
things, as “worlded”. The term “worlded” is my description: it accounts for the complexity of
the world as we know it and experience it, and beyond this it describes the world beyond our
knowing it. This worldedness or the realm Bhaskar’s “real” is far in excess of what we can
know of it. Consequently the term here is slightly different from Kourie’s (2006:79-80) use of
telluric: it is inclusive of all that has and can emerge. Since what we know (successfully) is
about  reality that  reality exists,  and since  our  knowledge is  partial  and fallible,  negative
knowledge (what we do not know i.e. conceptual absence) of it, also exists. Consequently
what we do and do not know of a thing or a law of nature for instance, must presuppose a
totality of things. The “worldedness” I speak of is this totality and it is this totality in which
our social and spiritual relations must take their place.    
2.2.4.5 A summary of critiques
To paraphrase the critical realist account, the philosophy of science since the enlightenment
had  it  wrong  by  (a)  setting  up  an  artificial  constant  conjuncture  of  events  in  closed
(experimental) systems, (b) describing such invariance as causal (a further dimension of the
fallacy of  actualism),  (c)  then generalising these  causes to  laws of  nature (the  empirical
fallacy), (d) these features then being perceived as exhaustive of reality, which as maintains
Bhaskar (1998:48), cannot hold in a world where systems are necessarily open. Consequently
later critique of postmodernism’s linguistic turn rests on the fact that the interpretive tradition
has stood too closely to a logical positivist conception of science, transferred to the human
sciences.
The hermeneutic tradition thus having bought into such positivist conception of science and
its  confusion  of  categories,  posed  an  unfounded  critique  of  (a  caricatured)  scientific
endeavour in which causality as described positivistically and which hardly ever happens,
was taken and assumed. Positivist human sciences therefore proposed a somewhat ridiculous
notion of the human sciences as in some way mimicking the former. Thus for critical realists
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both the extremes of positivistic sociology on the one hand, and its “critical foil”, the post-
structural hermeneutic tradition and their allegiance to Kant,  Wittgenstein and Rorty,  find
themselves in  error both hegemonically (passively)  and in  temperament (of their  positive
statements). In short the interpretive tradition has mis-identified itself with a misguided sense
of science and committed epistemic fallacy by extension.
2.3 Critical naturalism: the third alternative
In  summary  of  its  achievements  critical  realism  claims  for  a  non-positivist  mitigated
nomothetic hard science, which is conceptually softer and more accommodating in relation to
which  a  more satisfactory conception  of  idiographic interpretive  science is  posed,  as  for
instance in The possibility of naturalism (Bhaskar 1998).  López and Potter (2001:8) note that
critical realists are naturalists who claim that the social sciences can (only in general terms)
be studied in some ways similarly to the natural sciences. The implied limits (because of the
socio-linguistic determinants of social objects) will be examined later.      
2.3.1 Bhaskar’s trajectory
The  development  from  analysis  of  the  philosophy  of  sciences  and  consequent  critique-
building is the stuff out of which the various stages and concepts of commonly called critical
realism emerge. The conceptual stages which make for Bhaskar’s conceptual trajectory runs
from (1) (Bhaskar [1975] 2008) “transcendental realism” (focusing on the natural sciences)
through [+] (2) (Bhaskar [1979] 1998) “critical naturalism” (focusing on the social sciences),
being  [=]  “critical  realism”,  (3)  the  “theory  of  explanatory  techniques” (focusing  on
philosophies of science as ideologies) and (4) the “dialectical meta-critique” of the Western
Philosophical tradition, targeting various fallacies in the history of epistemology and their
social (moral) products. Each stage anticipates or is “proleptic” of the next. What is often
claimed within the critical realist community is that these four stages together revindicate
ontology in under-labouring for emancipation. In other words, the stages assert the reality of
things, concepts, people, society and transformative praxis. 
There  are  good  grounds  to  believe  that  these  stages  of  philosophical  development
dialecticised in the fourth, mark “Bhaskar I” as meta-critic from “Bhaskar II” as philosopher
of meta-reality (These are my metaphorical descriptions however I am amused to note that
Bhaskar (1993:329) uses a similar device in describing Hegel’s work.). The latter redeploys
dialectical  critical  realism as  a  meta-critique,  to  pose  its  own  critique  and  development
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conceptualised in Bhaskar I, to be sustained and developed and turned into Bhaskar II, in
which spiritual reality is then conceptualised. It is easy to see then how these basic concepts
in the inception of critical realism stretched to include the reality of the social world, equally
stratified  and  potentiated  with  its  own  possibilities  and  emergences,  begs  later
conceptualisation of spirituality and which critical realist conceptualisation we will explore. 
In retrospect, Bhaskar (2002a 166-1667) describes critical realism thus:
Diachronically in terms of its development over time from: [1] transcendental
realism, as  a  philosophy  of  science;  through  [2]  critical  naturalism,  as  a
philosophy of social science; through [3] the theory of explanatory critique, as a
philosophy which showed how one could rationally derive evaluative (and in
particular  ethical  and  political)  positions  from  matters  of  fact;  through  [4]
dialectical critical realism, as a theory of dialectic pin-pointing the necessity for
conceptions of  absence (and  negativity generally) and  totality  and laying the
ground for a theory of freedom as the absenting of absences or the elimination
[absenting] of constraints (blocks on human capacities and flourishing); through
to [5]  transcendental dialectical critical realism,  as a theory of the necessary
spiritual presuppositions of emancipatory (theoretical and practical) projects …
critical realism is to be understood in its essence as the systematic attempt to
(progressively)  think  being,  then  this  process,  carried  through  to  its  limits,
ultimately  transcends  (or  both  surpasses  and  suspends)  not  only  realism
conceived as involving subject-object duality, but thought itself.
2.3.2 Bhaskar’s canon
The canon of Bhaskar I  begins with, and in the order of stages above, (1) A realist theory of
science (Bhaskar [1975] 2008) (2)  The possibility of naturalism  (Bhaskar [1979] 1998) (3)
various publications of the 1980’s including a refinement of his refutation of Rorty (1983)
later  summarised  in  Bhaskars  (1989)  Reclaiming  reality:  A  critical  introduction  to
contemporary philosophy  (Bhaskar 1989:146-179), and in particular the article “Scientific
explanation  and  human  emancipation”  (Bhaskar  1980),  “Scientific  realism  and  human
emancipation” (Bhaskar 1986) and (4) Dialectic: The pulse of freedom (Bhaskar 1993) which
thus concludes his “transcendental-critical-dialectical” phases of realism, merely to provide
Bhaskar a well argued critique of philosophy with which to turn his attention to the project of
Bhaskar  II  whose  canon  (2000,  2002a,  [2002b]  2012,  2002c,  2002d)  is  emergent  and
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progressing under more trying personal circumstances. The newness of Bhaskar II published
in  From East to West  (2000) and three other books on meta-reality;  Reflections on meta-
reality (Bhaskar,  2002a),  From science  to  emancipation:  Alienation  and  the  actuality  of
enlightenment (Bhaskar 2002b) and a two volume: The philosophy of meta-Reality (Bhaskar
2002c,  2000d)  is  encased in  a  reflection  on  the  progress  of  critical  realism contextually
placed  within  the  critique  of  the  Philosophical  tradition  from  Parmenides onward  but
resulting in the particularly vexing philosophical discourse of modernity, often referred to as
“PDM”.
It  should  be  mentioned,  that  because  Bhaskar’s  critical  realist  literature  is  so  prolific,
including  its  revisions,  the  usual  orthographic  conventions  can  lead  to  confusion.
Consequently it has become conventional amongst critical realists to abbreviate the titles of
publications (in the order presented above)14 as  RTS (Bhaskar [1975] 2008), PON (Bhaskar
[1979]  1998),  SEHE  (Bhaskar  1980),  RR (Bhaskar  1989),  DPF  (Bhaskar  1993),  FEW
(Bhaskar 2000),  RMR  (Bhaskar 2002a),  FSE (Bhaskar [2002b] 2012) and  PMR  (Bhaskar
2002c, 2000d). 
It is mentioned that critical realism has set up a growing resonance in the epistemological
community, a claim that requires analysis. Firstly this resonance is composed of an attitude
which is perceived in the work of the second founders of Spirituality as it is in the academy: a
Zeitgeist if you will, in which a critique of modernism is implicit. Secondly one discerns in it
a  general  dissatisfaction,  with  reductionism  to  either  hard  naturalism  or  to  linguistified
historicism.  Thirdly this resonance evidences a growing diagnosis of a critical absence in
accounts of transformation and human agency.  The point here is that these three trends were
already felt in the transformational sciences at about the same time that Bhaskar began his
work. So the claim that critical realism sets the pace is perhaps true for philosophy but not
necessarily  so  in  the  level  of  substantive  social  sciences  which  still  struggle  with  these
questions. What critical realism has achieved is a philosophical account which in its very
impressive  analyses,  explanation  and critiques  has  over-reached the  piece-meal  nature  of
former ontological or neo-essentialist  intuition,  and in  the light of proposed and justified
alternatives  a  great  amount  of  rethinking  and  resituating  old  debates  in  substantive
philosophy and the problem based level of epistemology, is required. So too the caricatures
14I have here omitted titles not read for the presentation of this dissertation
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and prejudices about science and the role of philosophy evident in Kourie (2009:165-67) and
De Villiers (2006:102-105). 
Though not Bhaskar’s canon  per se,  the series entitled  The Routledge Studies in Critical
Realism,  is  constantly  growing and  provides  the  most  evident  forum for  the  substantive
rethinking,  whilst  some independent  literature  in  the  last  two years  and available  locally
imply  that  transcendental  realist  critique,  is  widely  read  in  places  where  primary  and
secondary literature is easier to come by. Also where the influence of critical realism remains
unacknowledged, the resonance of emergence and systems theory (for instance in Murphy &
Stroeger (2012) and Wilber (2000)) is palpable. 
2.3.4 Bhaskar’s system
In attempting to illustrate the philosophical and dialectical logic in the heart of critical realist
development, Bhaskar provides an easily learnt description which has come to be known as
Bhaskar’s system. Hartwig in Bhaskar (2008:x) notes:
Systems – though much out of favour these days, in which the complexities of
the world are acknowledged, and in which, it is claimed, we can only ever get
epistemological purchase (if that) – are very much like ontologies (which they
sometimes embrace): if philosophers do not develop one explicitly, their work
will implicitly or tacitly secrete one. Such an implicit system will, moreover,
usually be highly confused, precisely because it has not been thought through
comprehensively  and  as  such  will  unwittingly  incorporate  elements  of  the
compromise formations that [erroneously] define the intellectual horizons into
which we are all ‘thrown’.
The point being, if Bhaskar’s system is to have any significance as a system or his intentional
emancipative axiology remain uninterrupted, his work normally called critical realism should
technically be read as “critical realism and Meta-Reality” (Bhaskar 2008:ix). Furthermore
Hartwig describes each phase of argument as a Hegelian “moment” a “part or phase of a
whole”  (in  a  totality),  considered  either  synchronically or  in  its  diachronic  development,
where the parts and the whole are distinct from and internally related or essential to each
other” (Bhaskar 2008:xxi, footnote 2).
Referring  to  the  stadia  of  Bhaskar’s  system,  Hartwig  gives  the  shortest  and  most
approachable description (Bhaskar 2008:x): 
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The  system is  also  articulated  in  terms  of  seven  dimensions  of  being  (the
ontological  –  axiological  chain)  …its  dialectic  is  a  seven  termed  one  –  as
follows (where ‘7A’ [seventh awakening]  stands  for  non-duality ‘6R’ [sixth-
realm]  for  re-enchantment,  ‘5A’ [fifth  aspect]  for  reflexivity  understood  as
spirituality,  ‘4D’ [fourth  dimension]  for  human  transformative  praxis,  ‘3L’
[third-level]  for  the  totality,  ‘2E’ [second  edge]  for  negativity,  ‘1M’ [first
movement] for non-identity.                                          
The first thing to notice is that Hartwig has here reversed the analytical steps of Bhaskar’s
development. So to get a grip on the latter, a reversed reading from 1M to 7A gives a neat
summary of  Bhaskar’s  analysis  to  date.  The enumeration  merely shows the trajectory of
analysis (for some an irrelevancy) while Hartwig’s presentation above demonstrates a strong
sense of vertical  development  in the dialectical  and the axiological  aspects:  here read as
conditions for the possibility of science “non-identity” between  being and  knowing means
there are things we don’t know or are mistaken about, hence the necessity of a conceptual
“negativity” (the conceptual gap) which then presupposes a “totality” (the fullness of being),
which raises the possibility for “human transformative praxis” (filling the gap), (1) in the
epistemological  realm of  producing science,  new concepts  and theories,  (2)  in  the social
realm  of  betterment  and  emancipation,  and  (3)  in  the  moral  realm  of  spirituality  and
conceptualised  here  in  steps  5A,  6R  and  7A (real  ground-states  of;  non-duality,  love,
creativity etc.).
As  noted  above,  it  is  a  neat  system  of  thought  which  sheds  the  sympathies  of  many
“analytics” of the critical realist community along the way and to varying degrees. However
for students of Spirituality and in growing numbers in the near future I contend, a fruitful
field of contemplation. For those interested in the deployment of philosophical criticism in
the  anthropological approach  to  Spirituality,  Bhaskar  later  (1993)  proposes  that  the  1M
ontology of reality poses alteriety (otherness,  difference and contradiction)  in the face of
which  implied  appropriation  (as  I  am  doing  now),  a  dialectical  working-through  at  an
existential  level  confronts  us  with  “negativity”  and  “absence” (either  conceptual,  moral,
existential or spiritual and often hinging on real determinate and explanatory power). This
alterity/absence  then  becomes  the  ground  for  imagining  and  searching  or  transforming
towards totality. At this stage it is important to note that Bhaskar’s spiritual turn rests on the
very possibility of transformative human praxis which inspires his “transformative model of
human  activity”  as  a  social  theory,  the  culmination  of  the  philosopher’s  methodological
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analysis  in  the  practices  of  substantive  human  sciences.  From here,  he  consolidates  the
critique of Hume and Rorty in order to expand a meta-critique and explanation of Western
philosophical  tradition:  identifying  the  “good”  of  discourse,  the  emancipative  effect  of
dialectic and the inadequate conception of absence in the tradition. 
Perhaps in retrospect, presentation of the “system” at this early stage of the dissertation is
pre-emptive or rather precipitous. The system is in fact a synchronic articulation or sliced
presentation of being/reality based on a retrospective view of the diachronic development of
critical realism. Each stage represented here systematically is a stage in the development of
critical realist insight and which has not yet been covered in the dissertation. For this reason
we must return to it at a much later stage in order to demonstrate how it is expanded and
deepened.
2.3.5 Reflexivity
Always begging the question, “Under what necessary conditions can … arise or emerge?”
Bhaskar’s philosophical notion of spirituality, “reflexivity” is a broad term largely owing its
inspiration  to  the  Aristotelian  tradition  of  rational  judgement  and  practical  wisdom.
Reflexivity as the argument would have it is not only necessary for rational judgement and
the possibility to “see things right” or to seek intellectual and moral goods with real objects,
self-critique and so on, but expanded to its fullest sense it holds, the goods of science could
not be recognised without reflexivity (spirituality) as a condition for those “goods”. It is very
much  a  continuation  (but  not  limited  to)  the  rational  judgement  and  practical  wisdom
developed in Aristotle’s philosophy as necessary to live the good life in the domain of virtue.
Aquinas’ extrapolation of prudentia comes to mind, the reflexive quality of which is equally
applicable  to  practice  of  discernment  and  emotional  intelligence  work.  For  Bhaskar,
reflexivity is the continually emerging condition for good science and philosophy but also
love,  creativity and human emancipation,  wherein he sees human flourishing. Reflexivity
(wisdom) thus justified, acts as an axiological pivot inclusive of a basic condition for the
possibility of scientific progress but “proleptic” of spirituality conceived as meta-reality and
practical mysticism. 
 2.3.6. Bhaskar’s features of being (ontology)
As  features  of  Bhaskar’s  ontology  he  includes  “movement”  (being  moves), “edges”
(experiences of limits)”. Being possesses “dimensions”, “aspects”, “realms” and “awakening”
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as potentials and possibilities oriented to “totality”. All of which depend on the first principle
that there is a fundamental categorical non-identity between ontology and epistemology. For
Bhaskar there is a fundamental distinction to be made between being and knowing and that
being is prior to knowing, whilst knowing always depends on being. This position requires
that  ontology  take  philosophical  priority  in  our  thought  (and  critique  of  consciousness)
because ontology is real and epistemology is relative even when it talks about the real. So for
Bhaskar then,  ontological realism and  epistemological relativism are entirely compatible if
we get  our  ontological  priority right.  A value  long held  in  the  Aristotelian  tradition  and
reflected in the assumptions to the insights of Schneiders and Kourie (2009).
As Hartwig in (Bhaskar 2008:xi) points out, Bhaskar shares his position on the priority of
ontology with all scientific realism but his approach and argument is nuanced and for this
reason I’ve called his ontological nuance “eccentric” to once again delineate his, as opposed
to a more generally accepted metaphysical/critical ontology in which, I think Spirituality as
discipline would very much like to participate. Hartwig describes Bhaskar’s ontology: “more
specifically  as  structured  and  differentiated”  (phase  1);  “containing  mind  and  concepts”
(phase 2); “as intrinsically valuable” (phase 3); “also as alethic truth” and “spiritual” (phase
4) and “as enchanted and non-dual” in the philosophy of meta-reality.
2.3.7 Confluence and counterpoint.
No doubt  exploring  things  in  the  domain  of  spirituality  has  made  many of  the  analytic
philosophers  of  his  tradition  nervous  and  Bhaskar’s  spiritual  turn  is  perceived  in  some
quarters  as  either  dangerous  or  a  betrayal  bringing  controversy and  perhaps  entrenching
essentialism  or  anti-spiritual  intolerance  in  some.  Where  the  analytics  see  an  implicit
conceptual  reversal  from  Bhaskar  I  to  Bhaskar  II,  Bhaskar  sees  a  necessary  dialectical
(synthetic?) overreach (not unlike De Villiers 2006; Kourie 2009:166-167; Strauss 2012:66-
68) of analytic argument, underlabouring for emancipation by providing a profound meta-
theoretical basis for spiritual reality, whether one reads the project as a meta-theory of reality
or philosophy of meta-reality. In any event the “meta” is consistent (I will argue, merely by
begging the question), with a critical anthropological/anthropogenic reading of Spirituality. 
It is obvious to me that it is when Bhaskar exceeds the normally accepted remit of critical
realism as a movement that he has most to say about things close to the conception and heart
of  Spirituality  and  of  which,  we  must  say  more.  The  reader  is  not  required  to  infer  or
construct a confluence of interests between critical realism and Spirituality: it is given most
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profoundly in  the  axiology of  freedom.  To  further  the  argument  for  confluence  one  has
merely  to  point  out  the  similarity,  counterpoints  and  advances  of  conceptions  around
transformation, transcendence, non-duality and the critique of consciousness in Bhaskar and
more well-known Spirituality theorists. 
Nevertheless what I  believe the histories of Spirituality and Philosophy will  find hard to
ignore is Bhaskar’s integrity and consistency of analysis. I think that part of the philosophers’
appeal rests in a rigorous humility in proceeding from the begging question fundamental to
all philosophy: “under what conditions…?” Bhaskar I (if one excuses the continuation of the
metaphor), asks: “Under what conditions is science possible?” and Bhaskar II, “Under what
conditions is  transformation or spirituality (and Spirituality) possible?” Clearly a point of
confluence exists for Schneiders (1993:12, cf. Kourie 2009:165) in being “concerned with the
conditions of possibility of such experience”. A further agreement is reached in Bhaskar’s
later development of values as ultimate. 
I think the ultimate assessment of Bhaskar I, rests on his ability to account for and respond to
the  big  philosophical  questions  of  our  post-modern  age  but  whose  foundations  have
constantly plagued philosophical debates from Plato onwards. Bhaskar rightly identifies these
problems as ontological realism, epistemic relativism and rational judgement. However this
characterisation of Bhaskar as “I and II” should not be over played: its use here is merely to
state an insight about there being two implicit questions in the unitary system of thought and
bound  into  one  “ontological  –  axiological  chain”  (Bhaskar  2008:x)  and  systematically
developed.
2.3.8 Bhaskar’s conception of scientific progress: reality and the essence of science
The objects of science for Bhaskar (López 2011:11) are  “thing and not event centred …
Actually  occurring  events  are  not  exhaustive  of  the  real  [which  may  be  indicative  of]
unexercised or unrealised causal mechanisms … powers, forces, characteristics, or sets of
relations  … tendencies  [and  these]  are  not  invariant  ”.  Reality  is  complex,  ordered  and
stratified and of which we know a little. Another way of putting it is that in the “intransitive
dimension” the objects of knowledge are simply as they are independent of our knowledge of
them and our alleged knowledge and belief about them is “transitive”. Thus the appellation of
transcendental  realism  in  which  the  things  of  science  remain  (not  above  but)  beyond
knowledge as  product.  Production of knowledge must  attempt to infer  the real  nature of
things  however  imperfectly  in  a  real  context  which  interferes  with  our  accumulation  of
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description. Hence: (a) Rigour and methodology are important but do not guarantee progress;
(b) symmetrical prediction and explanation or similar positivist expectations dissolve because
reality itself is dynamic, or as Bhaskar (2008:11) states, “the truth of things-in-themselves
does  not  necessarily  (or  even  usually)  lie  upon  the  surface”.  Reality  is  possessed  of  an
“otherness” very suggestive of a complex personality.
As a scientific realist, Bhaskar believes in the intelligibility of the scientific project which he
analyses at various levels to expose the vulnerabilities in our traditional conceptions thereof.
All science for Bhaskar, must display an essential movement from observable correlates to an
invisible causal mechanism or interactive set of such. Consequently science in its essence is,
the same for both natural facts and social facts and this means that in its most basic form
science  is  potentially  able  to  bridge  the  two  cultures  divide.  Put  more  technically,  if  a
correlation is noticed say between “A and B” (to paraphrase Bhaskar), logically stated as AB,
then “science must move to a deeper level of  significant causality M, which when excited by
AB can theoretically account for  AB. M,  then becomes a new concept to be explained and
modelled”.  Consequently  the  role  of  science  is  to  plumb  through  layers  of  real  causal
mechanisms and strata in search of a greater conception of causal relations. “Plumbing” then
suggests that both natural and social reality is stratified and this fact imposes methodological
consequences, upon science and epistemology and this then commits us to a conception of
reality  as  possessing  an  ontological  depth  not  reducible  to  sociological  constants  or
phenomenological  perennials.  Archer  (1998:xvii)  summarises  the  technical  breakdown of
scientific process as it appears in (Bhaskar 2008) and (Bhaskar 1998:124-132) thus:
Thus  theoretical  explanation  proceeds  by  description of  significant  features,
retroduction to possible causes, elimination of alternatives and identification of
generative mechanism or causal structure at work (which now becomes a new
phenomenon to explain): applied explanation by resolution of a complex event
into its components, theoretical redescription of these components, retrodiction
of  possible  antecedents  of  the  components  and  elimination of  alternative
causes15.
Later Archer claims, following Bhaskar, for the universality (for social sciences at least) of
the  formulaic  movement  from  (summarised  as):  “Social  Ontology  to  Explanatory
15Compare Schneider’s conception (cf. Kourie 2009:156-158)?
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Methodology to Practical Social Theories” (Archer 1998:194). Bhaskar notes (1998:18) that
the  aspects  of  a  philosophy  of  science  “correspond  roughly  to  the  traditional  fields  of
epistemology,  logic  and  metaphysics  respectively”,  but  here  in  inverse  to  Archer’s
presentation above.
2.4 Social realism
If then critical realism in the natural sciences based its analysis on critiques of actualism,
empiricism and positivism, extending these critiques to include the Kantian tradition which
culminated in Rorty’s linguistic (wrong-) turn, social realism does a similar thing. Critiques
include  those  of  Comptes  positivism,  Newton’s  mechanism,  coupled  with  a  critique  of
reductionism in which the entire tradition of social theory is taken to task.
Firstly social realists accept that the ontological reality of society as unlike anything else and
disagree with the post-Compteans who they claim sought to nullify the difference between
social  and  natural  facts  and  whose  conceptualisation  of  naturalism  is  therefore  wrong!
Consequently as a movement social realism accepts the challenge that no glib unity of theory
(if that be positivist, empiricist, mechanist or reductionist) between natural science and social
science can exist. By critiquing these elements and demonstrating their fallacy social realists
transcendentally seek to avoid social ontology becoming either “Durkheim’s indeterminate”
(Archer  1998:189)  or  a  victim  of  “playful  language”  (Lyotard  and  Foucault)  or  as
(heuristically) “useful constructs”. Whilst social realism is committed to exposing epistemic
fallacy it therefore continues its critique of the French postmoderns and likewise Wittgenstein
then Rorty and seeks to transcend their positions.  Whereas for critical realism in the natural
sciences, one may legitimately seek causal mechanisms which may or may not be manifest,
social realism seeks variable outcomes due to the variety of intervening contingencies - a
holistic trend. 
So unlike natural facts are social facts that not only do they defy extrinsic closure (separation
of extraneous facts) but are intrinsically open, reflexive and creative. For Archer (1998:190),
“Social reality is so different that the ‘vexatious fact of society’ can be expressed as a riddle:
what is it that depends upon intentional human action but which never conforms to these
intentions?” Clearly the reductions of the old debates in social ontology discourse around
agency and structure or individualism and collectivism supported by positivist preconceptions
are evident and require re-thinking (Bhaskar 2012:229-231) for example in Lawson, Latsis &
Martins (2007).
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2.4.1 Bhaskar, philosophy and science
In introducing Bhaskar’s social critique and theory I’d like to comment that because he now
touches  on  an  area  of  study  very  closely  related  to  the  remit  of  Spirituality  not  only
methodologically  but  ideologically,  a  closer  reading  of  his  critical  naturalism  and  the
transcendental realism upon which it is founded is required and therefore this philosopher is
quoted more often and at greater length in this section. For reasons that will become obvious,
our purposes also require a clarification of Bhaskar’s conception of the relationship between
philosophy and science.
Bhaskar argues for philosophy as a conceptual science whose analogies and metaphors are
usually (not always) supplied by science. There is a natural resonance effect (explanatory
power) that these conceptions come to have across the interdisciplinary divide which can
account  for  the  possible  hegemonic  dominance  of  any  such  scientific  orthodoxy  and
emancipation there-from. Bhaskar’s  critiques  of actualism,  empiricism and positivism are
already clear  to  us.  “Suppose,  though,”  writes  Bhaskar  (1998:7),  “that  philosophical  and
scientific  accounts  were to  clash.  What  would this  show? Merely that  one had come up
against  the  limits  of  a  particular  scientific  form,  just  as  the  limits  of  the  possibility  of
measurement may be given by quantum theory. But that measurement has limits does not
mean that nothing can be said a priori about what the world must be like for measurement to
be possible within those limits.” 
It has been claimed that most critical realists are non-reductive naturalists so this is where we
now turn our attention. In former research, Griffiths (2007, cf. Schreiber 2012) has noted the
rise of biological epistemology. I think it is true of naturalism in general from Darwin (as an
extension of Copernicus) onwards. Bhaskar (1998:1) notes that the naturalist tradition has
been  skewed  and  unnecessarily  complicated  by  the  misconceptions  already  critiqued  in
Bhaskar (2008) and which positivist principles have created a falsely hard divide between the
two cultures of science. Bhaskar explains further (1998:2):  
Naturalism may be defined as the thesis that there is (or can be) an essential unity
between the natural and social sciences. It must immediately be distinguished from
two species of it: reductionism, which asserts that there is an actual identity of subject
matter as well; scientism, which denies that there are any significant differences in the
methods appropriate to studying social and natural objects, whether or not they are
actually (as in reductionism) identified.
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I think that this adequately describes the distinctions to be considered in the anthropological
approach to Spirituality. It should be noted that Bhaskar therefore disagrees vehemently with
biological reductionists like Richard Dawkins.
For the malaise which infects the social sciences Bhaskar blames the coupled concepts of
empiricism  and  individualism  which,  under  the  tacit  dominance  of  positivist  thought,
produced a blanket determinism where social structures were seen to be strongly coercive and
in  response  to  which,  interpretive  science  was  forced  to  use  categories  of  “behavior”,  a
further reduction. “Rather one will have to look to the distinct structures that mesh together
in the field of social life … recognizing that social individuals are in general both complex
and changing [that] provides a way of avoiding at the outset the false oppositions, such as
between theory and history or the universal and unique, on which the hermeneutical dualisms
turn” (Bhaskar 1998:20). Students of Spirituality are not unfamiliar with these dualisms (du
Toit 2006). 
As corrective to these misconceptions and false consequences thereof, Bhaskar proposes the
“cure” of transcendental realism. For non-positivist naturalism in the social sciences, social
predicates  make  for  a  distinction  from  the  natural  sciences  which  therefore  may  entail
different  procedures.  However  principles  that  govern  their  production  will  remain
substantially the same across the science divide. “[B]ecause social objects are irreducible to
(and really emerge from) natural objects, and so possess qualitatively different features from
them, they cannot be studied in the same way” (Bhaskar 1998:20). It should be noted that at
this point Bhaskar is not addressing transformative modes of knowledge although what he
says supports them. Bhaskar (1998:3):
In particular it will be shown that  ontological, epistemological  and  relational
considerations all place limits on the possibility of naturalism (or rather, qualify
the form it must take); and that these considerations all carry methodological
import.
It  is  these methodological  considerations  with which critical  spirituality theory struggles.
Bhaskar claims that the positivist tradition is correct to stress causal laws and generalities
which may be opaque to agent’s spontaneous understanding but nevertheless are at work in
social  life,  but  wrong  to  reduce  these  to  empirical  regularities.  On  the  other  hand
hermeneutical tradition is correct to point to pre-interpreted reality and the subject-subject
relationship in social science, but it cannot (should not) reduce science to modalities of this
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relationship. Also, claims Bhaskar (1998:21) the tradition fails to situate or refer to social
realities like “ideology and the rational defensible conceptual stuff for criticism and change”.
The interpretive tradition disables itself by not being able to provide critiques. Is this so? In
general perhaps, but what about transformative appropriations (critiques of consciousness)
within Spirituality’s hermeneutic processes? Perhaps in Bhaskar’s conception Spirituality as
we know it in the academy is perhaps a sub-science?
On the “cure” of transcendental realism, Bhaskar remarks (1998:16):
Now transcendental realism can under-labour for the social sciences in at least
three  ways.  Firstly,  it  can  help  debunk  the  claims  to  scientificity  made  by
practices which merely ape the image of science projected by positivism or one
of its mutant forms. In this way it can cut into the web of mutually supportive
resonance-effects  sustaining the various homeomorphs secreted by the social
order16. Secondly, it can set the terms for a more rational appraisal of the real
problems  the  social  sciences  face  by  enabling  fairer  contrast  to  be  drawn
between their conditions and possibilities and those of the science of nature.
And  finally,  by  exploring  an  affinity  which  philosophy  shares  with  social
science in that both seek, as at least part of their project, to identify and describe
the conceptions of agents engaged in social practices [to] illuminate a kindred
mode of discovery.
In the above summary then, the project for his critique of contemporary social science and its
consciousness is set.
To continue with Bhaskar’s conception of philosophy and science, he claims that philosophy
conceives  of  conditions  like  the  stratification  of  reality  but  science  identifies  them.
Philosophy  does  not  speak  of  a  world  different  from  science  (Bhaskar  1998:6-7)  but
considers “what can be established about it by a priori argument … its task is to show what
must be the case for the ensemble of scientific activities to be possible … Philosophy consists
in an irreducible level of discourse; it does not constitute an autonomous order of being [it is
therefore]  in  principle  susceptible  to  substantive  scientific  (sociological)  explanation.”  I
16Do Waaijman’s “forms” (2002) “secrete homeomorphs”?
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personally think this to be a clarification which potentially relieves the suspicion behind so
much prejudice against philosophy in what we often read in Spirituality literature.
For transcendental realism there cannot be a special connection or a special science of such
causal things that lie beyond sense-experience in a specialised field of philosophy, like former
conceptions  of  metaphysics,  for  instance.  If  a  “non-reductionist  account  of  science  is
accepted,  some  ‘transcendental’ entities,  such  as  magnetic  fields,  may quite  properly  be
regarded as objects of scientific investigation. But their ‘transcendence’ is a contingent fact
about the world, and philosophy speaks with no special authority about it” (Bhaskar 1998:7).
2.4.2 Critical naturalism
As  Archer  (1998:ix-xxiv)  notes,  in  summary  of  Bhaskar’s  critique  (1998:1-22),  the
philosophy  of  the  human  sciences  during  the  twentieth  century  evidenced  a  number
dichotomies  between:  (1)  “hyper-naturalistic  positivism17 and  anti-naturalistic
hermeneutics18”, (2) “individualism and holism”, (3) “structure and agency” (Durkheim and
Weber respectively) and (4) “Facts and values” (Hume), (5) “reasons and causes” and (6)
“mind and matter or society and nature”. The authors claim that these are transcended in
critical realism by (1) “a critical naturalism”, (2) “relationality and emergence of society”, (3)
“a transformational model of social activity”, (4) a refutation of Hume in Bhaskar’s “theory
of explanatory techniques”, (5) following such refutation “reasons could be causes”, and (6)
Bhaskar’s  description  of  persons  in  “synchronic  emergent  powers  materialism”  which
transcends the standard dichotomies of the body-mind problem. What is described here in the
five short concepts is the work undertaken in Bhaskar’s The possibility of naturalism (1998).
If  both  trends  of  unqualified  naturalism  and  anti-naturalism  are  based  on  a  positivistic
misconception of science a third possibility exists of qualified naturalism which is grounded
in “the specifity and emergent properties of the social realm” (Archer 1998:xiv). Opposed
then to  both  Weber  and Durkheim, the  critical  realist  conception  of  science  stresses  that
17Archer  (1998:xiv)  mentions  the  tradition  of  Durkheimian  sociology,  behaviourism,  structuralism  and
functionalism which attempted to bridge the dichotomy between Weber and Habermas.
18Archer (1998:xiv)  The interpretive  Philosophical  tradition of  Dilthey,  Simmel,  Rickert  and Weber “fused
Hegelian  and  Kantian  dichotomies”  to  draw a  distinction  between  nomothetic  and  idiographic  disciplines,
culminating in Gadamer and Winch (1959) who refused any purchase of positivism in the human sphere.
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society is both (a) a pre-existing condition for intentional insight and (b) as existing and
persisting only in virtue of it. Agents always act within the constraints and possibilities they
did not produce. Structure is both (synchronic) condition and (diachronic) outcome of agency.
So in contrast to some interpretive tradition actors are constrained but their accounts always
are the starting point of the social sciences. The “transformational model of social activity” as
this conception is called is non-teleological but relational, transcending the methodologically
individualist/collectivist  utilitarian approach.  The targets  of social  science are not  the so-
called constant patterns normally found in sociology19 but the ontological depth of stratified
causal mechanisms in particular, emergent features of social systems which act as ontological
limits on extreme naturalism. These limits are imposed by roles here described as “concept
dependence”,  “activity  dependence”  and “greater  space-time  specificity”  as  distinctive  of
social science. These limitations on a naturalist explanation for social science will become
evident as we continue our presentation of Bhaskar’s thought.
Further limits on rampant naturalism include a relational limit or a causal interdependence
between social science and its subject matter, the epistemological limit which comes with
studying  “open”  as  opposed  to  “closed”  systems,  necessitating  greater  descriptive  not
predictive theory. In short because of these distinctions in social science critical realists (here
critical naturalists) hold that social causes are as retroductively targetable as natural causes in
the natural sciences (Archer 1998:xvii). 
2.4.2.1 Bhaskar’s social theory
Here the dissertation presents a social theory based on limited naturalism, from critique of
alternatives, to pose an explanation of social life and the agency implicit in people.
2.4.2.2 The critiques
So convinced is Bhaskar (1998) of the ontological distinctiveness of social reality that he has
quipped that his book might just as well have been entitled, The impossibility of naturalism.
Here Bhaskar expounds the critical work of social realists, his root objection to individualism
in  the  comment  (Bhaskar1998:28,  cf.  Archer  1998:190):  “the  predicates  designating
properties  special  to  persons  all  presuppose  a  social  context  for  their  employment.”  His
19Are Waaijman’s “forms” (2002:6) sociological and “constant patterns”?        
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analysis  throughout demonstrates how the positions of the old debates stood too closely to
empiricism  and positivism in their  reductions  and that  to  avoid  the pitfalls  social  theory
tended to engage in heuristic  methodological  games.  Why they did so was not due their
inability to perceive emergent properties or the relational aspects but due to a fear of their
unobservable  nature20.  Archer  (1998:192-3)  paraphrases  Bhaskar’s  argument  thus:  “What
went wrong with sociology (standing for social theory in general) was basically ontological
disenchant and an increasingly torrid affair with epistemology.” Amusingly, I think Bhaskar
has this in mind when he accuses Foucault of a “reduction to rhetoric”. Also we cannot deny
academic  Spirituality’s  compliance  in  the  trend.   Bhaskar’s  objection  in  short  is  that
ontologies  and  structures  described  as  subject  only  to  discursive  negotiation,  “sells  out”
emancipation by squashing the possibility of transformational agency under a reduction.  
2.4.2.3 Bhaskar and transformation.
For Bhaskar transformation of discursive content in institutions is an indication of a much
bigger  set  of  relations  which  make  for  discourse.  For  him  we  have  to  re-confront  the
problems of structure and agency outside the confines of empiricism from which starting
point we can then pose a “transformational model of social activity and a causal theory of
mind” (Bhaskar 1998:ix). These are built on the relational conception of the subject matter of
the  social  sciences  since  in  the  morphogenic  nature  of  society  “only  relations  endure”.
Transformation though ubiquitous is socially mediated.
2.4.2.4 Intransitivity, trans-factuality and stratification.
Bhaskar  (1998:1-20)  begins  with  the  three  ontological  tenets  of  social  realism:  The
ontological characteristics of “intransitivity” pertaining to scientific objects, “transfactuality”
of causal mechanisms and “stratification” of social reality. Their application for the natural
sciences  has  already been described above.  However  in  a  relative  discontinuity with  his
conception of social facts the intransitivity of which is the mind independent prerequisite of
social science as it is for natural science is very different. Here the mutability intrinsic to
society, as a “natural kind” to society, requires an explanatory methodology that takes into
account  the  relational  quality  of  social  facts.  Trans-factuality  of  mechanisms  refers  to
causations which are real and therefore have properties and powers and are continuous and
20Does this account for Waaijmans (2002:430) ‘myopia’ in regards to secular spirituality.
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invariant,  yet which display outcomes that are usually highly variant in open systems. In
other words causal mechanisms in society are as causal as natural causes in natural sciences
but exhibit a more relatively enduring consequence.  However although things in society may
be historically contingent this does not render social  things purely a contingency (against
Rorty).
To practice social science one must have the value that some relations are necessary and at
least relatively enduring. Since trans-factuality in social causes is only relatively enduring
and  “quintessentially  mutable”  (Archer  1998:196),  preconceptions  about  the  ordering  of
society either synchronically or diachronically are avoided. Social realism in this way is non-
prescriptive and non-normative. Explanation therefore must have something of an analytical
history of  society’s  emergence.  Commitment  to  stratification means a  rejection of  purely
superficial data: accepting historical explanation but no reduction to it. Instead of relying on
horizontal explanations of one experience, the fact that conditions and antecedents are present
implies  a  vertical  explanation of  generative  mechanisms which give  ontological  depth to
social temporality. These factors then explain the depth of “the present”.
What is implied between historicity, vertical relations and time requires the cohesion (another
necessary stratum) by ideological and dare I say spiritual commitment to a reflexive critique
of consciousness. So Bhaskar would then support the idea that social forms are necessary and
conditional  for  any  intentional  act  because  they  possess  a  characteristically  ideological
component which gives those social forms their coercive power, yet these forms cannot be
said to determine and therefore cannot explain agency (and contra Waaijman (2002), ergo not
Spirituality). Yet too the individual is able to engage unconsciously with social forms re-
producing or consciously producing or consciously transforming, ideology and society!  
Social-realist theory does not have preference for one way of proceeding; methodology is
most prescribed by its ontological target, similarly in the study of Spirituality. If there exists a
universal aetiology of theory: from social ontology to explanatory methodology to practical
social  theory,  it  is  a  highly  negotiable  one.  Bhaskar’s  concept  of  social  ontology  is
philosophical,  a  meta-theory  perhaps  appealing  to  a  gamut  of  approaches  in  Spirituality
uncluttered by concerns about what structures, mechanisms or entities, make up the social
world. However the idea of underlabouring so dear to Bhaskar, implies that we cannot avoid
(for  Spirituality  also)  addressing  society  in  its  constitution  as  relational  and  relatively
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enduring  (Bhaskar  1998:29).  Perhaps  then  in  self  contradiction  of  my  former  question,
Spirituality may not be a sub-science but in some critical respects a meta-conceptual-science?
 2.4.2.5 Relational and transformational dimensions
A cursory scan of the list of the articles from the  Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy  in
which “relations” are a major concern shows 1054 entries ranging across the philosophical
field. Obviously no exhaustive list of what these relations might be exists. It is implied that
these are possibly (following social reality) ever expanding. They are variously reported as:
internal  and external,  social,  psychological  and material,  covering a  gamut  of  social  and
logical agreements, contracts, structures, attitudes, thoughts, beliefs and conventions which
receive some specialist attention within the remit of the various philosophical sub-interests.
So when we speak of relations generally (as does Bhaskar) the term takes on the character of
a functional glyph. What one might hope is that the term generates a general understanding of
what we mean by the term “convention” and “convention transforming”.
For Bhaskar these relations (hardly ever just at one time (synchronically)) but as they are
over time (diachronically) that provide the relatively enduring features of society and are
what constitute the epistemological target, as relatively enduring ontologically real objects for
the  social  sciences  in  general.  These  are  the  properties  that  societies  possess  and where
Bhaskar  in  true  realist  style  begins  his  analysis  before  shifting  to  the  epistemological
questions. “This is not an arbitrary order of development. It reflects the condition that, for
transcendental realism, it is the nature of objects that determines their cognitive abilities for
us that, in nature, it is humanity that is contingent and knowledge, so to speak, accidental.”
(Bhaskar1998:25).  Bhaskar  is  not  much  interested  in  mass  movements  and  claims  that
sociology (social  theory)  should be concerned with the relations  between individuals  and
groups and between such relations (thoughts, attitudes and beliefs) and their relations. To my
mind in the second part  of the preceding sentence relations  are  thoughts  about  thoughts,
attitudes to attitudes and beliefs about beliefs thus indicating the reflexive quality of humans
as “being conscious about being conscious” and so epistemologically justifying ideology,
oppositions and meta-relations and a critique of consciousness. 
People as individuals do not create these relations or society but rather, these relations act as
pre-existing conditions for peoples’ activity. Society is an ensemble of structures, practices
and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform: often containing or expressing a
moral problem (Bhaskar 1998:36). This position avoids the classical positions of Durkheim’s
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top-down conception  of  things  between  society  and  individual  respectively  and  Weber’s
converse stance. Bhaskar (1998:37) writes:
Society, then, provides necessary conditions for intentional human action, and
intentional human action is a necessary condition for it. Society is only present
in human action, but human action always expresses and utilises some or other
social form. Neither can, however be identified with, reduced to, explained in
terms of, or reconstructed from the other, There is an ontological hiatus between
society and people, as well as a mode of connection (viz. transformation) that
the other models typically ignore.
If philosophy in the past, as Anscombe, De Villiers and Kourie have correctly insisted did not
address transformation seriously I think Bhaskar is some remedy. It is clear for Bhaskar that
the  causal  mechanisms (relations)  in  society are  themselves  social  products  and possible
objects of transformation. They are only relatively enduring and do not exist independently of
human action and human conceptions. In this way society is sui generis. It is for this reason
that human action or social action requires a social explanation/theory which then cannot rely
on non-social  parameters which act  as social  or naturalist  reductions.  As noted above by
Archer  (1998:196),  social  structures  do  not  exist  independently  of  the  actions  or  the
conceptions that they govern and this requires that social structures (as webs of relations) are
only relatively enduring. Therefore both the natural and social sciences, (characterised by
emergence)  are  available  to  and  compatible  with  (a  limited)  “diachronic  explanatory
reduction” in the sense that is of a reconstruction of the historical processes of their formation
out of simpler things (Bhaskar 1998:39). Let me comment here to avoid an omission, that
critical  realism  and  in  particular  Bhaskar  is  steeped  in  the  philosophy  of  historical
consciousness and it is from this absorption of the philosophy of the twentieth century that
the  critiques  and theorising  arise.  This  raises  the  question,  is  Bhaskar  open  to  historical
reduction?  
2.4.2.6 Bhaskar and historicism
While  Bhaskar  exhibits  historical  consciousness  so  characteristic  of  postmodernism  and
academic Spirituality, he critiques a historicist reduction or the use of history for deductive or
predictive purposes because anything can happen. Thus historicism as a predictive tool is
untenable because society always operates within an open system which cannot  be over-
determined  in  any  way.  The  insight  here  vindicates  Sheldrake  (cf.  Kourie  2009:163):
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“Spirituality  …  must  cast  the  net  wider  [than  history]  because  of  the  recognition  that
Christian spiritual experience is  not reducible  to the history of Christian History”21.  (The
comment of course is implicit of a dichotomy which belies the point made by Bailey (2001)).
Thus social  science over and above the question of natural science is  necessarily always
incomplete. The consequential insight into the historical and transformational character of
epistemological  development  means we can never  anticipate  the transformations  we seek
since  these  become apparent  as  knowledge,  long  after  the  emergence  of  the  ontological
development itself and that is why according to Bhaskar, history continually needs to be “re-
written” (Bhaskar  1998:48).  One of  the consequences  for  this  conception  of  the society-
person connection (Bhaskar 1998:37) is:
a radical transformation in our idea of a non-alienating society. For this can now
no  longer  be  conceived  as  the  immaculate  product  of  unconditioned
(‘responsible’) human decisions, free from the constraints (but presumably not
the opportunities) inherited from its past and imposed by its environment. 
People self-consciously transform society to enhance their flourishing or at least can do.
However  it  should  be  clear  to  us  that  relations  while  constituting  structures  are  not
themselves adequate  in the agent to  transform those structures.  Agents are  freer than the
structures that precede them. To have effect,  relations must be mediated.  The mediations
according to Bhaskar, are occupied by people; their positions, “places, functions, rules, tasks,
duties,  rights,  etc.  … filled,  assumed,  enacted by individuals,  and of  the  practices … in
which, in virtue of their occupancy of these positions … they engage … such positions and
practices, if they are to be individuated at all, can only be done so  relationally” (Bhaskar
1998:41). In other words transformation is effected by the causal placement or situation of
relations and is held between positions people hold and the activities (including mental ones)
their so doing enact. We note then that Bhaskar’s conception is a strongly structural position
which neither, Valera or Harré (Bhaskar & Harré 2001:22-39), agree with.
Continuing with Bhaskar’s (1998:41) theory, he claims of it:
It allows one to focus on a range of questions, having to do with the distribution
of  the  structural  conditions  of  action,  and  in  particular  with  differential
21Perhaps enough comment, to place Waaijman’s (2002) approach as historical reduction?
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allocations of: (a) productive resources … including cognitive ones to persons
(and groups) and (b) persons (and groups) to functions and roles (for example in
the division of labour). In doing so, it allows one to situate the possibility of
different  (and  antagonistic  interests)  conflicts  within society,  and  hence  of
interest-motivated transformations in social structure.
Consequently, the Philosopher (Bhaskar 1998:41-45) claims to avoid endemic weakness in
conceptions  like:  the  market  economy,  the  “Hobbsean  problem  of  order”,  historical
materialism  in  which  Marx  conceives  (overconfidently)  strong  determinism,  the  false
dichotomy of  positivist  “external” relations  versus  Hegelian  “internal”  relations  and  the
Marxist/non-Marxist divide.
2.4.2.7 Comment
The  comment  here  is  a  combination  of  my  thoughts  on  Bhaskar,  philosophy  and  with
implications for the social task of dissertation writing and Bhaskar’s later reflection on his
social theory from  Reclaiming reality: A critical introduction to contemporary philosophy
(Bhaskar 1989:77-88). 
If society pre-exists the individual, human activity works on given objects which may be
material or cognitive or both as provided, is there a place then for so called, formal causes?
Our social condition as understood here applies to discursive and non-discursive practices,
science, politics, economics et cetera. The idea is functionally an Aristotelian one, that in any
processes a “material cause” as well as an “efficient cause” is necessary, but I suspect that we
are scientifically and historically long past any adherence to the conception of hylomorphic
formal causes in denial of contemporary mediations and relations. Bhaskar therefore would
disagree  with  Plato,  Aristotle  and  Waaijman,  here.  For  Bhaskar  social  forms  and  their
epistemic derivatives are rather mediations of causes.  This is partly Schumpeter’s point, now
offered in a summary of Bhaskar’s (1989:78) explanation, half a century later.
Thus people in their social activity must perform a double function: they must
not only make social products but make the conditions of their making, that is,
produce (or to a greater or lesser extent) transform the structures governing their
substantive activities of production.         
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One of the conditions for such is intentional human engagement, not only monitoring our
behaviour but to monitor the monitor, permits seeking the wise, a conception developed in
Aristotelian  terms  and  whose  academic  equivalent  resides  in  supervision  perhaps.
Descriptions of intentional action (including writing and supervision of a dissertation) may
include personal reasons and their social (academic) mediation/function. There is for Bhaskar
the existence of autonomy of the psychological from social realms. “Thus we do not suppose
that the reason why the garbage is collected is necessarily the garbage collector’s reason for
collecting it (though it depends on the latter)” (Bhaskar 1989:80). Similarly language does
not exist apart from our utterances, the rules of grammar may place limits (conditions) on
how we use language but do not determine it. The task then of the various social sciences is
to find the conditions that make the forms and mediations of social action possible but not to
presume that having done so that these act as predictive determinants.22 “Thus people do not
marry to produce the nuclear family … But it is the unintended consequence (and inexorable
result) of, as it is also the necessary condition for, their activity”. Forms of spirituality are
then bi-products and mediations and not intentions even though they rely on intention.
2.4.2.8. The limits of naturalism in the social sciences: the methodological implications
Before  we  explored  Bhaskar’s  (1998)  critique  and  theory-building,  the  philosopher
mentioned three ontological limits  which the objects  of social  science place on naturalist
explanation:  “concept  dependence”  which  means  that  unlike  natural  structures  social
structures do not exist independently of our conception about what we do in our activity,
“activity  dependence”  implies  that  social  structures  unlike  natural  ones  do  not  exist
independently of the activity they govern, or produce whilst “greater space-time specificity”
which indicates geo-historical and geo-political situation as a distinctive interest  of social
science. None of these limits are reductive. Since theory building and analysis continue in
parallel,  Bhaskar’s  fourth  ontological  limit  emerges  later  in  the  work  under  discussion
(Bhaskar 1998:53): The subject matter of the social sciences includes not just social objects
whose conception we have seen above, but beliefs about those objects and ourselves. In short
the limitation of social science is situated in its subject matter - society. Since society like a
magnetic field is not perceivable and cannot be “empirically identified independently of its
effects, it can only be known not shown to exist” (Bhaskar 1998:82-83 italics added). Thus
22Comment enough to address Waaijman’s reliance on forms?
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our remit of response is not to “society” but to our relations. This in itself is not a limit for
science but what is most limiting is that society and persons operate in an open system and
this denies social science the possibility “decisive test situations” and this fact limits the form
of knowledge that distinguishes social theory as descriptive only and never predictive23. I
cannot but interpret the afore-said as an absolute denial of any scientific reversal to non-
negotiable formal causes.
Social  theory advances  in  post-fact  relationship with the development  of  its  own society
which then it must describe. However it must be said just as the social dependence of social
theory is established, society itself cannot be conceptualised apart from some theory be it
proto-scientific, scientific or ideological. Therefore Schneider’s expectations of “explanation”
(Kourie  2009:159)  are  only  conceivable  “after  the  fact”.  There  are  however  times  of
turbulence  and excitement  (as  there are  in  the  natural  sciences)  when consciousness  and
epistemology grow unpredictably. Bhaskar’s later conception for this occurrence is “pulse”. I
believe that the pulse of secular spirituality is resoundingly palpable in the academy and the
world. Success of hypothesis in social science might be tested empirically (after the fact) but
exclusively on the basis of its explanatory power and the resonances it sets in motion.
How then do we avoid total arbitrariness? Since the work of the social scientist is so concept
dependent much of that work is already identified. The burden of arbitrariness is then to be
most likely found in the initial stages of setting up workable definitions by virtue of which,
research and re-description become possible. “So I suggest that in principle as philosophical
discourse stands to scientific discourse, so a discourse about society stands to a discourse
about its effects” (Bhaskar 1998:86)24. It therefore stands perhaps contrary to the denial of
definitions in some Spirituality theorists some definitional beginning is required to make a
plausible argument. Consequently, in agreement with the interpretive tradition Bhaskar holds
that  the  conclusions  of  social  sciences  are  “historical,  not  formal”.  His  criticism  of
hermeneutical  tradition lies  in its  closeness  to  empirical  realism which “blinds” it  to  the
reality, falsity or conceptual inadequacies in these conclusions. 
23A point not explored in Waaijman (2002)?
24Hence the necessity of definitions in Spirituality theory, that abandon “determinism” for “transformational
agency”?  
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One  must  in  my  opinion,  question  in  the  strongest  moral  terms  the  lack  of
ethical/transformational content in epistemology at a certain level and I believe that Bhaskar
has already demonstrated eloquently, that the claim to value neutrality amongst the social
sciences  is  itself  a  value  and  therefore  the  claim  can  logically  be  dismissed  as  an
inconsistency. We understand I think rightly that Schneiders and others have claimed a very
different position for Spirituality: that it is a science (all things being equal) of values which
are  “ultimates”  and  that  these  values  as  contextual  effects,  are  somewhat  enduring  and
therefore somewhat mutable, but nevertheless reflect the existence and ontological reality of
“valuing” and evaluation.  
It is perhaps entirely possible that at the ontological level of valuing what we value most are
“selves”: mine, yours, others and universalised beyond our species. This might explain why
lived spirituality is vulnerable to extreme psycho-pathology and narcissism on one hand and
flourishes in empathy and the ability for “kenosis” on the other. Perhaps therefore one should
contemplate  an  “implicit”  within  du  Toit’s  (2006:66-69)  suspicion  that  anthropologically
speaking, spirituality is a techne rather than a mere technology of the self25 and beyond this,
society.  I  believe fundamentally that  explanations of values  at  an ontological level,  or as
Bhaskar might claim the alethic level is perhaps purposeful. Perhaps it is taken as a given in
some circles of the updated Aristotelian tradition that the study of Spirituality implies “depth
work” as intrinsic to practical spirituality and enlivening in the academic discipline. In my
view  such  interest  even  when  it  is  philosophically  absent,  trumps  a  mere  taxonomy or
sociology of values. Historically and in support of postmodern critique we might note the
evident study of Spirituality in regionally significant postmodern and more lucrative sector of
society as some research, indicates for Heelas (2012:3-10) and Bailey (2001:31-99).  
If this analysis is indeed to the point, where might this effect the supremacy that Kourie
(2009)  and  Schneiders  (2009)  put  on  hermeneutics  and  which  Bhaskar  characterises  as
critique-less? No doubt at a purely methodological level hermeneutical attitude legitimates
tolerance and interdisciplinary study.  No doubt  hermeneutics  furthers (self-insinuates) the
breadth and depth of Spirituality study and this is valued. But what value does hermeneutics
25One wonders after reading du Toit (2006:64) here in conjunction with Grainger (2002: 337-346), how or
where  the  differences  lie,  between  spirituality  as  “technology”  and  Psychotherapy?  Cf.   Emmons(1999),
contributors to Van Ness (ed.) 1996: 227-303, Lesniak’s “appeals” (2005:7), Monyaco (2006), Shea (2005:49)
and Shaw (2005:350-361).
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hold that is sufficient to itself? If the answers are to be given in strictly methodological terms
as opportunities for the practice of appropriation and transformation, these are laudable and
virtuous practices. However without a critique how can appropriations and transformations be
universalised for the free flourishing of all? More to the point, if the latter value is not tacitly
held how do we come to a judgement about the possibility of individual appropriations and
transformation? The obvious  telos or axiological choice in the Aristotelian tradition (“the
good life”) relies heavily on the ability for rational judgement to identify what we truly need
and want, coupled with the practical wisdom on how to implement these goods. While these
may be  taken  as  given  within  some Spirituality-talk,  there  seems  to  be  little  interest  in
justifying  either  the  ontological  underbelly  upon which  good values  depend nor  for  that
matter do we address their universality. It would appear that our fear of invoking tyranny and
of prescribing to others what (positively identified) values we should have within the geo-
political milieu has left us bereft of the general anthropological principles. We cannot play the
game of values at a “lived” level of spirituality and then pretend that at a meta-level these do
not apply. And it certainly won’t do, in my opinion that value-free hermeneutics serves as our
preferential epistemological value/practice without grounding the role of ontology, rational
judgement and critique.
At a meta-epistemological level Spirituality poses critical questions (Kourie 2009) about the
limits  of  historicism for  example.  An epistemological  point  is  made about  the  danger  of
historical reduction. How can such judgement, be made without the exercise of ontologically
based  reflexivity,  upon  which  we  rely  so  heavily.  Put  simply  without  a  philosophically
derived ontology the practice of interpretation does not make sense. 
The  methodological  meta-critique  in  academic  Spirituality  must  exercise  an  open  yet
critically-minded rational judgement about the reality, falsity and conceptual inadequacies of
methodologies and the values they pre-suppose. At root the meta-conception of Spirituality in
critical mode, after the ontological turn of late postmodernism participates in and furthers that
philosophical resonance. Without so doing the hegemonical shortcomings of social irrealism
cannot avoid Kourie’s “trap” (2009:166). If under the hegemony or resonance of tolerance,
Spirituality  holds  itself  to  value-free  neutrality  at  a  meta-epistemological  level,  while
criticising reductions  to  historicism it  must  fall  into the  trap of  its  own inconsistency.  A
necessary epistemological good, is as good as any other moral good. The intrinsic values of
Spirituality science cannot at any level without solipsism, lapse into moral relativism or so
Bhaskar might have it.
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The failure to address the question of ontology in adequate terms without which description
interpretivism must necessarily fail Bhaskar claims to the good of ontological analysis  in
critical realism. But again having asked the question of Spirituality and in the interests of
truth  and  consistency,  we  must  ask  of  critical  realism  “to  what  depth”  and  “who  is
measuring?” There is to my mind a real mystery implied in Bhaskar’s description of  depth
which needs contemplation and interpretation yet these must of themselves be recursively
involved with a critique of what it is that we truly want and need,  or we have nothing at all.
Bhaskar (1996:86) has it thus:
Thus what has been established, by conceptual analysis, as necessary for [a]
phenomena  may  consist  precisely  in  that  extra-conceptual  reality  which
consists of the real relations and processes in which people stand to each other
and nature, of which they may or may not be aware; which is really generative
of social life and yet unavailable to direct inspection by the senses.
The  generalised  epistemological  unawareness  of  extra-perceptive  historical  conditions
challenges  Bhaskar  to  propose  a  critique  of  consciousness.  This  I  propose  is  where
Spirituality  might  wish  to  take  advantage  of  non-traditional  and perhaps  trans-traditional
vocabulary. The nexus of philosophy, anthropology and comparative religion is useful. The
question of values held both above and below the level of consciousness requires analyses.
Bhaskar  suggests  these  are,  “best  exemplified  perhaps by Marx’s  analysis  of  commodity
fetishism” in Capital (Vol. 1. Ch. 1, cf. Bhaskar 1998:86). Bhaskar notes in summary of Marx
that value relations which are specific social realities, are falsely then translated into natural
a-historical  qualities  of  things,  by  capitalism.  (Does  Waaijman  (2002)  commodify
spirituality?) Furthermore these relations are then mystified into capitalist (perhaps catholic
for Waaijman) conventions like the pay-slip (or other forms), where the power of labour (read
spirituality) is transformed into the value of labour (sociological categories of Spirituality).
The former derogated to the latter. Obviously for Bhaskar here the categories are confused
(perhaps conveniently) and are not applicable to immediate experience.
Coercive confusion most typically characterises ideologies and false philosophies of science,
for  Bhaskar.  Thus  it  is  philosophically  imperative  to  explain  and  criticise  ideology  by
exposing fallacious value relations (including certain claims to be value-free). It is further
required that we should account for why these are so held from a superior explanation – “a
mode of explanation clearly without  parallel  in  the natural  sciences.  For beliefs,  whether
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about society or nature, are clearly social objects” (Bhaskar 1998:87). Superior explanation or
conceptual criticism then engages in social criticism and sets up the conditions for change:
“theory  fuses  into  practice  as  facts  about  values,  mediated  by  theories  about  facts,  and
transformed into values about facts”. The non-sense of value independence in social science
collapses because whatever value so held can be proven to be false. Values are reasons and
reasons are real causes of agency for Bhaskar.
2.4.2.9 Bhaskar and agency in synchronic emergent powers materialism
Again  the  context  is  a  critique  on  “Hume’s  law”  which  Bhaskar  disavows  by analysis,
explanation  and  refutation.  Upon  the  success  of  proving  from  analytic  perspective  that
“reasons” can be “causes” accompanied by answers to traditional objections (Bhaskar 1998:
83-93)  Bhaskar  builds  his  theory  of  people  and  intentional  agency  called  “synchronic
emergent powers materialism” which proposes and describes (apart  from abovementioned
critiques) the ontological depth of agents in contemporary terms. The term materialism is
open to much misinterpretation. Here we can allow Bhaskar’s clarification (1998:125): 
Philosophical materialism comprises: (1) ontological materialism, asserting the
unilateral dependence of social upon biological (and more generally physical
being)  being  and  the  emergence  of  the  former  from  the  latter;  (2)
epistemological  materialism,  asserting  the  independent  existence  and
transfactual  activity of at  least  some of the objects  of scientific  thought;  (3)
practical materialism, asserting the constitutive role of human transformative
agency in the reproduction and transformation of social forms.
To follow the conceptual development of Bhaskar’s theory, again we will allow him to speak
in (Baskar 1998:81-97): 
I am going to argue that intentional human behaviour is caused, and that it is
always caused by reasons, and that it is only because it is caused by reasons that
it is properly characterized as intentional.
I intend to show that the capacities that constitute mind, as so conceived, are
properly regarded as causal, and that mind is sui generis real emergent power of
matter, whose autonomy, though real, is nevertheless circumscribed.
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The third step in the argument involves coming to see that not just events, but
states and dispositions may properly said to be causes. Thus the possession of a
reason, conceived as a more or less long-standing disposition or orientation to
act in a certain way, may itself be a cause …                 
… so that there is no more mystery about why beliefs become wants (causally
efficacious) than there is about how wants issue in actions. For the desires that
transform beliefs in to wants (interests and needs) and so on … into actions, are
generated like the beliefs themselves, in the course of the practical business of
life … One does what one wants to (or intends) unless prevented.  This is a
necessary truth …
Bhaskar’s  (1998:97-99)  synthetic  twist  accomplishes  an  accommodation  of  several
philosophers: Husserl’s insight that “agency presupposes belief”; Schutz’s insight, that belief
occurs as a “continual stream unless prevented”; Aristotle’s acknowledgement that “there is
no problem in passing from desires to action (avoiding existential dilemma)” and that our
continuing  “activity  is  trained  on the  objects  of  our  desires”  and Marx,  for  seeing  “the
practical  life  context  for  desires  becoming beliefs”  and on which “Marx can  explain the
‘theory to practice’ connection”. New theory introduces dissonance into the generative matrix
of action, thus Wittgenstein claims; “we now see something different and can no longer go on
naively  playing”  (Wittgenstein  1956:13-40,  cf.  Bhaskar  1998:116)  and  finally,  Freud’s
“extension of unconscious beliefs and desires”, hence the scope and pattern of naturalism
here described.
2.4.2.10 Persons
Bhaskar (1998:81-82) defines persons thus:
…a person … is a unitary concept of an entity to which both of two types of
predicates (material and psychological) are applicable … a person’s activity …
typically consists in causally intervening in the natural (material) world, subject
to  the  possibility  of  a  reflexive  monitoring  of  that  intervention  … the  first
aspect is logically and temporally (both phylogenetically and ontogenetically)
prior to the second. The capacity for reflexive self-monitoring … is intimately
connected with our possession of language … as a necessary condition for any
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discursive intelligence. Both the intervention and commentary are, of course,
always the situated doings of agents at places in time.
In commentary, I think we can clearly see the logical steps which make “synchronic emergent
powers  materialism” what  it  is:  A theory  of  persons  as  aware  of  their  constant  stream,
constantly emerging, really agentive within material (as well as cognitive) circumscriptions.
Philosophically speaking Bhaskar (1998:101-104) develops his position on persons directly
from his theory of social reality once again asking and answering: “Under what conditions
can persons reproduce society?” It must be noted that Bhaskar’s affirmation of emergence
requires argument against reduction to materialism and behaviourism.
Basically his argument on the mind-body relationship is this: “The brain is the physiological
basis for consciousness, but theories of brain function cannot describe consciousness because
the higher order must always explain the lower” (Bhaskar 1998:98). I would suggest again
that critical realism is a useful contemplation for the Spirituality scholar for whom a critique
of consciousness about agency and transformative values might feature as “ultimate”.  
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Chapter Three: Bhaskar’s critique of ideology, dialectical and spiritual turns
3.1 Development of a theory of explanatory techniques
Here we trace the development of Bhaskar’s interest in explanatory techniques and which
culminates in his idea of ideology as false consciousness.
3.1.1 An analysis of Bhaskar’s critique
The  ideological  turn  in  Bhaskar’s  work  which  he  presents  in  his  theory  of  explanatory
techniques  is  yet  further  development  of the critical  aspect  of  critical  realism,  materially
concerned with a highly developed critique of Hume, Rorty and others which has constantly
contextualised critical realism. The criticism features also as intra-argumentative content for
the development of explanation and theory as well as locating the site for a process of critique
refinement. The critique of Rorty (1983) is here omitted, but to note that it is relatively easy
to extrapolate for ourselves as part of Bhaskar’s critique of the interpretive tradition and its
participation in epistemic fallacy by extension, once we understand the critique on positivism
and  empiricism  and  the  argument  for  non-positivist-critical  naturalism.  Purely  for
completeness the critique of Rorty is deeper than most. It is characteristically a refutation of
Rorty’s  (1983)  concept  of  science,  relativism,  assertion  of  society  language  and  self  as
contingency and model of emancipation.
3.1.2 The critical refinement
Having depended mostly on immanent and transcendental critiques the philosopher changes
tack  and  advances,  by  subsuming  the  transcendental  critique  into  one  that  is  more
sophisticated but presupposes the former:  explanatory critique later radicalised in Bhaskar’s
(1993) treatment on dialectic. According to Bhaskar (1998:121) the features of the critique
not  only  presuppose  transcendental  refutation  but  a  rational  choice  similar  to  theory
preference  in  substantive  science.  Furthermore,  it  offers  an  explanation  of  the  targeted
account  as  a  “lived  body of  beliefs”  which  requires  substantive  sociological  explanation
insofar as the targeted set of beliefs, allows demonstration of its fallacy as necessarily ipso
facto false, it enables us to identify the targeted account as “ideological” (a dis-placement of
science and agency). Such “an explanatory critique entails of course an  evaluative one” (a
point to which we must necessarily return) Bhaskar comments that his change of tack is
explicit: “I proceed from refutation and situation to substantive explanation”. Consistent with
what  is  claimed  above  explanatory  critique  culminates  in  the “theory  of  explanatory
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techniques”.  Bhaskar  notes  the  similarity  explanatory  critique  has  to  empirical  criticism
deployed by Kuhn ([1962] 1996) and which is described in our summary of Kuhn’s method
in chapter two, above.
3.1.3 Theory of explanatory techniques
As usual this critical milieu is the context for theory development. The development of theory
to describe ideology begins in the first steps towards a social theory but picks up momentum
in his (Bhaskar 1998:62-71) exposition on “philosophies”. The development is indicative of
Bhaskar’s philosophical commitment to ridding science of false consciousness/ideology in
which he believes his work under-labours for the emancipation of humanity. His conception
of the role of philosophy begins to show distinctive Aristotelian virtue characteristics but in
terms  of  intrinsic  ontological  and  philosophically  derivable  values.  Based  on  analysis,
Bhaskar seeks and uses the good of philosophy (“truth” and “consistency”) to wage war on
false  consciousness  (fallacy  and  inconsistency).  Bhaskar’s  development  of  critique  to
dialectical meta-critique of philosophy, targeting its unsustainable irrealism, culminates in the
philosopher’s  Plato etc. (1994). The un-sustainability of irrealism lies in the fact, that the
arguments are extremely vulnerable to the type of immanent critique he has up till now used
so well  and which he later (1993) refers to as “Achilles’ heel” techniques now deployed
against the philosophical tradition (Bhaskar 1993:365-370).
3.1.3.1 A reflection
There is something minimalist in Bhaskar’s refutations. Against Hume’s law for instance, he
seeks not to prove that in all cases “is” implies “ought”, nor to explain all cases of illusion:
one case will do. Humeans as we will see shortly are still able to claim that in general “is’s”
do not imply “oughts” but they may no longer claim that it is  never the case.  Ergo Hume’s
law in its usual characterisation is an illusion and part of an ideology of false consciousness.
It should also be clear by now that, in years to come another philosopher with a superior
explanation might expose the flaws in the thinking upon which the entire project of critical
realism  is  based  and  do  so  successfully  without  posing  false  dichotomies,  inner
inconsistencies or reductions. It is the importance of this point upon which Bhaskar (1993)




The argument building necessitates the identification of lacks or absences in our philosophy.
In Bhaskar’s social theory we have already seen how relative un-consciousness on the part of
agents  can  account  for  the  fact  that  we  can  go  on  producing  and  reproducing  false
consciousnesses and ideologies until challenged by a superior set of explanations of which
transcendental  realism  is  an  example  (Bhaskar  2012:127-129,218-219).  In  Bhaskar’s
(1993:223-366)  analysis,  the  three  conceptual   “lacks”  that  lie  un-accounted  for  in  the
heritage of irrealism in our philosophy from Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle onward, are: (1)
The concept of ontological depth and the epistemological requirement to plum that depth in
science unforeseen by Plato’s reified forms; (2) the analysis of  “agency” as explanation of
change and not “difference” and (3) the concept of “absence” for if agency is causal it must
make a difference against a conceptual or political  absence.  These lacks are expanded to
include “non-anthropism … totality, intransitivity, stratification, transfactuality, contradiction,
reflexivity,  and  agentive  agency.”  Recognition  of  these  conceptual  absences  in  irrealism
Bhaskar  claims  contribute  to  a  philosophical  “primal  squeeze”  on  the  possibility  of
transformation (“de-agentification”) and a positivistically described ontological monovalence
or reduction to homology. Bhaskar blames this state of affairs on a “triple transposition” of
Plato’s analysis of statements about non-being into false statements, the analysis of change in
terms of difference, and the presupposition of the satisfaction of reference. 
It is worth commenting on the second point here. Plato conceptualised human diversity as
stemming from a diremption (falling) from the “Simple” or the “One” in the unity of the
“form” realm. Falling from this realm of unity humanity entered a demi-realm of unhappiness
and  alienation  the  indications  of  which  were  perceived  in  our  differences  and  diversity.
Lacking  a  concept  of  human  agency,  Plato  therefore  derogated  diversity  and  change  as
somehow morally imperfect. Consequently happiness was never possible in this life but only
in our return to the realm or world of the simple forms, in which happiness itself dwelt. It is
an idea which set up the philosophical theory of “other worlds” in which alone, things could
be different or better. One doesn’t have to think too hard to see the disaster and dichotomy
(the reification of happiness or heaven) of later Christian consequence and with which Heelas
(2012) and others struggle. The analytical Aristotle, according to Bhaskar above, transposed
this concept into the so called “problem of the one and the many” which is responsible for the
two  cultures  divide  in  science  and  continued  the  de-agenting  of  humanity  within  the
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philosophical tradition. I am forced to reflect on how often one hears the words “I’ll be happy
when…”   
Returning to Bhaskar’s admission of an “evaluative” stance above is all important. Largely
up till now we have been dealing with a substantive argument and critique at the coal face of
the philosophies of science,  epistemology and methodology. For some of us it  is easy to
dismiss  substantive  argument  in  philosophy,  our  interests  simply lie  elsewhere.  However
things speed up for the reader at this point of Bhaskar’s development. One gets the palpable
sensation that  Bhaskar now has a  fixed target in  his  sights:  a hegemony of ill-conceived
notions and fallacies in which our philosophical tradition has set up a traditionally hallowed
resonance of alienation from happiness, change, and confidence in the reality of our own
agentive power, by reducing being and causality to a mystifying demi-reality of epistemic
fallacy.  Consequently the  severally  demonstrable  distinctions  of  the  domains  of  the  real,
empirical and the actual were confused between ill-conceived distinctions of the intransitive
and transitive dimensions of science. 
What we see in the publications from 1980 to 1993 is Bhaskar’s critique of consciousness
hence, his pre-occupation with “ideology” which is nothing more than Bhaskar’s name for
false-consciousness. Bhaskar’s evaluative critique is targeted at the ideology of irrealism, the
foundational moments of which Bhaskar traces back to Parmenides and whose tradition, he
finds lacking in a concept of absence necessary for dialectic.  Bhaskar’s insight is that this
oversight needs resolution, to then address the progress of humanity as “mystical scientist”
and scientists as “practical mystics”. It is a deeply challenging revolution of values to be
appropriated.
It should also be clear that what Bhaskar terms the “ideology of empirical realism” delivered
science into certain hard conceptions of: natural science, the gulf between nomothetical and
idiographic  sciences,  irresolvable  and  false  dichotomies  and  reductions  to  “materialism”
and/or reifications to “idealism”. The upshot for science, perhaps Bhaskar would say, is that
we  have  been  duped  into  a  conception  of  science  as  a  war  between  at  least  two  false
consciousnesses,  both  participating  in  “irrealism”  (a  philosophical  attitude  of
disenchantment). 
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3.1.4.1 Hume’s law: fact and value II.
We  have  spent  time  on  Bhaskar’s  evaluative  stance  in  his  critique  which  leads  to  the
development of his theory of society and persons. The conceptualisation of agency is central
however it does ride on his argument for transformation, which in turn is required to derive
values  from facts.  In  order  to  do  so,  Bhaskar  has  to  dismantle  the  “taboo”  enacted  by
“Hume’s law”. The argument is based on the insight (1993:63; italics added): 
But  that  truth  is  good  (ceteris  paribus)  is  not  only  a  condition  for  moral
discourse, it is a condition of any discourse at all. Commitment to  truth and
consistency apply as much to factual discourse as to value discourse; so cannot
be seized upon as a concealed (value) premise to rescue the autonomy of value
from factual discourse, without destroying the distinction between the two, the
distinction that is the point of the [Humean] objection to uphold.
So  what  we  may deduce  is  that  Bhaskar’s  critique  of  Hume  does  not  rest  on  a  simple
inference from “is” to “ought” (the major taboo), it rests on proving firstly that Hume’s law
has a necessary commitment to the separation of “is” and “ought” and which is the “law’s”
point. Then it rests on Bhaskar to prove that that commitment is false (necessarily only in one
case), and if he can do that he destroys the necessity of law-like status, and then proceed to
replace it with a superior explanation about the relations of “is” and “ought” and “why” it is
that Hume’s law fails. It is the same critique that Bhaskar develops along Marxian lines to
identify ideology which he equates with bad science, illusion and false consciousness. The
begging  question  which  begins  the  quest  may  again  be  paraphrased  as  “Under  what
conditions, does false consciousness in science, arise?” 
3.1.4.2 The TINA formation
Fundamental to the critique of ideology and operative in things like the history of Hume’s
law, is  Bhaskar’s  analysis  of  the  ironically  termed  “TINA” (“there  is  no  alternative”26)
formation:  operative  clusters  of  confused  fallacy  and  truth  upheld  as  sometimes  pre-
conscious belief and sometimes expressed in strongly coercive tones, serving as substructures
of hegemony (Bhaskar 2002a:202-3):
26P.W. Botha’s finger wagging comes to mind. Perhaps time to cross another “Rubicon”?
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[The]  false  theory  depends  on,  presupposes  in  practice,  the  true  one;  even
though  the  false  one  may  dominate  and  even  occlude  the  alethically  true
component of the totality which is that particular TINA formation.   What is
identified here is a cluster of ‘half-lies’ in the service of a grand fallacy …. The
analysis  of  TINA formations  is  essential  to  the  whole  project  of  ideology-
critique,  of  demystification  and  the  empancipatory  potential  of  philosophy
generally. 
If we reflect for a moment on the characteristics and consequences of TINA formations, we
notice that they are firstly constellations or complexes of value=thoughts centred around one
or other aspect of life. They exhibit enough fundamental truth to acquire assent and enough
fallacy to confuse change (Bhaskar 2012:28). Their hidden message or injunction is “not to
question”, because “life is like this” and “there is no alternative”. Emotively they reduce
response  to  fear  based  acquiescence  with  the  tacit  acceptance  that  transformation  is  too
difficult or impossible and certainly not worth the trouble. Together the hegemonic effect is to
enslave.   
3.1.4.3 Critique of the hermeneutical tradition expanded.
Considering the audience of this dissertation, versed in the theory of theological exegesis I
will forgo much of the history and the debates, if only to make Bhaskar’s point more clearly.
Firstly, he accuses the interpretative tradition of buying into the empirical realist hegemony of
science and in retaliation becoming anti-naturalist. As a result it has committed the epistemic
fallacy by extension: reducing in various forms and arguments “being” to “language” or in
some cases to “action” and in other’s to “history” and I would suggest in Waaijman (2002), to
“forms”. At a second level the critique and analysis is aimed at the (heuristic) conjoinment of
social theory and the “personal account” based on an assumption that the latter is in some
way  incorrigible.  This  he  refutes  showing  life  to  be  more  than  merely  conceptual  or
behavioural  (1998:134-135)  but  defined  by  “it’s  [individual  account’s]  criteria  of
significance, not our own [that if the social theorist] … and within a form of life” about
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which  it might have a declared opinion or not27. Such forms of life cannot be described as
reductive or understood generally by sociological descriptions (‘re-conceptualisation’), but
(against Winch (1959) by the agent’s “grasp” of “their existence”.
Bhaskar analyses a three-fold socialisation of social scientists which blinds them to this fact
and thus he explains the proliferation of heuristic devices deployed in Verstehen. The critique
and analysis is in usual style comprehensive and the explanation, detailed in the final chapter
of  1998.  His  final  point  is  that  Verstehen,  described  in  its  traditional  sense  cannot  be
exhaustive of interpreted (even social) reality. Bhaskar puts it thus (1998:140):
Social  science is  not only concerned with actions,  it  is  concerned with their
conditions and consequences (including the states and relations of structures and
agents).  And  is  concerned  with  what  societies  and  persons  are  (and  may
become), as well as what they do. Moreover it is concerned with actions which
are practical, not just symbolic: with making (poeisis), not just doing (praxis), or
rather with doing which is not, or not only,  saying  (signifying or expressing).
Such making always possesses a material cause. So it is important to note the
limits of all Vichian arguments for hermeneutics: what we do not make, we have
no privileged understanding of. And we make neither society nor ourselves. 
Perhaps for Bhaskar, Waaijman’s formalist theological spirituality is not so much about the
transformation of the “fallen from grace” but the reproduction of the “fallen into irrealism”?
3.1.4.4 Four hermeneutical circles
Bhaskar (1998:153) speaks of the tradition as producing four sets of “hermeneutical circles”
which he enumerates “C1” to “C4”. Consistent with his theory of science he claims C1 as “a
condition of any act of enquiry” and C2 as “a condition for any dialogue”, in the sense of
27Waaijman’s (2002) “forms and foundations” are now largely out of date and where they endure
they have done so for a significant period. At their monasticised “high point” few legal alternatives
were possible, and to rebel meant death, imprisonment or exile. Their coercive strength relied heavily
on the pre-Copernican worldview and one may argue that this worldview still haunts us in a number
of social “ownership” ills and structures of our time. It is fitting that we wish to reduce their harm
because the world needs to heal itself. If we are to be afforded this opportunity, we are required to
become agents of change.
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which and in another context Perrin (2007:41 cf. Kourie 2009:164) can claim “Hermeneutics
… can be applied to … all aspects of human life.” C1 and C2 are thus, following Gadamer
“universal” across scientific divides and that due to the limits on naturalism in the human
sciences,  the  conceptions  of  C3  as  including  interpretation  of  other  cultures  and  C4  as
including  interpretations  of  meaningful  objects,  are  specific  to  human sciences  alone.  In
critique of tradition, Bhaskar says that C4 cannot be modelled on “communicative acts” or
“context”. Both C3 and C4 require “dialogical social enquiry” and “non-logocentric reading”.
The various  hermeneutical  circles as exercises in  Verstehen can however  be described as
being in a part-whole relationship. Bhaskar’s critique of the interpretive tradition is aimed
mostly at what he envisions as an inadequate linguistic formulation of Verstehen. I suppose
here, we all have a bit of difficulty? Lest the critique presented in summary form here appear
an over-generalisation, it must be noted that Gadamer is a special case and Bhaskar does pay
tribute to his ingenuity in trying to come to an understanding of ontological depth, especially
(I suspect) in Gadamer’s “aesthetics”?  
3.1.5 The critique of ideology: an appropriation for Spirituality.
There is in my opinion a very important character to critical realism as a philosophy from the
margins, undoubtedly part of Bhaskar’s experience (of expatriated, post-World War II, Anglo
Indian  heritage).  It  is  often  the  case  in  my own experience  that  the  marginalised,  their
experiences of hegemonic relational constraints of poverty, class, sexuality, race and gender,
are  aware  of  possibilities  in  science,  law,  economics,  politics  and  religion  that  are  not
immediately apparent to those who are more complacently accommodated in the tyranny of
the “normal”. 
I think it also clear that institutions and social forms as relatively enduring structures are the
most likely purveyors of ideology as understood by Bhaskar. Institutions and the relations
they encourage are notoriously difficult to transform because having come to ideologically
held power and governmental funding (and sharing similar notions of what the world must be
like)  they  exist  however,  under  the  condition  of  freedom  that  presupposes  that  such
transformation is possible.  In every arena this condition is based on our ability for rational
judgement (reflexivity/wisdom) upon which belief of the intelligibility of science rests and in
which social world we can act for eudaimonia and the free flourishing of all. This goes some
way  to  show  that  after  some  reading,  the  concepts  of  critical  realism  and  their  easier
applicability are simple to grasp and obvious in themselves. Critical realism is in this regard
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not  merely  another  philosophical  movement  it  is  in  my  humble  judgement  a  veritable
revolution in the realm of epistemology and if extrapolated, an explanation and offering for a
spiritual conversion of everyday life.
I have to note that a critique of one’s personal consciousness is a very powerful thing. For
instance, in “Scientific explanation and human emancipation” (1980) and elsewhere ([1979]
1998,  2012:125-144),  Bhaskar  elaborates  an  ethical  argument  grounded  on  truth  and
consistency. If it is to succeed here as to the level it has done so internationally then I suggest
what is required of us as an intellectual community is a certain reformation of the mind and
the will,  to recognise a long overdue and unparalleled reflection on the nature of science
extrapolated  to  the  every-day  world  of  existence.  We  certainly  need  an  account  of
transformation, emergent causality and the autonomy of the intentional realm, its limits and
possibilities,  different  from  the  type  of  sociological/psychological  heuristic  “taping”  of
nomothetic and idiographic parts to fit an argument (I would suggest, that we’ve all seen it
practiced  if  not  recognised  it!).  How  can  academic  Spirituality  resist  a  true  critique  of
consciousness, if not for ideological reasons? If the inter-disciplinary or hermeneutic methods
are valuable we need to know by analysis of the stature with which critical realism provides,
their limits and possibilities for instance the distinction of “forms of life” (Bhaskar 1998:134-
135) as existential expressions of socially mediated ontological depth and not as taxonomic
categories of determinist expectation.
The transformative resonance that critical realism as a global movement sets-up, relies on a
certain  self-appropriating  freedom by the  agents  who provide the material  conditions  for
knowledge in the social cube. Freedom to act on the part of others is sui generis insofar as it
frees the academic will to inform itself of the argument. This dissertation underlabours under
these conditions and in this  purpose: the literary material on South African shores is still
inadequate and in short number however this state of affairs transforms from week to week
and improves our chances of partaking in the growing interest which I have contended, has
made and will continue to make critical realism an inevitable contemplation for all students
of the natural and human sciences. This dissertation is written in a transformative moment
(however small) in the history of epistemology of a regional context and therefore furthers a
transformative interest.
From  the  number  of  articles  in  López  and  Potter  (2001)  for  example,  but  also  in  the
Routledge studies in critical realism series, one notes the disparate interests from ecology,
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sustainability and information systems. As numerous authors have noted readers of critical
realism are often students of other disciplines. So too I believe spirituality scholars will find
in  critical  realism a  vindication  of  the  many (methodological  and material)  values,  upon
which (consciously or unconsciously) Spirituality operates as an identifiable and emerging
resonance-effect in an open field of epistemology and existence. 
3.1.5.1 Analytic philosophy: room at the “critical” inn, anybody...?
In  a  clearly  transcendental  movement  Bhaskar  argues  the  philosophical  imperative  of
conceptual critique expressed logically as social criticism so producing the conditions for the
moral  imperative  of  emancipation  which,  as  structurally  undergirded  condition  for  the
emergence of both critical realism and of a more liberating conceptualisation of the role of
dialectic, precedes it.  Bhaskar’s project here (1998:vi) is, “to reclaim reality for itself.  To
reclaim it  from philosophical  ideologies  – such as  empiricism or  idealism – which have
tacitly or explicitly defined [reality] in terms of some specific human attribute, such as sense-
experience, intuition or axiomatic-cination, for some or other restricted – individual or group
–  interest”.  His  inspiration  is  Marxian  (reason  as  dialectic)  and  is  an  extrapolation  of
Edgeley’s (1976) “account of how purely descriptive and explanatory theory can be critical of
its  object”  (cf.  Bhaskar  & Collier  1998:390).  Consequently as  Bhaskar  exposes  the false
dichotomy between  facts  and  values  which  is  heir  to Hume’s  Law and  the  concomitant
impossibility  of  value  neutrality  in  social  science,  he  conceptually  builds  a  case  for  a
modified ethical naturalism for which one hopes, room may be found in the “critical” inn. 
3.1.5.2 …for an ethical heart?
This is nothing more than presenting the ethical “heart” implicit in the discursive conditions
for philosophy: dialectic as process of emancipation; (a) intrinsic in any cognitive product of
rational judgement (Bhaskar 1980:16); (b) the ways that theory transforms practice (Bhaskar
1993:418-43); (c) the Freudian tradition of consciousness raising and “depth work” and (d)
the level of practical rationality (1993:459-61). It has philosophical repercussions for all sorts
of  interrelated  “implicits”  in  the  emergent  literature  of  spirituality  be  they  described  as
“implicit  religion”,  “emergent  spirituality”  or  “post-secular  spirituality”  and  the  more
fundamental concepts of agency, ontological depth, transformation within the social cube,
these must presuppose. In short, from the exposition of an emancipative imperative as social
cause  (amongst  other  things)  be  they  still  emerging  or  inadequately  conceptualised,  the
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proposition of (cognitively) limited naturalism in the study of spirituality must continue to be
posed.
3.1.5.3. A rhetorical question?
It may be argued that Bhaskar as part of a personal conviction to right certain wrongs, sets up
a dichotomy in his social theory in which “reproduction” and “production” of knowledge are
less admirable than its “transformation”,  similar to the “dharma/karma” dichotomy of the
East (Bhaskar 2012:45) in the sense that one may move from more or less unconscious living
(reproduction) to enlightenment and consciousness. We should note that these terms become
synonyms  for  condition  and  end-state  respectively  in  Bhaskar’s  and  Hartwig’s  (2010:5)
conception of transformation.
One may wish to pose a question: Surely we learn our skills first in the former productive
practices?  The  point  is  taken  that  these  can  remain  a  trap  for  entire  academic  careers
especially unreflective of their epistemological bases, especially at the level of substantive
sciences. But do these initial steps not warrant too, the good of philosophy and science? To
revisit a point made earlier: in all probability and all things being equal that the relative lack
of literature in South African libraries and in insufficient numbers for quick inter-library loans
sets certain real limits on the possibilities on the number of dissertations from South African
institutions of higher learning, dealing with critical  realism. Does not the under-labouring
aspect  of this  dissertation,  replete  with  reproduction of  critical  realism,  not  transform an
awareness (reflexivity) in the “behind the scenes” and “in the corridors” of those institutions?
If  this  were  impossible,  and that  the  only platform for  such reproductions  be  limited  to
publications, the point of recursively based undergraduate studies is redundant.
Mezirow (2000:xii) describes his findings on transformative learning thus:
Findings suggested that a generic development in which maturity in childhood
is  understood  as  a  formative process  that  includes  assimilation  of  beliefs
concerning oneself  and the world,  including socialization and learning adult
roles.  Adulthood  was  perceived  as  a  transformative  process  –  involving
alienation from those roles,  reframing new perspectives,  and reengaging life
with greater degree of self-determination. The process was characterized as a
praxis,  a  dialectic  in  which  understanding and action interact  to  produce  an
altered state of being.
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Perhaps Bhaskar’s  interest  is  primarily the matter  of  transformation,  the emancipation of
science and society and in the face of which,  their  reproductions must appear more than
merely  frustrating.  However,  the  point  cannot  be  left  there,  dharma  and  karma,
transformation and reproduction, respectively apply to “a life”, namely beyond the limits of
naturalism  and  ill-fitting  taxonomies  of  social  theory.  While  the  resonance  of  dharma,
transforms  the  life  born  into  the  conditions  of  karma  and  (re-)  production,  a  dialectical
relationship is set up that is only superficially dualistic. Though the dialectical presence of
our conditions never leave us (until we leave them and life as we know it), practice in the arts
of  transformation  con-join  with  theories  of  transformation  in  praxis  that  can  be  truly
experienced as non-dual and unitive at the level of “alethic” being.  
Bhaskar’s explanations have often been paraphrased here as, “Why so-and-so got it wrong…”
How  is  it  that  we  get  things  wrong?  We  have  already  understood  that  multiple  social
influences  and  relatively  enduring  relations  act  as  causal  structures  in  the  “doing”  of
substantive  sciences  and  which,  all  things  being  equal  (ceteris  paribus)  might  have
influenced us to get things right. It follows then that the same conditions which produce truth
produce error. The multiplicity of  telos and outcomes, must then presuppose a condition’s
non-preference or non-duality. 
3.2 Bhaskar’s dialectic
From the development of Bhaskar’s conception of explanatory techniques, it will be noted
that Bhaskar is becoming more interested in the good of philosophy and its power to critique
ideology and deliver people into a new conceptualisation of reality, which is emancipating in
the sense of truth making us free. It is for this reason that in Dialectic: the pulse of freedom
(1993:120) Bhaskar seeks to provide a unified theory of dialectic, a choice he defends thus:
Dialectic  has  the  closest  possible  etymological,  historical  and thematic  links
with argument … However straight away … we must distinguish between (a)
wide  from (b) more rigorous sense of ‘dialectical argument’. The former (a)
embraces  anything  from the  expansive  sense  of  interplay  mentioned  above,
through any systematic interconnection that unites a body of thought to, such as
absolute idealism, Marxism or dialectical critical realism of a 1M – 4D kind,
which  has  any  claim  to  be  called  ‘dialectical’  [demonstrating]  dialectical
connection as between distinct but inseparable elements. The latter (b) includes
only  arguments  which  turn  in  an  essential  way  upon  2E  notions  of  real
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negativity or contradiction, that is, which involve absence or mutual exclusivity
(in addition to internal relationality).
The final chapter of Bhaskar (1998, cf. Bhaskar & Norrie 1998:561) and the sources for the
theory of explanatory techniques are proleptic of conceptual development here. Bhaskar and
others  (in  the  Routledge series)  have  provided useful  summaries  of  its  development  and
contents in extracts and articles elsewhere as are detailed descriptions of the major concepts
of dialectic, four degrees of Critical realism, negation, absence, totality, emergence and the
dialectic of desire of freedom.
3.2.1 The pre-eminence of absence
So it is in Dialectic: The pulse of freedom (1993) that Bhaskars’s meta-critique gains pivotal
ground. The usual pattern of critique,  explanation and re-theorising are discernible in his
presentation. If critical realism is to be described as a philosophical attempt to think being,
Dialectical critical realism is an attempt to think absence (Bhaskar 2012:37-38). Why is this
important? Bhaskar asserts that logically, being must presuppose its own contradiction. Both
as term and philosophical concept being must be set against  and presuppose a ground of
“non-being”  out  of  which  it  becomes (ontologically)  and  which  gives  being its
epistemological  definition  and  bounds  (meaning).  Therefore  if  critical  realism  is  to  re-
vindicate  being  by offering  it  a  totalisation  (its  full  ontological  due)  it  must  address  its
dialectical ontological partners of “absence” or “negation”. Secondly if critical realism is to
sustain its basic critique of positivism a purely positive statement of ontology defeats itself.
To  maintain  its  own  coherence  then  a  “negative  dialectical  totalisation”  of  ontology  is
required (Bhaskar 1993:3-8;  itallics added): “In this study, I aim to re-vindicate negativity
… , I would like the reader to see the positive as a tiny, but important ripple on the surface of
a sea of negativity.” Also:
I shall be occupied with negativity and negation in many other senses of the
verb ‘to’ , negate, including, ‘deny’, ‘reject’, ‘contradict’, ‘oppose’, ‘exclude’,
‘criticize’, and ‘condemn’, and with their interconnections.   
Bhaskar (1993:239-240) makes the distinction: 
Thus negativity is systematically connected with space-time, and negation with
geo-history … Contrary to almost all philosophers … in that I argue negative
without positive being is possible but the contrary is  not the case,  I am not
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primarily concerned with nothing and nothingness, but with  real determinate
non-being … And my base concept of non-being is absence,  the simplest and
most elemental concept of all. It is easy enough to see that any world containing
change  must  contain  absence  …  Moreover,  insofar  as  all  transcendental
arguments  turn  on  agency  …  all  transcendental  argument  must  be  seen  to
presuppose the category of absence. 
3.2.2 Eight genealogies of dialectic
Thus the project requires an analysis, explanation and critique of the history of  dialectic.
Bhaskar’s primary sources (1993:100-102) include: (1) Heraclitus’ dialectical contradictions
“identified by Marx as generative”, (2) Socrates’ dialectical arguments modified by Aristotle
“to  the  pursuit  of  groundable  ideas”,  (3)  Plato’s  dialectical  reason  conceptually  daring
flexibility of mind leading to “ alethically grounded and materialistically mediated practices
of collective self emancipation”, (4) Aristotle’s  dialectical propaedeutics,  a combination of
Socrates and Plato “it sets the boundary conditions for the continual circulation in and out of
the sphere of formal reasoning, in which meanings and (e.g. truth) values remain fixed and
determinate  …  characteristic  of  all  (meaningful)  discourse  in  science  and  ordinary  life
alike.”, (5) Plotinus’ and Schiller’s dialectical process, “This normally postulates an original
undifferentiated unity, geo-historical diremption28 or diaspora and an eventual return to a non-
alienated but differentiated self or unity-in-diversity: and it constitutes a deep rooted  theme
in Judaic/Christian/neo-Platonic thought. In Marxism … “a spur in the struggle for a society
involving the abolition of all systematic forms of exploitation, subjugation and repression.”
(6)  Hegel’s dialectical  intelligibility  or  “immanent  critique  of  … conceptual  and  socio-
cultural forms”. In Marx, “the explanatory critique of the causally generated production of
social phenomena …” (7) Marx’s dialectical praxis, “unity of theory and praxis (‘absolute
reason’) in practice (not, as Hegel, in theory) in the non-preservative transformative negation
of  oppressive  social  forms.”  (8)  Kant’s,  Hegel’s,  Marx’s  and critical  realism’s  dialectical
freedom which is “Dependent upon the achievement of absolute reason in dialectical praxis
and  the  transformation  of  dialectical  intelligibility  … this  encompasses  the  absenting  of
28In concurrence with Bhaskar’s conception of “irrealism”, Gillian Rose (1992: 45-56) clearly analyzes and
discerns  a  continued  “Diremption  of  Spirit”  in  the  post-Kantian  (postmodern?)  hermeneutical  tradition,
quipping: “O Shadowy Spirit – whereto your Substance? O protean and ghoulish Subtext – what is your Text? O
multiple opacity – what is your Actuality?”
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constraints  [including]  the  Hegelian  dialectic  of  reciprocal  recognition  and  the  Marxian
dialectic of real de-alienation, but generalizes … these dialectics to aspire to the achievement
of  a  naturalistically grounded social  humanity in  a  trans-specific  pluralistic  global  order,
subject  to  the  material  conditioning  imposed  by natural  constraints,  oriented  to  the  self-
realization of the concrete singularity of all …”
In Bhaskar (1993:2) the author claims as he does in Archer (1998:xix):
The dialectical phase of critical realism … had three main objectives: (1) The
dialectical  enrichment  of  critical  realism;  (2)  the  development  of  a  general
theory of dialectic, of which Hegelian dialectic could be shown to be a general,
limiting  case,  [and  in  (1993:3)  adds]  capable  of  functioning  as  agencies  of
human self-emancipation;  (3) the generation of the rudiments of a  totalizing
critique of Western Philosophy.
3.2.3 The dialectical enrichment of critical realism
The  “dialectical  enrichment  of  critical  realism”,  in  terms  of  the  synchronic  slicing  in
Bhaskar’s system targets critical realism through the lense of 2E negativity. Thus Bhaskar
claims (1993:299): “The system of dialectical critical realism constitutes a second wave of
critical realism, structured around the critique of  ontological monovalence [flattening] and
pivoting on the  ontological  primacy of  the category of  absence. The result  is  a  regional
extension on to the terrain of dialectics…” However, the enrichment so claimed is multi-
dimensional,  meaning  that  its  usual  concepts  and  critiques  as  encountered  above  are
broadened and deepened.  For  instance  the  critique  on positivist  ambiguation  of  the  real,
actual and empirical realms receives greater analytical restatement (Bhaskar 1993:230-235)
and the exposition of epistemic fallacy is transformed into a critique of irrealism. 
Since we have already covered most of these dissatisfactions we can focus later merely on
this enrichment of them as “dialectical effects” which are decidedly ethical, transformative
and proleptic of his philosophy of meta-reality. Bhaskar and Norrie (1998:561) write: “The
central task of Bhaskar (1993) is to synthesise dialectical methods with existing critical realist
concerns”. The effect is to radicalise concepts within critical realism by re-interpreting and
expanding Hegel’s ideas of identity, negativity and totality to include transformative agency.
In this way the concepts of critical realism are pushed into the realm of morality and ethics. A
further way in which critical realism is enriched here is the appearance, of a proliferation of
105
figure, for the first time and which some may find useful because they not only describe the
conceptual development of this book but of the earlier works too.
3.2.4 Development of dialectical theory
The chapters in Bhaskar’s (1993:iv) publication are indicative of his development as already
presented: 
 1 Introduction: Critical realism, Hegelian Dialectic and the Problems of Philosophy
 -    Preliminary Considerations
2 Dialectic:The Logic of Absence – Arguments, Themes, Perspectives, Configurations
3 Dialectical Critical realism and the Dialectic of Freedom
4 Metacritical Dialectics: Irrealism and Its Consequences
It should be noted that as the reconceived dialectical theory emerges, as a meta-epistemology,
dialectic takes on a synthetic quality and it is in this vain that Bhaskar critiques a stand-alone
emphasis (value) of analysis (and the analytical mind) in the dialectical tradition of Western
philosophy. As an aside, in his nuance of “to negate” above Bhaskar mentions “condemn”. A
connection may be made here with a further synonym which appears in spirituality literature,
apophasis whose original  pre-Christian  usage  (Blackwell  2003)  meant  to  condemn or  to
indict acts of treason and corruption. While its legal nuance is lost in the Christian tradition
and replaced there with a formulaic anathema, the indictment of purely positive descriptions
of God (the premise of negative theology) is a limited case proleptic of critical  realism’s
critique of positivism and therefore for some, an interesting parallel.
Bhaskar and Norrie (1998:562):
This complex and profound development of critical realism involves a broad
and  multiform treatment  of  dialectic:  in  its  historical  and  systematic  forms;
epistemically, as the logic of argument and the method of immanent critique;
ontologically,  as the dynamic of conflict  and the mechanism of change; and
normatively-practically, as the axiology of freedom.
Obviously dialectic is operative at many levels in the history of Western thought.  One way of
characterising  dialectic  is  to  note  the  bi-polar  opposite  assertions  and  positions,  yet
necessarily related (mutually presupposing) concerns of those assertions within a debate. 
106
This is dialectic at the coal face of substantive philosophy, which ideally leads to refinement
of oppositions and an enrichment of conceptualisation of the philosophical concerns at hand.
Dialectic can also lead to reversal in the sense of Kuhns’ “falsifyability”.
Bhaskar claims (1993:3-4):
… dialectic has come to signify any more or less intricate process of conceptual or
social…conflict,  interconnection  and  change,  in  which  the  generation,
interpenetration and clash of oppositions, leading to their transcendence in a fuller or
more adequate mode of thought or form of life … plays a key role. But … dialectical
processes and configurations are not always … preservative.
The  dialectical  processes  and  configurations  exist  at  levels  of  “ontological”  dialectics,
“epistemological  dialectics”,  “relational  dialectics”,  “practical”  dialectics,  “meta-
epistemological” dialectic operative at many levels of knowing and being within dimensions
and inter-relations of the social cube and into the intransitive and transitive dimensions of
science.  Dialectic  receives  the  full  stratified  and  differentiated  ontological  treatment  of
critical  realist  analysis.  Dialectic  can  also  result  in  a  most  important  (for  Bhaskar’s
development)  remedy  of  argument  as  in  immanent  critique,  discussed  above.  Derridian
“deconstruction” is therefore a dialectical moment in the history of philosophy. It  is also
evident that dialectic is responsible for the “unity of Greek Philosophy” (Strauss 2012:55-75)
and that dialectic pervades all fields in philosophy (Strauss 2011:207-217). It is plain to see
that in Bhaskar’s opinion, theories of incommensurability or irrealism defeat or suspend the
possibility of dialectic.
Dialectic  is  therefore  not  only  systematic  but  historical  and  trans-historical,  constituting
movements and epochs in Philosophy. It is a short stretch following the Marxian-Hegelian
nexus for Bhaskar to discern dialectic within social forces, and the history of history and most
notably in revolutionary and emancipative movements. Consequently the unified theory of
dialectic that this philosopher proposes moves from philosophy into the realm of the social as
a  critical  tool  for  the  emancipation  of  people.  I  think  it  is  obvious  to  note  that  such
emancipations  happen over  time within cumulative events  that  bring tension and release.
Social  dialectic  like  that  of  its  epistemic  systematisation,  exhibits  pulse-like  rhythm and
moments of excitement.
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3.2.4.1 Dialectic: logic of negation
I remember in years past dialectic was presented by a teacher as “a negation of contradiction”
and  this  explanation  was  based  on  the  Parmenidean-Aristotelian  expansion  of  identity-
relations  which  embargoed  contradiction  in  a  law-like  principle  of  “non-contradiction”.
Bhaskar  disagrees.  In  a  nut  shell  he  claims  that  without  contradiction  there  can  be  no
learning, correction nor betterment. Contradiction is not something we can or should avoid
and  for  this  reason  dialectical  critical  realism is  based  on a  principle  of  non-identity  or
negation. Negation is real and has a causal effect which is “to negate” or cause absence.  This
absence or negation also is stratified and differentiated in its effects (Bhaskar 1993:5):
[Negation can be] … determinate absence or non-being (i.e.  including non-
existence). It may denote an absence … from consciousness (e.g. the unknown,
the tacit,  the unconscious), and/or of an entity, property or attribute (e.g. the
spaces  in  a  text)  in  some  determinate  space-time  region,  e.g.  in  virtue  of
distanciation,  or  mediation,  death  or  demise,  or  simple  non-existence.  It
connotes, inter alia, the hidden, the empty, the outside: desire, lack and need…
Of course what is absent or void at or from one level, region or perspective may
be present at another. This is what I shall refer to as the ‘duality of absence’. 
Consequently for Bhaskar (1993:174-6), at its primary level dialectic is absenting a mistake.
Since  a  mistake  is  an  absence  of  knowledge,  dialectic  is  an  absenting  of  absence.  Thus
dialectic can be universalised or generalised to all spheres and strata of existence, absenting
ills, absenting constraints, absenting un-freedom, and therefore is “the axiology of freedom”.
Consequently, the absenting action of critique is part of critical realism’s dialectical mission.  
3.2.5. Absence and dialectical critique
Consequently,  understanding dialectic  as  the  logic  or  causal  effect  of  absence  (“absence,
absenting absences”) in the world requires that causal absence cannot be reduced to a mere
social conception, or a conceived contradiction, or inconsistency (Bhaskar 1993:67). What
then is needed and which Bhaskar hopes to provide is a theory of Absence/negation (Bhaskar
2012:37-38),  an  adequate  conceptualisation  of  which  has  itself  been  absented  from the
philosophical tradition, by positivistically described identity, anthropically monovalent and
contradiction intolerant accounts of  being.   Ultimately it  is  important  to theorise  absence
because the critiques of “epistemic”, “actualist”, “positivist” and other fallacies can be tied
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together as parts of a greater “anthropic fallacy”; the reduction of “being” to “human” being
or “human experience” of that being, usually described positivistically. “I have argued that
any theory of knowledge presupposes an ontology, in the sense of an account of what the
world must  be like,  for  knowledge,  under  the descriptions  given it  by that  theory,  to  be
possible”  (Bhaskar  1993:205).  For  Bhaskar  being  pre-exists knowing.  If  therefore
epistemological  dialectic  depends  on  “absence”,  however  ill-conceived  or  hidden  that
absence is from theory, does not remove its ontological status in the intransitive dimension of
things,thus making a purely positivist account of being untenable. The fact that absence is
multiform and therefore stratified necessitates its reality or ontological depth - so too for truth
and dialectic.
3.2.6 Non-Identity, non-duality, intellect and morality in space-time
In critical realism till this point the prime moment has rested on a non-identity between being
and  knowing.  Here  the  non-identity  affords  a  critique  of  anthropic  “centrism”  and
recommends a moral decentring from the ego (Bhaskar 1993:207-308 passim.). Important for
philosophy it prevents the susceptibility to the standard view on subject-object relations and
the  dualisms  that  follow  it.  Decentring  from  an  ever  present  ego  requires  the
acknowledgement  that  the  geo-historical  past  is  present  in  us  (an  important  insight  for
epistemology and  spirituality)  constituting  a  deflation  of  ego-centricity  and exposing  the
fallacy of scientific and social individualisms 29(Bhaskar 1993:208). In asserting the reality of
time and space Bhaskar (1993:210) notes:
There  is  nothing anthropocentric  about  the  reality  of  space,  time,  tense  and
process.  I  defend the irreducibility of  Mac Taggart’s  A series  (past,  present,
future) to his B series (earlier than, simultaneous with, later than), that is, to be
specific, the reality of tense and the irreducibility of space-time on any world-
line both for the transitive observer and the intransitivity of the observed.
The contribution bares some thinking. Mac Taggart’s relativist analysis need not detain us
here. Bhaskar’s position reflects the theoretical reality of Einstein’s concept of “space-time”
29Bhaskar (1993:208) notes  the importance of reasserting the geo-history of  being,  “of  tense and place as
irreducible and spatio-temporality as real, of the tri-unity of space, time and causality in tensed spatialising
process  of  emergent,  divergent,  possibly  convergent,  efficacious  spatio-temporalities  and  rhythmic,  of  the
constitutive presence of the past and outside.”
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as a medium with inter-causal effect. As a medium space-time envelopes us (mediated by
gravity and the electromagnetic field) in what Bhaskar might say is the intransitive dimension
of reality, however as he claims, we are capable in the transitive dimension of penetrating
time (in its zones) by a telephone call and penetrating space with supersonic flight. Bhaskar’s
insight is that the intransitive “non-duality”’ of space-time can be experienced as a duality
whose effects can be relatively interfered with in the transitive dimension. So too, although
conditioned by past determinants, “being with” someone “in the moment” can cut though the
effect of the experienced duality and this penetration is not just an effect but a reality. We do
not in the moment effect time-space continuum but penetrate its dualistic features to its non-
dual status of reality. We do not relativise space-time or reduce it to the Mac Taggart’s B
experience, but transcend the transitive to experience the intransitive dimension of non-dual
space-time. 
Bhaskar’s later, but shortly introduced concept of “non-duality” of the intransitive dimension
of life is already discernible.  However this concept rests on acknowledging the intransitivity
of real categories in an attitude of realism.
3.2.7 The otherness of reality 
The  “otherness”  of  contradiction  (“alterity”)  necessitates  a  referential  detachment  in  the
knower as does the otherness of existential intransigence in the social being. In a species-
being able to differentiate and discriminate a certain distancing is required in our analysis of
the otherness of space and time. What alterity masks, is absence. For Bhaskar (1993:72-73),
contradiction has a “dialectical fertility” exhibiting a challenge to our complacency. Linking
his  ideas  on  dialectic  and  meta-critique  the  author  claims:  “There  are  seven  main
philosophical errors conjugating around contradiction”: 
(a) To logicize being – by using the principle of non-contradiction as a criterion – or,
in Hegel’s case, contradiction as a postulate – for defining reality;
(b) To detotalize being – by refusing to admit the existence of contradictions (logical
ones included) in reality;
(c) To  belittle  or  obtund  the  significance  of  contradictions  –  either  as  bases  for
criticism and/or harbingers, indeed dynamos, of change; 
(d) To acquiesce to, rather than try to resolve (or more generally seek an appropriate
response to), contradictions
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(e) To imagine triumphalistically that such resolutions are always possible, even if
only in principle
(f) To assume that once a system contains a contradiction, contradictions must spread
universally and inexorably throughout it;
(g) To be intimidated by, or fight shy, of them.
These  errors,  though  not  consistent,  are  not  unconnected:  they  form a  dialectical
ensemble.
3.2.8  The  programme of  practical  mysticism:  rational  judgement,  reflexivity,  truth,
trust and alethia.
This  dissertation  must  soon  focus  on  Bhaskar’s  realm  of  the  “meta”  and  his  theory  of
practical mysticism which is conceived to emerge from natural roots in the deep strata of
being:  cognitively  encompassing  reflection  on  the  “is”  realm  and  morally  a  reflexive
reflection  on  “ought”.  To  counter  any  split  or  dichotomy,  Bhaskar  (2012:19-23)  has
demonstrated the defeat of Hume’s Law which along with its contribution to irrealism and
ontological  monovalence  in  Western  philosophy also  has  played havoc with  truth  theory
generally. Bhaskar may claim to re-vindicate a moral ground to rational judgement based on
the insight that all conversation assumes the values of truth and consistency. From there the
author expounds the human virtue and ontological reality of trust, the principle of “alethia” -
the ground-state of agency, reflexivity, rational judgement and the axiology of emancipation,
accounting for inaction as action and the fact that we cannot but act morally (including a-
morally)  from an  “is”.  This  presents  the  argument  in  a  broad  stroke  which  needs  some
complementation. Firstly Bhaskar (1993:174):
In articulating dialectic as absenting absences,  and socio-substantively as the
conatus for freedom (and, further, universal human flourishing in the context of
their species and nature generally), I am going to employ three complimentary
approaches:
1. A retroductive explanatory derivation of the concept from its genealogy;
2. A meta-critical exposition of the concept within dialectical critical realism, in its
‘positive’, ‘negative (critical)’ and systematic extensions.
3. A critique,  traditional  (‘transcendent’),  immanent  and proto-explanatory (meta-
critical), of analytics, or more generally the analytic problematic.
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From this method, Bhaskar (1993:175) extracts a theory of dialectic as “logic of change”: 
It  is  naturalist,  in the threefold sense (1) that it  entails  an emergent powers
materialism, in which society is materialized ultimately in virtue of embodied
intentional causal agency reacting back on the kinds of materials out of which it
is  formed;  (2)  [thus]  it  legitimates  the  possibility  of  an  explanatory  social
science;  and (3) that it  licenses us to  pass from purely factual  to evaluative
conclusions. 
Central to his advance on “alethia” is Bhaskar’s (1993:214) treatment of truth: 
‘Truth’ seems at once (a) the simplest and (b) the most difficult of concepts. (a)
Saying ‘true’ to a proposition is to give one’s assent to it – that is its primary
function,  whereby  redundancy  and  performative  theories  derive  their
plausibility. But one is thereby committed to a claim about the world, roughly
to the effect that that is how things are, from which correspondence theories
from the time of Aristotle have drawn their currency. This claim carries the
normative force ‘trust me – act on it’,  whence pragmatic theories gain their
footing. At the same time this claim, if challenged, needs to be  grounded,  a
requirement that seems to point in the direction of coherence theories.  So a
truth judgement will typically carry a fourfold dimentionality,  possessing (i)
expressively  veracious,  (ii)  descriptive,  (iii)  evidential, (iv)  imperatival-
fiduciary aspects. This four-dimentionality is intrinsic to the judgement form as
such, and is  not limited to truth judgements. Each aspect is  universalizable,
albeit in different ways, and aspects may be loosely attached to the concrete
universal and the social cube … For the moment it is sufficient to appreciate
that  it  is  in  virtue  of  its  basic  world-reporting meaning  …  that  truth-talk
satisfies a transcendental-axiological need, acting as a steering mechanism for
language users to find their way about the world.
Bhaskar’s insight here contributes to a later reflection on worldview in the final section
of the dissertation.
Stemming  directly  from  the  normative-trustworthy  dimension  of  truth  experienced  in
everyday living and without which we would never stop and ask for directions when lost,
comes Bhaskar’s (1993:217, cf. Bhaskar 2012:xxiv,286) concept of alethia: “Truth is alethic,
112
as  the  truth  of  or  reason  for  things and  phenomena,  not  propositions,  as  genuinely
ontological, and in this sense as objective in the intransitive dimension.” One could say of
alethic truth that it is truth as “instantiation of being” (Cuppitt 1998).
Bhaskar  (1993:220-260)  notes  that  in  order  to  universalise  truth-talk  from theoretical  to
practical (moral) truth we must recognise two elements at the root of thought. 
Universalizability is both (a) a test for consistency and (b) a criterion of truth in
the fields of theoretical and practical reason alike.
I.End-states, which would be universalizable, are not always realizable by agents
(e.g.  one  can’t  get  from  x  to  everywhere  and  one  can’t  go  to  y  from  just
anywhere). However, in general it is plausible to suppose that one can progress
towards them, or mitigate regress away from them [P].
Put syllogistically the flow of reason here goes from a value (1) “be practical”, to satisfy (2)
“P” above and thereby (3) “be grounded in an explanatory theory or sets of theories of (a) the
current situation, (b) the desired end-sate and (c) the transition from (a) to (b)”.
Both  an  agent’s  praxis  and  its  groundings  should  be  universalizable  in  the
senses that they be 
1. Transfactual,
2.  concrete  –  satisfying  all  the  moments  of  the  concrete  universal
(including,  of course, concrete singularity).
3. actionable, in the sense of agent specific, and 
4.  transformative,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  oriented  to  change  (in  the
direction of the postulated end-state [P]).    
This claim about reason is then universalised.
A moral reasoning is a species of practical reasoning … it is (non-uniquely)
dialectically,  and  so  specifically  transfactually,  concretely  and  actionably,
‘binding’ and universalizable in form, and that its ultimate object is flourishing
humans-in-nature. Practical reasoning may arise from a failure to satisfy some
desire want or interest [an absence]. It logically presupposes a negative (proto-)
critique and a positive (proto-) theory of how to remedy the situation – an aspect
of the duality of theory and critique. To be slightly pedantic for a moment, what
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is  required  is  clearly  to  diagnose  the  problem,  explain  it  and  then  take
appropriate action to absent it.            
Fundamental to Bhaskar’s analysis of reason is that in order to fulfil these truth obligations
one must have a relationship with the alethic world-as-it-is, and our conception of the world
should  be  tried  in  reason  as  to  its  satisfaction  of  trans-factual,  concrete,  actionable  and
transformative aspects. These epistemological aspects of truth operate within the transitive
dimension but are nevertheless intransitive indicators of something trustworthy, namely truth
as  “what  it  is”  and invoking  an  instinctual  and rational  trust.  Trust  (including  levels  of
mistrust  (Bhaskar  1993:274)  requires  reflexitvity:  “in  its  most  basic  form  [reflexivity]
specifies the capacity of an agent or an institution to monitor and account for its activity … It
is  thus systematically connected,  in virtue or the intra-dependence of social  being,  to the
phenomenon of trust”. Thus it can be claimed that what guides the moral action is a reflexive
wisdom.
A distinction  which  is  worthy  of  constant  reminder  and  which  Bhaskar  often  makes,  is
between the intransitive and transitive dimensions in which trans-factual causality is said to
be resident in the former. How so for the question of morality? Critical realism spends much
time in the critique of “idealism” in both Kantian “categories” and Platonic “forms”, even so
moral realists must hold a place for objective morality in the intransitive dimension. What is
it  and  how  do  we  know?  In  short  the  answer  is  a  self-evident  confidence  in  naturally
occurring reason, the conditions for which are philosophically derivable of our species-life.
The obvious fact that we “are”, “act” and “know” before any debate about what it is we are,
act and know indicative on the same “alethia” which gives rise to rational judgement in the
realm of truth and knowledge, yet may produce error in the transitive dimension specifically
guides action through the exercise of reflexivity (Bhaskar 1993:260):
Thus as the criteria for rational agency one must: possess the knowledge to act
on one’s own real interests (the cognitive requirement); be able to access skill,
resources  and  opportunities  to  do  so  (the  empowered  component);  and  be
disposed to act (the dispositional or motivational condition). 
This leaves “the moral consciousness of the species in principle  open”.  This naturally open
moral power;  the ability to “transition from fact  to value”  (Bhaskar 1993:211) and from
theory to practice is thus susceptible to the (dialectical interdependent) relations of the social
cube.
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So there  is  an  ethical  alethia  ultimately  grounded  in  conceptions  of  human
nature … the anti-naturalist fallacy [e.g. hard social-contract or form theories]
often  functions  merely  to  screen  the  generation  of  an  implicit  emotivist  or
descriptivist  morality  reflecting  the  status  quo  ante  of  actually  existing  a-
morality – it de-moralizes. 
Therefore,  the  naturalistic  and  philosophically  derivable  position  of  alethic  realism  is
inexorable,  because  contradiction,  dialectic  and  absence  are  real,  as  are  our  rational
judgements  on  what  to  do  about  a  situation.  In  the  relational  or  transitive  dimension
descriptive morality and moral judgements are necessarily relative and diverse. It is evident
that being human means being in “action” and being in “knowledge” in the transitive sense,
however for Bhaskar, in the intransitive dimension we are conversely, active and knowing in
being.
The absence in which we have our being, for Bhaskar (1993:6-7) can be real, transformative
or radical. Radical negation is that “which involves the auto-subversion, transformation or
overcoming of a being or condition. It is important … to distinguish negating processes from
self-negating  processes  and  self-negating  processes  from  self-consciously  negating
processes.”  Contra Plato and Frege absence does not rely on a positive presence, but vice-
verse. “Non-being, within zero-level being, exists and is present everywhere”.  
3.2.8.1 The dialectical effect of Bhaskar’s system: totality and agency
In terms of Bhaskar’s (1993:207-238) system, 2E (experience of ontological limitation) is the
“abode” and “heartland” of absence/negativity and “the dialectical category par excellence”.
3L (a conception of “totality”) is the dialectical home of “unity and diversity”, “intrinsic and
extrinsic”,  “parts  and wholes”,  “concrete universals  as concrete singulars”,  “centrification
and peripheralization” present within partial totalities in complex and open process. “The
internal aspect of totality is  reflexivity”.  This accounts for intellectual distanciation, ethical
judgement, practical wisdom and the axiology of emancipation. It is interesting to note that
Bhaskar adopts non-identity as a “prime moment” in a philosophical movement to totality. A
dialectical totality or a totality including absence logically speaking cannot have a positive
identity and Bhaskar claims we can claim no privilege in it but to take our place as reflexive
agents  exercising  the  virtues  of  our  intellectual-moral  natures,  which  in  the  intransistive
realm is “non-dual”. However the abode of totality must be internally cohesive in some way.
Bhaskar (1993:209) states:
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Totality depends on internal relationality … aspects of intra-activity,  including
existential constitution of an element by another, permeation (or containment)
and  connectedness  (or  casusality)  … yields  at  once  hope  and  possibility  to
totalizing depth praxis … mediated not only by the reality principle (which we
can now call alethia) but also by the virtue of practical wisdom or phronesis.
This  reality  of  internal  reflexivity  at  the  heart  of  cosmic  totality  is  the  4D  zone  of
“transformative agency” decentred from humanity and thus universalised. However in human
agency operating at various levels “good reasons may be causes” to exercise the sometimes
necessary dialectical reversals of consciousness and self-consciousness in order to impart a
“highly  contingent,  directionality to  geo-history,  presaging  a  society  in  which  the  free
flourishing of each is the condition for the free flourishing of all. [Bhaskar adds] Agency …
trustworthy totalizing transformatist  transitional  praxis … is a species-specific ineliminable
fact. 
It is exactly this intellectual-moral agency which Bhaskar (1993:209) sees being reduced or
flattened in the history of philosophical discourse:
First, in the lack of a concept of embodied intentional causal agency. This may
take the form either of a physicalistic reductionism or a spiritualistic dualism –
the  former  entailing  de-agentification,  the  latter  dis-embodiment  –  or  both.
Second,  in  reification of  facts,  where ‘reification’ means the attribution of a
purely thing-like characteristic to human beings, their products and/or relations,
and  in  fetishism  of  conjunctions,  where  ‘fetishism’ means  the  attribution  of
animistic  (ultimately,  anthropomorphic)  magical  powers  to  things,  attendant
upon  empirical  realism.  Third,  in  the  logic  of  commodification  [:]  reducing
powers to their exercise. 
These for Bhaskar are the general philosophical causes of alienation. I would contend that
this ontology of agency or philosophical anthropology of emancipation is not a reduction to
optimism, it can and does experience reversal and contends with an open system in which
anything  can  happen,  including  hegemonically  judgemental  conceptions  of  anthropology
which proclaim sinfulness and fallen-ness and reductions to a singular pole of the duality
whilst, the non-dual ground is occluded. 
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The ultimate cure then is to realise the “alethic ground of being” for humans in the irreducible
“being of agency” and this constitutes the beginning of Bhaskar’s enquiry into the ground-
nature of being in the intransitive dimension and the enquiry into what that nature of the
human alethic ground state is.
3.2.8.2 Emergence
The basic idea of emergence is no longer a new concept for us here and therefore we can
afford a scant summary of argument. Bhaskar (1993:49-51, cf. Bhaskar 2012:234)) claims,
“In emergence, generally, new beings (entities, structures, totalities, concepts) are generated
out of pre-existing material from which they could have been neither induced or deduced.
There is a quantum leap…”30. We can see then that though things emerge from other pre-
existences, these pre-existents are not necessarily identified or able to be positively ascribed
at the time. Placing negativity as a dialectical background in total “otherness” to positively
present existence and as... opposite of the actual, “establishes distinct domains of difference
qua alterity – real determinate  other-being”. This otherness of negation as an ontological
causal realm (neither open to reduction or reification) is not a contradiction, but a reality of
being.  Emergence  always  happens  in  some  partnership  with  absence.  Conceptualising
dialectic  as  contradiction  dependent  only,  is  inadequate.  Conceptual  emergence  may  for
example  sometimes depend (Bhaskar  1993:55)  “upon the  exploitation of  past  or  exterior
cognitive resources … But it may also be affected by means of a perspectival switch, the
formation of a new Gestalt, level or order of coherence without any additional source”. 
3.2.9 Summing up the dialectic.
It  seems  evident  that  the  nature  of  dialectic  presented  here  is  an  enormously  rich  and
interwoven dance in the realms of being and knowing between partners: their presupposed
bipolar  opposites  set  up  the  conditions  of  their  ontology  and  their  role  in  that  dance.
Nevertheless between and encompassing the two partners a space is necessary for the dance-
partnership to take effect: Absence does not presuppose, but is nevertheless the condition for
presence. Non-being is a condition of the possibility of being and emergence in science and
life, neither being reducible to the other. From a meta-critical “balcony-view” we are able to
imagine a dialectical relationship between “analytic” separates and “dialectic” partnerships of
30I believe that this notion is similar to that of Zohar & Marshall’s (2000:115-163) “New model of the self”,
perhaps? 
117
thought  in  philosophy  “in  which  dialectical  reasoning  [moving  together]  ‘overreaches’
analytical  [separating]  reasoning”  (Bhaskar  &  Norrie  1998:565).  This  is  the  intellectual
development which sheds many of Bhaskar’s analytic friendships.
3.2.9.1 Absence is mediated by duality
If  the  bi-polarity  of  non-being and  being are  not  reductive  to  each  other,  what  form of
mediation or means connect them and their internal form to totality? Bhaskar’s answer is
“duality”. Duality is thus the conceptual target which concerns From East to West (2000), the
immediate  precursor  to  Bhaskar’s  philosophy  of  meta-reality  and  the  culmination  of
dialectical critical realism. Duality gives things their identity and distinction (in asymmetrical
relationship  (Bhaskar  2012:234))  within  “the combination  of  existential  interdependence”
(Bhaskar & Norrie 1998:565).
Duality locates the specific within the general, agency within structure, freedom
within the conditioned, and it is marked by two closely linked dialectical motifs:
those of hiatus-in-the-duality, which defends autonomy against either reificatory
[above/  outside  reality]  or  voluntaristic  [unlimited  achievement  of  wants]
collapse  [implicit  self  reductions  to  individualism],  as  well  as  locating  the
possibility of dislocation; and  perspectival shifts, such as that required by the
duality  of  structure  and  agency  in  sociological  contexts.  Similarly,
constellationality signifies  the  necessary  connectedness  of  things,  such  as
dialectical unity of dialectical and analytical reason described above: the former
builds on the latter, overreaching but not transcending it, while the latter is at a
loss without the former.
I  mentioned earlier  that  Bhaskar’s  dialectic  is  the  pivot  upon which  his  spiritual  turn  is
grounded. In the Hartwig interview entitled “The foundations of critical realism” (2010:119),
Hartwig calls Bhaskar’s 1993 publication an “extraordinarily ambitious agenda” one agrees,
with Hartwig and Wilson (2012:250), in accounting for the reality of absence, Bhaskar is
struggling with the problem of apophasis - “the problem of saying the not”. Making “the
unsayable  sayable”,  signals  for  Hartwig  and Wilson the  spiritual  turn.  It  is  obvious  that
Bhaskar’s  (2012:35-38,125,131-133,145-148)  idea  of  transcendence,  in  excess  of  Kee
(2002:121-136), is not in line with the usual religious reification but located in the acts of
transcendence in the mundanity of every-day life and which we hardly notice or speak of31. It
31Cf. Adorno & Horkheim (1944) esp. the comment that metaphysics has descended into micrology.
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is noteworthy that the “worlded-ness” of Bhaskar’s conception of spirituality loses him more
friends among the more religiously oriented “analytics” leading to some heated disagreement
amongst critical realist ranks.  Perhaps the best summary of the sticking point is found in
Bhaskar’s (2000:156) claim that:  “Religion hegemonizes the concept of spirituality,  so in
order  to  see  the  possibility  of  a  non-religious  secular  spirituality  you  have  to  go  via  it
[religion]”. I think this might be answer enough for Waaijman’s (2002:430) doubts on the
matter of secular spirituality and why he cannot see it as an emerging possibility. But there
again Waaijman has no exposure to the  Gestalt  of critical realism and therefore must fall
short of conceptual developments unavailable to him. 
For  Bhaskar  it  is  evident  that  traceable  religious  ideology whose  theological  hegemony,
socio-cultural influence and power relations have suppressed or rather reified transcendence
and emancipation.  As such the basic  conditions  of  human life  came to be  replaced with
discourses on, for instance “the spiritual man” as sacramental donatum in baptism, coercively
enacting a partition of “we the spiritual” from “they the secular/heathen/pagan” in which the
latter derogations are ill-defined,  confusing and punitive, “splitting” selves into irrealism and
demoralising spirit.  It  takes someone from the margins  to  see other  options32 despite  the
concerns of Slife & Scott-Richards (2001). These being the natural movement of spirituality
as anthropological and philosophically derivable good in non-dual openness and generosity:
whose freedom needs no control or catechism but whose formation by religious ideology,
presupposes that freedom, that openness and that generosity.  
What then constitutes the relative endurance of institutions or indeed Waaijman’s “forms”?
Obviously this must have a great deal to do with the meaning they afford to people. We have
seen  already  how  it  is  that  coercive  ideologies  and  TINA formations are  able  to  defy
rationality  for  hundreds  of  years.  However  meaning  is  not  purely  an  appropriation  of
ideology but is constituted in the relatively enduring but nevertheless real relations we have
with nature, ourselves, others and an evaluation of their status as natural and cognitive goods,
either contributing to sustainable truth and consistency or not. No institution,  I believe is
consistently good but each exist under the non-dual condition for such goodness as a natural
feature. This condition must cohere around an interior intentionality in a worldview context.
32Although Slife,  D & Scott-Richards,  P (2001),  note  the  difficulties  in  engaging  spirituality talk without
theology in the Psychotherapy room. 
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For an institution  or  world view to  attain  longevity it  must  presuppose  its  own intrinsic
ontological value for the flourishing of humanity, it must plainly speaking, “serve”. 
I think it reasonable to acknowledge that human agents who “join-up” or volunteer time to an
organisation  (especially  constitutionally  value-laden  ones)  of  other  (pre-existing)  human
doings/functions/mediations, do so for a number of reasons at various levels of awareness.
Nevertheless their  ontological contribution of self  in selflessness to take up positions and
hold office and the like reproduce/transform a possibly causative, meaningful, value-laden
discourse, already in place.  Meaning and appropriation of meanings is part  of the human
agency  which  then  continues  to  reproduce,  transform  or  perhaps  even  abandon  those
meaningful  discourses  and  their  institutionalised  embodiments.  The  cognitive  content  in
meanings must be open to reflexive critique and evaluation, in at least a few members or else
the organisation would fail. Self conscious evaluation, Bhaskar says rests in the experience of
a type of alethic congruence that is tested with our whole being and what we test is the truth
and consistency in the “depth-being” of a truth. Innately so the argument continues, humans
are drawn to the practice and practical value of learning, ontologically speaking theory and
praxis are an inseparable non-dual reality, rather I suspect, like “space-time”: analogy which
can enlighten our commonly held distinctions between Spirituality and spirituality. We do not
argue  that  these  distinctions  do  not  speak  of  realities,  but  rather  that  their  realities  self-
insinuate and therefore may belong to the same ontological non-duality: reflexive humanity
who wants and needs to be practical. Our linguistic convention, in bestowing a capital “S” to
the  epistemological  realm,  may  be  part  of  a  set  of  epistemological  conventions  which
legitimately yet  discursively mediate  a reality into a  discussion.  Note the discussion (the
smaller item) gets the bigger (capital) letter, when what it attempts to describe exceeds any
such  conception.  Both  “theory”  and  “practice”  aspects  of  the  non-dual  reflexivity  are,
possibly diminished/suspended/disoriented by lies, oversight, accepted convention and false
consciousness which produce cognitive dissonance and these might obviously impair rational
judgement, anything can happen. We are often blinded by dualism (perhaps a function of
Foucault’s  (1977) “occularism”?):  anything can happen because we occlude the wild and
ontological “spiriting” reality which begs a hidden but implied term of (S)(s)pirituality: not
an impossibility but merely another thought structure.   
If rupture and departure are possible it is so under the same condition as belonging. Rupture
or hiatus including the possibility of intra-psychic break-down must be indicative of a break
in one or other of the socially binding relations or a breakdown in the trust in their truth of
120
theory and consistency of praxis. Leaving an organisation however is not merely the only
option. We may then engage politically and both critically and dialectically oppose such as
many atheists have done so with the church. This is our freedom within the limitations of
social matrix so well described in Bhaskar’s conception of social theory. 
At core for rational judgement and a critique of consciousness to take place and an evaluation
of society made possible, we must have values and the possibility of transforming to those
ultimata. This is the insight which makes spirituality a very significant addition to the human
sciences. But where do we ground our values? In social contract? In form of life? In the Bible
(heaven forbid)? In Aristotle? Aquinas? Or any number of competing social forces, including
the existential intransigence in traditions and other ideological hegemonies of the world? The
question might seem naïve because values in their diverse plethora are probably the most pre-
interpreted aspect of human life. If this is so we reduce our evaluation of values to “because
someone else says so”. Obedience in this sense becomes slavery. Rather Bhaskar suggests the
truth of what others might say if indeed it is a necessary truth must be recognised as alethic,
self-evident  and  sui  generis:  existing  as  a  rational  intransitive  and  emerging  into
consciousness by their own rational good which we then translate into either social contract,
forms of life, religion etcetera. If we continue to reproduce a hermeneutical and uncritical
irrealism in our methodology or seek merely to continue reproducing Aristotle, without a
Gestalt shift we may not have any place to justify our truths and consistencies but back into
human exercise of epistemology and a diremption of values into the realm of relativism.
At some point we have to challenge the fact, though methodologically academic Spirituality
has done well generally, that there exists still an amount of obfuscation in our derivation of
values. Consequently, no explanation for betterment is possible without an account of non-
duality, absences, emergences, agency and progress. The ultimate assessment of Waaijman’s
(2002) contribution must rest on his ability to account for these things as trans-factually,
concretely, actionable and transformative. Rather I suspect he is perhaps guilty of standing
too  closely  to  Christian  theistic  categorical  mis-identifications  and  assumptions  which
ultimately must  lead  one to  question the  implied Christian “actual”  in  the weight  of  the
content  here  and  to  which  he  then  applies  a  formalistic  reduction,  and  despite  his
acknowledged attempts to reach for the interior concreteness of being? Perhaps further, his
dialogical method and critique of consciousness so implied, fails because (in denial of his
protestations), Waaijman fails to see depths of being or the openness of ontological systems,
discernible to Bhaskar: comparatively speaking Waaijman is seen to be religion “confined”:
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(Waaijman 2002:427) Perhaps, an unfair critique? However, it may be argued that under such
hegemony “dialogue” here becomes a thinly disguised heuristic construct undergirded by an
equally regional “aspected” historical reduction despite his best intentions. The absolutism of
theistic boundaries, though extended to that lexicon’s limits  merely extends theism into a
tyrannous regime which is sui-generis by consumption of its opposition. However, the point
is here taken that historically speaking the questions of being and its concrete life have long
been held in religious terms.
Since social structures so obviously avail themselves as taxanomic descriptions and therefore
must  (in  critical  realist  vain)  be  the  purview of  relative knowledge,  does  their  relatively
enduring existential intransitivity stand alone as adequate descriptive of value flourishing, a
critique of consciousness or foundations for Spirituality for that matter? “Where is social
structure?” asks John Scott (2001:77-86) or are they “metaphors for Social complexity”? Or
is  it  that  structures  acquire  causal  powers  donated  by  human  agents  or  in  dialectical
partnership  with  them  (as  I  have  intimated  above)  and  therefore  do  not  possess  an
autonomised causal power of a natural human kind? Even as heteronomically reduced agents,
people  act.  Where  is  Waaijman’s  empowerment  of  the  agent  outside  of  the  author’s
paradigm? Is it true then that the Kantian emancipative impulse which so clearly is evident in
philosophy since then, is not that pervasive in the ordinary meanings of the world? Why? Or
perhaps we merely wish to deny Marxian challenges for the alternative TINA of an easy-
going neo-liberal peace, while waiting for the Lord to come? If spirituality and Spirituality-
talk think they can remain unengaged in the debate, where then do we put human flourishing
and/or  our  perishing  (López  &  Potter  2001:36)?  In  a  “final  judgement”,  the  temporal
equivalent (in a critique of consciousness) from which, we have resigned? 
On the other  hand if  we concede to postmodern relativism and individualised alienation,
“uniqueness and choice become the only vectors of difference.” (López & Potter 2001:40).
Forms of life do have some intra-inter-dependent causal impact. What is the price of a true
spiritual consciousness within the collective lattice-work of our many individual and social
relations? Do we return to James’ (1902, cf. McGinn 2001:291) pragmatic stance (Thayer,
1982:169 cf. López and Potter 2001:42) and accept an agentic relativism in a world that we
do not fully comprehend, dodging without deconstucting the inappropriate values of former
times? Certainly the creative aspect of human agency and the evaluative intention is very
much in question here. Our originality is often severely limited in and by our world of power-
related unnatural causes and hegemonic pre-suppositions about “whose story is told”. Where
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then is the alethic appreciation of the things we most need and want, if not beginning with a
thorough going critique of consciousness?
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Chapter Four: Bhaskar’s spiritual turn and philosophy of meta-reality
4.1 A critique of consciousness in philosophy and the world
Repeated mention has been made that Bhaskar (1993) crafts a dialectical meta-critique of
Western philosophy, the beginnings of which are described above. Thereafter using the so
called  “Achilles’  heel”  techniques  Bhaskar  critiques  the  un-sustainability  of  major
conclusions  in  that  tradition  completed  in  Plato  etc:  Problems  of  philosophy  and  their
resolution (1994). Though interesting to the philosophical the detailed critique of irrealism:
the “primal  squeeze” on ontological  depth,  strata  in being,  agency,  diversity and rational
judgement, having (one hopes) adequately understood them for our purposes, perhaps can be
dispensed with. It is to the philosophy of meta-reality that we can now turn. In Bhaskar’s
(2002a:167-70) Reflections on meta-reality, he summarises his analysis of the philosophical
discourse of modernism which introduced the second chapter of this dissertation. His fifth
phase  is  described  as  “Western  triumphalism”.  Here  he  raises  a  series  of  facts  so  often
remarked upon in spirituality literature. 
We have witnessed the rise of political and religious fundamentalism, the resurgence of fear-
based  communalisms  amongst  which  I  strongly  suspect  the  proliferation  of  strongly
conservative,  nationalistic,  strongly  orthodox  movements  and  religious  orders  loosely
confederated around a conception of the Pope John Paul II “reform” in America and beyond,
effecting and entrenching the explicitly triumphal enthronement of Benedict XVI during the
following period. This time, during which the church has had to confront its own negation
and  moral  absences  and  presages  again,  a  soul-searching  re-evaluation  of  its  existential
poverty after very vague official apologies of the “no comment” style. American and “Nato”
politics  fare  no better  (with their  arsenals of bombs, drones and robots) for a non-egoist
emancipation of humanity. In greater geo-historical proximity it seems that leaders are unable
to  contend with  the pressing problems of  poverty,  greed and transformation,  presaging a
repeat and reproduction of a most unfortunate history. 
If  we wonder at  the depth and radical  analysis  of irrealism (Bhaskar  2012:xxvi,171) and
whether it bares responsibility and real effect, let us reflect on the obvious roles of greed and
mistrust that I believe continue a culture of denial under modernism and increased moral
denial under the hegemony of Western triumphalism. Our media-borne everyday experience
of hegemony in contemporary corporate and “branding” economy, bares some reflection. In a
forthcoming publication entitled  The sleep of reason: The crisis in capitalism, the crisis in
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banking, the crisis in branding, David Goatham (2014) synthesises contemporary naturalist
investigations in the science of selfishness, to critique the consciousness of corporate culture
whilst suggesting that large scale hegemony discourages change. From an interdisiciplinary
“dip” into positive psychology, quantum spirituality,  the reflections of leading economists
and other journalism, the author seeks to justify the discourse on the emotions and values.
Goatham’s (2014:2-36) synthesis reports on an international corporate culture riddled with
psychopathy,  predatory  callousness,  environmental  irresponsibility,  greed,  mistrust,
alienation, coerciveness, denial, “group-think”, shunning behaviour, Peter Pans, materialism,
youth-obsession, lying and cheating - all indicative of a lack in thinking and empathy. In this
naturalistic  analysis  of  consciousness  a  number  of  Bhaskar’s  TINA’s  dance  with  great
destructive effect (Goatham 2014:1-2): 
The  implosion  of  companies  like  Lehman  Brothers  and  Fannie  Mae,  the
international  financial  meltdown,  the  double-dip  recession,  the  bizarre
performance of Bernie Madoff, the scandals surrounding Goldman Sachs, the
Barclays Libor rate-fixing debacle in the UK, the collapse of the Royal Bank of
Scotland,  the  September  2012  trading  antics  of  Kweku  Adoboli,  who  was
allegedly only ‘two trades away’ from sinking UBS, Switzerland’s biggest bank,
the  US  Senate’s  400-page  report on  HSBC,  Europe’s  largest  financial
institution,  revealing  that  the  bank  had  accepted  $1.5  billion  from ‘money-
laundering  Mexican  drug  lords  and  Al  Quaeda  sympathisers’, and  the
stratospheric  bonuses  that  bankers  in  failed  companies  insist  on  paying
themselves  despite  their  flawed  performance,  have  together  generated  much
discussion about greed and a perceived lack of ethics in banking, and what is
sometimes  called  ‘The  Crisis  in  Capitalism’.  Capitalism  is  not  a  naturally-
occurring phenomenon like gravity,  nor an object like the planet Jupiter. We
made it. It is a human cultural artefact like an AK 47 or a chocolate cake ... But
the problems facing capitalism and banking are not really about the intricacies
of finance and its sophisticated tools; they are about the lusts and avarice and
fears  and  fallibility  of  people  ...  We  might  note  that  some  enterprises  and
financial institutions (headed and staffed by people) seem to regard their clients
not as members of the same species but as insentient objects, fodder for the
corporate maw.
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Though I do have minor philosophical reservations about some premises and conclusions, the
investigation is clear about the locus of the problem, namely a generalised alienation of being
and morality. Goatham’s (2014:42) cure is, “Doing good by being good”: 
The world has changed. There’s now a need for companies to be seen to be
doing good by being good. One extremely influential book cataloguing these
trends  is  ‘WHO CARES WINS’ by David  Jones. The message  of  the  book
endorses the findings of the Edelman Trust Barometer: that HOW a company
behaves is as important to its success as what it sells, and is as important as its
bottom line to many investors. Consumers have choices; but are not always in
possession  of  criteria  that  enable  them  to  make  fine  distinctions  between
marginally different intrinsics and features of one product over another.  It  is
much  easier  to  use  an  emotive  ‘image’ or  aggregate  gestalt  impression  to
discriminate at the moment of purchase. Companies need to be earth-centric,
animal-centric,  AND people  centric.  They need to  be  good,  or  they will  be
punished in powerful social media.
What then our society needs, says Goatham (2014:50-59) is something like Bhutanese Gross
national happiness: “Bhutan Studies has defined eight prerequisites for happiness—physical,
mental  and spiritual health;  time-balance;  social  and community vitality;  cultural  vitality;
education; living standards; good governance; and ecological vitality. This is wisdom, not
greed”33.  The  author  suggests  a  route  of  virtue  practice  for  the  individual.  “Live  Martin
Seligman’s Six Key Truths: Wisdom and knowledge; courage; love and humanity; justice;
temperance;  spirituality  and  transcendence.”  Again  rational  judgement,  a  critique  of
consciousness and action seem to be called for. “To see past the average, the status quo, the
good enough, the seductive panacea of the okay, you need vision and intensity of mind and an
undying fury”.
From this excursion into economic crisis it is proposed we can see that Bhaskar’s analysis
and  critique  of  the  philosophical  discourse  of  modernity,  in  which  the  critique  of
consciousness, conceptual life and ego is implied, reveals: a recursive ideology of irrealism
and hegemony of oppressive de-agentification and a heteronomy of ontological monovalence.
In  response  we  have  retreated  away from reality  into  a  numbing,  dumbing  hyper-realist
33In support of Goatham’s idea here, cf. Diener & Ryan 2001: 15-34. 
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distrust of our ability for transformation. We fail to be enchanted with being in the world,
retrench the insatiable greed and increasingly banish our-selves from any number of more
“sunny” options.  Upon these facts and acts Bhaskar develops a cultural-ideological critique
and progressively sets himself up to focus on the necessity of spirituality as a corrective to
marginalisation and other ills in the philosophical discourse of our time, replete with possible
hegemonic inflections for academic Spirituality. Bhaskar (2002a:xxii): 
The world of demi-reality is a world of illusion, a world of falsities, which are
nevertheless  causally  efficacious.  The  causal  efficacy  of  these  falsities
presupposes a truth,  at  a deeper level of being or reality,  which is screened,
masked or denied, in some manner occluded by the level of demi-reality, which
also dominates it.                    
However what of critical realism in this context? “... critical realism actually began around
1968  and  was  initiated  really  with  a  concern  with  problems  of  modernization  and
underdevelopment”  (Bhaskar  2002a:123-4).  Bhaskar  claims  that  he  quickly  came  to
understand that theories of development had no relevance for underdeveloped countries.
But when I looked at the philosophical tools which should have enabled me to
point to its irrelevance, I discovered that actually there was no way that I could
do that, because philosophy had actually pronounced a taboo on the world: it
had said you cannot talk about the world in itself, you can only talk about our
descriptions  of  the  world.  So this  doctrine,  which  I  called epistemic fallacy
which prohibited the discourse in philosophy about the world, about how the
world was in itself, was encapsulated by Hume and Kant and was actually the
conclusion of a whole long train in western philosophical thought.
So began the critical realist train material to this dissertation. 
4.1.1 Meta-reality: development and turns
In Reflections on Meta-reality (2002a) Bhaskar does exactly that. The book is not a consistent
development  of  argument  as  we  might  expect.  Rather  it  is  a  mixture  of  philosophical
development interspersed with talks delivered during that time. These reflections dwell on the
conceptions  which  have  emerged  from  his  (2000)  autobiographical  writings.  For  those
uninitiated into the spiritual thought of the East the transcriptions are indeed interesting. 
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Unlike treatment of critical realism till now the publications on the philosophy of meta-reality
will  not  be  analysed  separately,  in  order  to  provide  a  shorter  but  fuller  presentation  of
conceptual development. Admittedly the task is made more simple by Bhaskar’s inclusion of
a summary of the philosophy (Bhaskar 2002c:ix-xiv) from which much is presented here.   
Internal  to  the  programme  of  critical  realist  development,  transcendence  is  dialectically
located  as  operative  in  over-coming  or  transcending  irrealism.  Post-fact  to  an  argument
already  established  the  philosophy  of  meta-reality  asks  of  critical  realism  (and  here
paraphrased),  “Under  what  conditions  are  transcendental  acts  possible?”  Fundamental  to
these conditions, one might assume is the quality of alterity, the real otherness of reality. It is
this  alterity  and  contradistinction  of  the  self  in  relation  to  totality  that  the  naturalistic
beginnings  of  thought  about  power  relations  have  been  earlier  proposed,  in  the  initial
development of moral consciousness and hence spirituality. Such conception would be totally
consistent with dialectical critical realism. However it is here that Bhaskar reverses some of
the many categories and principles of dialectical critical realism claiming that to speak about
non-duality, dialectical positions must be necessarily abandoned and transcended. Although
Bhaskar doesn’t say this in so many words it is evident that the “philosopher” though not left
behind,  is  subsumed  into  the  concerns  of  the  “guru”.  Hence  much  of  his  “reflection”
rehearses a set of values and philosophical principles which are appropriate to a discourse on
non-duality, there-in contradicting some positions held by critical realism in its context of
dualism and dialectic (2002a:185-230). One can imagine the (lack of) reception these about-
turns received amongst critical realist philosophers. 
The  new  philosophy  is  not  a  total  abandonment  of  critical  realist  principles  (Bhaskar
2002a:8):
Meta-Reality is a new philosophical position. It accepts but goes beyond critical
realism, insofar as it pinpoints the reality of the non-dual states and phases of
being,  showing  how  they  underpin  and  sustain  the  totality  of  all  forms  of
human,  and  indeed  all,  life.  Understanding  Meta-Reality  is  to  realize  the
limitations of the world of duality. 
However some principles of critical realism stay whilst others are turned:
Critical realism already understands reality as structured and differentiated, as in
process  and  changing,  as  a  totality  or  whole  and  as  containing  human,
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potentially self-conscious transformative agency. The world that men have made
and which we currently inhabit is a world of duality: of unhappiness, oppression
and  strife  –  more  especially,  it  is  a  world  in  which  we  are  alienated  from
ourselves, each other, the activities in which we engage and the natural world
we inhabit, currently hurtling into crisis and self-destruction.
These  ‘turned’ principles  are  the  ones  so  hard  fought  for  and  re-vindicated  in  previous
argument against irrealism, particularly the principles of non-identity and alterity. In critical
realism these share an innate intransigence against purely anthro-centric appreciations and
subjectivism and as far as the new philosophy shares and appreciates critical realism, these
principles are acceptable for their place in critical realism and in the dialectic of a philosophy
in the context of duality.
If we are to sum-up the central characteristic of critical realism it is an analysis, critique and
explanation of a wide and deep historical field of category mistakes and ambiguities which
have  seduced  us  into  philosophical  and  social  pathology  (Bhaskar  2002c:xv)  “deep
fundamental errors constitutive of our misunderstanding of being … Thus we mis-identify
our-selves as egos; we mis-identify consciousness as mind etc.”.
In the philosophy of meta-reality (2002c) however the alterities of interest which “turn” are
the two concepts of non-duality and transcendence. In non-duality there can be no duality of
dialectic,  no  alterity  nor  existential  intransigence:  dialectical  thought  in  consciousness  is
transcended or abandoned and for Bhaskar this fact suggests that otherness of being becomes
a co-presence of the other, in us.
The justification furthered in the axiology of argument holds that alterity and non-identity
have to be transcended if re-enchantment is to be possible and non-duality of ground-state is
envisioned. Establishing his argument for “intention”, “enchantment” and “non-duality” by
rational and reality-centred transcendental movement, Bhaskar is afforded the opportunity to
describe  the  basic  four  moments  of  critical  realism  (1M  –  4D)  as  moments  of  “will”,
“thought”, “love” and “spontaneity/creativity” respectively. These qualities then act as causal
reasons in transcendental acts in the world, and result in (all things being equal) unitivity. It
should  be  noted  here  that  unlike  Wilber  (2000),  Bhaskar  sees  unitivity  founded on non-
duality  as  an  awakening to  the  “suchness”  of  the  reality  he  has  spent  forty or  so  years
vindicating. It is both a ground-state and end-state and everything (stratified) in between, in
which  anything  can  happen.  It  is  not  (as  Jacobs  2009:83)  claims  of  Wilber  a  reductive
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teleology, but a dynamic axiology of freedom. Bhaskar (2002c:179) comments: “Thus, on the
new position of the philosophy of Meta-Reality … shows the scientist to be nothing other
than a (practical) mystic; and shows the mystic to be of necessity engaged in the most this-
worldly concerns”. I do not think Karl Rahner (1967:39-48) ever dreamt of vindication from
analytic (perhaps post-analytic?) philosophy! However the world of duality has a specific
effect (Bhaskar 2002a:10-11): 
In our world it is duality, and its characteristic forms of reasoning and behavior,
instrumentalist, mediated, conditional, heteronymous, forced, attached, analytical
(in the worst sense of dividing and breaking up), which rules. The possibility of
human emancipation depends upon expanding the zone of non-duality within our
lives; and in the first instance upon the shedding of our own heteronomy, so that
we become in a way non-dual beings in world of duality.  
4.1.2 The argument for non-dual ground states and the cosmic envelope 
Basically,  Bhaskar’s argument (here paraphrased) runs thus: If we believe ontology to be
dynamic  and  stratified  it  is  conceptually  possible  to  speak  of  a  “ground-state”  of  pure
potential  and  from which  the  many  other  layers  of  ontology  (being  and  consciousness)
emerge into variable and contradictory (sometimes dialectical) phenomena in a species and
therefore generally. Such a ground state we must then conceptualise as “non-dual: “the non-
dual sustains the world of duality” (Bhaskar 2002c:ix). Furthermore to exist in a species the
ground state must presuppose a general non-dual ground state of all species and categorical
ontologies, beyond and deeper than that of the species and the emergence of their “concrete
singularities”. Here envisioned is a ground state of all that exists regardless of such species-
beings coming into actuality and thereafter, experience. To describe this ground state of all
Bhaskar chooses the term “cosmic envelope”: The non-dual level that connects all reality and
in some way circumscribes creation (Bhaskar 2002a:12, 2002c:ix) as “a basis or ground, a
mode of constitution and a fine structure … (or interior)”.
Bhaskar is quick to point out that individualised boundaries do not exist  at  this plane of
potential (perhaps by way of thread entanglement? Or enfoldment (Bhaskar 2012:xxv) and
that this ground is not God (“the ultimata” not The Ultimatum (Bhaskar 2002c:xii)). However
Bhaskar is neither for nor against theistic distinctions of the type putting God “into” or “out-
of” creation. For the theist the Divine realm is supra-transcendental lying behind and beyond
the connectivity of the cosmic envelope, but is not ever forbidden from it. So it would seem
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that the theologically termed “incarnational reality” of the Second Person of the Trinity, must
still cross the boundary of creation into the cosmic envelope before the divine can become
human. Bhaskar (2012:29,125,150-164) claims that philosophy of meta-reality exceeds but
can accommodate non-reductive discourses on God. The particularly Christian interest above
remains theologically intact although Bhaskar’s interest lies in a philosophical reflection of
this world of ontological reality, the human dimension of practicality that even the Christian
must traverse.
4.1.3 The turn from non-identity to identity.
The first step of critical realism rested on a distancing from epistemic fallacy, a separation of
and liberation of being from knowing. This non-identity principle then served in a generalised
emancipation or dis-identification from all the category mistakes and fallacies Bhaskar has
thus described and which have damaged our notion of being. The work of critical realism up
until the dialectical stage is therefore a work of critique and analysis (separating concepts) of
dualism from within the context (history) of dualistic knowledge. The analysis of dialectic
has then developed the unavoidable conceptualisation of “non-duality” and “transcendence”
thus necessitating a greater synthesis (connecting concepts) of critique. The synthetic instinct
or aspect in philosophy as a dialectical partner and fulfilment of analysis is expressed here in
the addition of non-duality, requires a conceptual reversal of the duality-bound necessity of
non-identity in critical realism. Perhaps it may be said that having separated ourselves from
the mistakes and mis-identities of orthodox philosophy (through critical realism) we need to
re-identify ourselves with a more liberated identity principle  presented in the philosophy of
meta-reality.  (Does  Bhaskar  here  join  other  Spirituality  writers  to  imply  that  spiritual
awareness  is  perhaps  contextualised  by  reversal?  If  so  does  this  conceptualisation  give
ontological  depth  to  a  process  in  life  and  which  is  therefore  a  more  adequate
conceptualisation of Plato’s diremption?) Likewise, transcendence requires a mindful identity
“with”, “into” and “beyond”. Bhaskar (2002c:xiv) has it thus:
…it is pretty difficult to get a coherent account of knowledge, unless involving
in  some  way  the  identity  of  the  knower,  known  and  even  the  process  of
knowing. Moreover, identity can hold between any two terms, and it is indeed
difficult to see how ultimately any two things in the world could be related in
some way unless in some mode or point they are interconnected, and in that
moment of interconnection, they are identified … otherwise there would be no
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grounds for declaring the non-identical elements distinct.
Bhaskar (2002c:xiv) makes an important distinction:
…this philosophy of identity has nothing in common with philosophies of identity
where identity is modeled on punctiform, atomistic point, or on the other hand an
abstract blanket whole. This is rich holistic, differentiated and developing identity.
Therefore  central  philosophical  principles  like  “categorical  realism”,  “stratification”  and
“alethic-being” no longer connote the necessity of “alterity” as they did for critical realism.
Having distanced ourselves from our mis-identity with the mystifications of conceptual and
social life by a critique of consciousness, we are ready to engage the real “enchantment of
being”.
Bhaskar  (2002c:xvii-xviii)  notes  three  mechanisms  “in  virtue  of  which  relationships  of
identity occur: The first consists in relations of  transcendental identification or being one
with our attention to some-one or a task. The second is reciprocity involved in relationships
between beings who come into causal or other connection with each other. At the moment of
connection there is a level of reciprocity, which is actually definitive or constitutive of their
being that connection...” In the footnote Bhaskar adds: 
This thus presupposes a moment of identification, the basis of which lies in co-
presence, that is, the capacity to be one with another lies in the fact that the
being or qualities of the other are implicit or enfolded, and in this way already,
co-present in the other … the claim of the philosophy of meta-Reality is that all
other beings are enfolded within myself, or at least the alethic truth of all other
beings, such as the molecular structure of a crystal or the nature of gravity or
what it is like to be a dragon.
 
Of alethia, Bhaskar (2001c:xxiv) claims: “ … just as meta-physics signifies the ground  and
truth and first reality (the ground level reality, so to speak) of physics or nature, meta-Reality
signifies the ground, truth in the sense of alethia and first reality of being … So this could be
said to be a philosophy of truth … Hence the ‘meta’: it is the ground and truth of reality”. 
Consequently (Bhaskar 2002c:xviii):
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Co-presence is important not only because it is the ultimate ontological basis of
our  possibilities  of  transcendental  identification  and  the  laws  of  reciprocity,
including karma, but also because it explains why … we subjectively feel and
experience a commitment to the project of universal self realization, that is the
fulfilment and flourishing of all beings in the universe. Because they are also a
part of my positive incompleteness. 
4.1.4 Co-presence
These ground-state qualities are sui generis moments in the ground state of interconnection of
all in which Bhaskar (2012:165-182) claims we are co-present in each other, there being no
contra-distinctions  to  be made in  an  “intransitive  dimension”  of  non-duality and without
which  fact  we  cannot  be  “pre-interpreted”  nor  carry  with  us  our  “history”  nor  act
“reciprocally” (Bhaskar 2002a:12-13):  
It  is  an understanding of co-presence which allows us to make sense of the
enfolding and unfolding of possibilities within being, including possibilities of
human beings  learning things  and performing acts  which  they never  dreamt
about, or identifying (transcendentally) with beings and at a level they never
knew or  thought  existed  … More  generally,  the  phenomena  of  co-presence
explains what happens when we have unfulfilled or split intentionality, we carry
the  desire,  in  the  form of  an attachment,  within us  … Unfulfilled  and split
intentionality describe two forms in which human beings contain elements of
heteronomy which  block  or  check  their  freedom,  when  we  contain  nothing
inconsistent  with  our  ground  states,  [and]  have  eliminated  negative
incompleteness  [the  result  of  our  intentionality],  we  may  be  said  to  be
‘enlightened’ or  ‘realized’… But  such  a  being,  situated  on  the  cusp  of  the
cosmic envelope, will immediately be orientated to the elimination of negative
incompleteness which is not the product of his intentionality but the product of
the intentionality of others – for he has no ego, or sense of separateness, which
allows him to privilege his own lack of suffering and freedom over the suffering
and unfreedom of others. 
However  Bhaskar  is  as  aware  as  is  Gelman  (2008)  that  ground  state  is  notoriously
unavailable to language - it seems to possess itself with a sui generis apophasis in the sense
of its observer status. It possesses a dialectical unavailability: it refuses to identify itself but
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by its heteronymous targets which it seeks to absent and dissolve in a way removed from
discursive analysis. Ground-states operate at a level of total openness by way of which lack
of self-statement it protects and whose mystery makes scientific progress possible.
4.1.5 Non-duality and transcendence
Bhaskar (2002c:ix-xi) claims there are “three ways in which non-duality sustains the realm of
duality”:  1.  As  a  ground  state  the  connectivity  of  all  ground  states  and  the  “ultimate
ingredient  in  all  other  states  of  being,  activity  and  consciousness”;  2.  In  the  sense  that
“certain  features  of  transcendence  are  essential  to  the  constitution  and  reproduction  of
everyday life”; (a)  relatively,  in the sense that “one situation can surpass and resolve the
problems in a pre-existing situation”; (b) absolutely as “non-duality or unity in or with a total
context”;  (c)  “Between  the  relative  and  absolute  sense  we  have  the  phenomenon  of
emergence out of the blue” and (3) as constituent or “deep interior of any moment or aspect
of being or consciousness [revealing] qualities of bliss, emptiness, suchness, rich identity, or
pure unbounded energised love … continuous with the ground state qualities of creation …
its ontologically ultimate interior” 
He adds:
The  four  principle  forms  of  transcendence  … [1]  transcendence  away from
objective  totality  into  its  own  subjectivity;  [2]  its  transcendence  from  its
subjectivity  totally  into  some  objectivity  …  transcendental  identification  in
consciousness; [3] its total absorption in agency … transcendental agency; and
[4] its total unity in action with other agents … [as], transcendental holism or
teamwork.
 
Bhaskar also notes the importance of three other concepts: (1) “transcendental or real self” ;
(2) two inflections of  transcendental consciousness;  (a) “consciousness of or at our ground
state” and (b) consciousness in “transcendental identification or unity”; (3) “transcendental
ingredience [as] only one factor … in the whole complex [of] other states which may be
regarded as emergent from it”. At the outset it is understand that Bhaskar’s presentation of
transcendence is any ordinary transgression of the boundary between duality of life, and non-
dual states. It is indeed a two-way street, (Bhaskar 2002a:10) “indispensible features of all
human being, social life and indeed necessary condition for any human act at all”. Bhaskar’s
analysis of non-duality and transcendence is therefore far in excess of the realms of Western
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traditional  mystical  writing,  yet  I  think  a  profound  insight  into  the
human/spiritual/transcending  state  of  affairs  within  a  naturalistic and  anthropological
conception,  philosophically  derived.  It  is  no  more  a  “secularisation”  than  any
emergence/incarnation of alethic being. Knowing full well the human dimension implicit in
the theological framework yet unfamiliar with contemporary developments within the sub
disciplines of theology, I can merely beg the question that parts if not all such analysis must
be implied or reconceived in those disciplines and the philosophy of religion.
Set  against  this  conception  of  reality’s  “ground state  of  non-duality”  Bhaskar  builds  his
theory of  transcendence.  Explaining  then,  the newness  of  Bhaskar’s  philosophy of  meta-
reality one appreciates that the critique of consciousness is foundational. Bhaskar does not
approach Western theology explicitly, rather in line with what I discern as an ironic intention
and the limits of Christian theology, the epistemology of which he (Bhaskar [2002b] 2012)
expounds. Generally Bhaskar borrows his terminology from the East which is his chosen
representative  of  the  marginalised  spiritual  emancipation  of  humanity.  Bhaskar  seeks  to
express (philosophically) the fundamental spiritual truth which lies behind or at the base of
reality  and  which  therefore  accounts  (as  a  condition)  for  reality  as  split,  dualistic,
dichotomous, ailing and sometimes “downright sinful”, in my opinion34.
If positivistic representation of reality lacks a clear exposition of absences (but which it must
necessarily presuppose) dialectically speaking,  alethia in intrinsic self-evident truth and the
irrefutable  ground  of  being  (“at  ground-level  of  being”)  must  pre-suppose  non-duality.
Thereafter and upon which non-duality; a “practical mysticism” that transcends and grounds
the realm of the spiritual/religious categories can be negotiated in Bhaskar’s words “from
East to West” and later “beyond East and West”. Clearly the axiology is trans-traditional and
the preoccupation is the agentive process towards non-duality namely, transcendence.  
4.1.5.1 Christian non-duality?
Let me state at the outset of my comments here that I am not a theologian and I cannot
comment  in  more  than  general  terms  from  a  philosophical  stand-point  sympathetic  to
concerns of spirituality. However any reasonably read person will be aware that in the Hindu,
34As further indication of Aristotelian tradition’s mark in critical realism here, one is immediately reminded of
Aquinas’ conception of evil as ‘privation’ of good. 
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Buddhist and Taoist traditions the concept of non-duality is a fairly well developed traditional
experience or value. This is however not overtly so the case in the West where theological
explanations tend to speak in terms that are either neo-Platonic or similarly dichotomised
terms couched in a form of dialectical relationship with God in Jesus. However in Christian
conceptualisation,  non-duality  is  neither  forbidden  nor  explicitly  valued.  This  fact  alone
means that a theology of God outside of anthropomorphic categories acting as media, for
instance, and not at the totalized mystery as “the beginning and end of all things”, often
means for we Westerners that identifying with a god here, we experience a diremption of the
present - we have no now: a diremption of the middle space between past and future. 
The space of the  present  has always been “up for grabs” amongst ideological competitors.
After all it is  the space  par excellence, that “be-ing” is the only rational thing to do. The
history of mysticism would suggest that this authentic (ontological) space or ground state,
transcending dichotomy and analysis is a very “valued” (sometimes value-laden) experience
with a number of benefits. It is also a place of extreme liberty from the tyranny of history and
concomitant indwelling of the past. As such it experiences an open future.
For hegemonies it has been important to “own” the interior landscape of consciousness by
owning its appropriated social double - the “ego” or the self-expectant socialised self. The
insight being that, give a person an ego and the interests of the inner free world, is split. In the
East and certain monasteries of the West people are encouraged in the meditative practice of
the  “now”,  but  essentially  it  is  not  what  hegemonies  want  to  encourage  too  much.  In
Christian-Western milieu generally mystics who have said too much of their experience have
run into trouble with the censor’s (De Melo, Merton, de Chardin, Chenu, Avila, Eckhart, to
name a few). There is something dangerous and unpredictable about mystical non-duality
begging as it does, the absence of God. 
Owning the experience of the inner world requires a theory of anthropology and in the West I
suspect the “guts” have been torn from the experience of authentic being. We do not practice
the  present  but  the  presence  of God,  in  whom alone is  our  real-self  hidden.  Christianity
certainly approaches non-duality through a relocation of the self into God who is of another
place and time (“on High”, (Heelas 2012:11)) yet whose Presence and Incarnation must be
enacted “as” the present. As a result the protestant quiet time is theologically branded with
expectations  to  be  “doing”  something.  Christianity  is  a  story of  an  alienated  and reified
human  middle:  Christ  is  cure  alone.  However  this  time-necessary  duality  in  Western
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conception of God suggests a non-dual reality below the surface of philosophically embedded
Christian discourse.
In the diachronic development of biblical thinking there is no access to an analysis of God
apart from the human categories of relationship and alterities deployed in the emergence of
Revelation. Perhaps one might say that in the process of scripture making, especially that of
Old Testament writing that God  emerges but generally what is meant is a description of a
conceptual emergence in theology, a purely epistemological exercise but described as and
encased in  the  human experience  of  love.  Consequently non-duality in  theology (strictly
speaking) is subject to the same conceptual squeeze evident in Bhaskar’s description of “de-
agentification” in philosophical tradition and put into another time and another place beyond
the bounds of proto-theology or a speculative Creation/Eschatological theology, one suspects.
Having said this however none of the above precludes the synchronic experience of non-
duality described in the literature of Christian mysticism. It is in mystical writing that one
does  encounter  vocabulary of  non-dual  or  “unitive”  states.  To mention  a  few traditional
interpretations  unitive  states  have  been  thomistically  conceptualised  as  “infused
contemplation”  “practice  of  the  presence  of  God”  (Bother  Lawrence)  or  “divine  union”
(plethora) often characterised in terms of spiritualised eroticism (the ‘Songs’ of Solomon and
the love poetry of Egyptian royalty?) all of which are understood as a mystical grace. This
brief excursion is not intended to overlook the many other descriptions to be found in the
tradition or their diachronically transformative telos towards the mind of Christ, or union with
God and the ultimate value of theological virtue, it espouses. Consequently we can justifiably
claim  that  unitive  experiences  as  types  of  non-duality  and  found  in  Christian  mystical
tradition  are  in  some  way prototypical  or  exemplary,  synchronic  moments,  theologically
extrapolated  and  diachronically  represented  in:  (a)  ecclesiological  descriptions  of  the
“mystical body”, (b) creational “fact/act”, (c) sacramental life and so on.  Rahner’s famous
claim for the ubiquity of mysticism in Christian life of the “future”, I suspect very much rides
on these understandings. Of immediate interest then is the presupposition that the relational
aspect of Christian existence has on human ability to access unitivity and non-duality. I am
aware that some authors in former texts on mystical theology keen to avoid accusations of
pan-entheism  preferred  to  distinguish  between  states  of  union  and  non-duality.  Their
distinction often has rested on the primacy of love restricted to the human-divine (theotic?)
axiology. 
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So even here the Western dichotomy of mind reconceptualised in theological, divine-human
relational matrix provides context. For some sceptical of the possible theological overreach
or/and  despite  the  reality  of  divine-human  relationship  or  even  our  relations  with  such
claimed relationship by others at some level, is indicative of an ego-illusory, demi-reality
resting on a primal split of consciousness so ailing our philosophy and our world: a false
separation of self within self and self from others and the open field of creation. I have no
need to raise the ire of the theologically inclined however I think we can agree that within the
academic realms of Spirituality there is great appreciation of the point that theology has been
burdened with dichotomy. In the critique of religious consciousness which is deployed here
and mostly in  the  next  chapter  much of  the  argument  seeks  to  demonstrate  the  harmful
consequences of dichotomy and its layered existence in Christian thought. The very same
dichotomy Bhaskar recognises as a profound philosophical fault, clearly discerned by many
in theological inheritance. Furthermore it would then be correct to say that insofar as the
mystical tradition values unitive experience, transcendental Christian experience is a special
and limited case (or description) of transcendence into non-duality.  
4.1.6 Confluence?
Where I think spirituality, mysticism and Bhaskar’s philosophy are essentially confluential is
in the elucidation of “intentional aspect” of human life (Bhaskar 2002a:36) denoting a surge
to the common ground of reality, in secular spirituality: a transcendence not up-and-away but
material and grounded within the stratifications of “telluric” and “alethic” existence, part of
the same reality that critical realism has described from its inception (Bhaskar 2002a:175).
Perhaps  providing  a  worthy  contemplation  or  anthropological  therapeutic  for  so-called
“incarnational”  theology?  Certainly  within  the  common  ground  of  discourse  here  “an
emergence  out  of  nothing  or  a  kind  of  engulfment  by  something  awesomely  different”
(Bhaskar 2002b:xii) are well documented limited understanding of transcendence. 
4.1.7  Bhaskar’s  system:  summary  of  the  diachronic  development  of  critical  realism
represented as a synchronic system – further development
Bhaskar (2002a:178-179) says of his project:
To summarise, transcendental realism breaks the taboo on a rational discourse
about being; critical naturalism on a rational discourse (and therefore possibility
of  sublation)  of  duality,  contradiction and  split;  the  theory  of  explanatory
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critique breaks the taboo of a rational discourse about values; dialectical critical
realism of a rational discourse about negativity, dialectic, process and change;
and  finally,  transcendental  dialectical  critical  realism of  a  rational  discourse
about transcendence and the transcendent … thus critical realism is a process of
development in thought which builds ever more complete and rounded totalities,
continually  self-critical  in  a  process  of  self-transcendence  without  any
conceivable or a priori positable end.
Thus Bhaskar’s (2002a:181-188) system is expanded from transcendental dialectical critical
realism (“TDCR” here) to the philosophy of meta-reality (“PMR”):
1. Ontology incorporates “the idea of alethic truth, including conceptions
of  an essential  ultimate ingredient  of  the cosmos as  a  whole  (thematised in
conventional  theology  as  God)”  at  TDCR  level,  expanded  to  PMR
understanding of “ground-state and cosmic envelope and then as the ground of
the ground-state and that envelope” 35 which exibits “the moment of will”.
2. Negativity as back-drop to the transcending process towards a greater
totality  “in  any  dialectical  process”  in  TDCR  and  “and  transformative
processes” in PMR: “the moment of thought”. I would add for our purposes, the
practice of seeking the presence of God in discernment set against a panoply of
apophatic absences including theological ones36.
3. Totality is described as “the idea of love as an essential binding, healing
and  totalizing  force  in  the  humanised  world,  and  indeed  possibly  in  nature
generally”(TDCR) and (PMR): “the moment of emotion”.
4. Transformative praxis is “spontaneous right action and cosmic consciousness or
enlightenment, as the realization of the goal of absolute reason, that is the unity of
theory  and  practice,  the  norm  of  reflexivity,  which  we  have  seen  drives  the
dialectic of philosophical enquiry” (TDCR) and “self-realisation and ultimately
35Cf. also McGinn, (2001)  The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart, especially the movement between the
ground of being and the universal ground for which description, Eckhart invented terminology. 
36Cf. Sells (1994) for nuances of the apophatic panoply.
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universal self-realisation”: “the moment of  making” ... We might add again the
mature stage of discernment as pre-empting the mystical state of “union” (Bhaskar
gets there in stage seven).   
If dialectical critical realism focuses on dialectic through a theory of absence, the philosophy
of  meta-reality  has  derived  and  then  analyses  5A:  “the  moment  of  intentionality”,  thus
broadening and deepening the conceptual axiology of critical realism, demonstrated above.
From  there  on  Bhaskar  again  works  dialectically,  saying  that  thinking  in  terms  of
intentionality  implies  a  sixth  realm of  re-enchantment:  (Bhaskar  2002a:183-184)  “… re-
enchantment can help to roll back disenchantment and enables the space of the re-enchanted
world, that is the world which was always enchanted, to develop and grow, the effects of
disenchantment to be reversed or undone, and indeed enchantment to take on the aspect of a
new  form”.  The  seven  dimensions  of  being  (“the  ontological  -  axiological  chain”)  are
completed  (but  never  final)  in  7A  (“seventh  awakening”)  which  stands  for  non-
duality/unitivity.
So in the philosophy of meta-reality proceeding from the dialectical movement from non-
identity  through  absence,  to  totality  presupposes  transformative  agency  and  is  expanded
along a dimension of transcendence. Transcendent acts bring us into our ground-state which
is necessarily engaged when we let go of our (“egoic”) selves to join up with tasks, goals,
people, discourses beyond personal interest alone. The simple fact that we do and can pay
enwrapped attention to another object, instruction or person in the operations of our everyday
life (reading a presentation of Bhaskar, for instance), Bhaskar (2002c:167-171) demonstrates
the  alethic  reality  of  transcendence  at  the  ground  of  everyday  existence.  The  reality  of
ground-state and the unavoidable necessity of acting transcendentally are conditions without
which the actions of everyday life would not be possible. Consequently all acts of an alethic
nature  and where  values  might  be “causes”,  emerge  agentively from the  ground-state  of
being.  Consequently  all  positive  intentions  (Bhaskar  2002c:91-166,172-232,313-364)  like
“creativity”, “love” and “freedom” are consistent with “ground-state” and are its everyday
mundane occurrences in the world of duality.  This is so even when that world of duality
might  evince acts  of destruction,  hate,  and hegemony.  The blatantly obvious  presence of
negative  intentions  and  emotions  rests  upon  the  necessary  existence  of  their  positive
counterparts in the ground state.
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4.1.7.1 Love
Perhaps Bhaskar’s treatment on “love” (Bhaskar: 2002c:xxxiii,172-232, cf. Bhaskar 2012:
235, 339-362) is most telling. “There are probably five theorems which are worth anticipating
here”:
1.  Negative emotions,  such as fear and pride,  depend entirely on the absence or
incompleteness (e.g. conditionality) of love;
2. Nevertheless such emotions exist only in virtue of, are sustained by and derive
their energy from the ground state quality of love;
3. Such emotions disappear when there is only love; 
4.Negative  emotions,  the  whole  nexus  from  desire  and  greed  through  jealousy,
anger, fear, etc. are all systematically related to each other; to the social structure and
to categorical errors (philosophical mistakes) which are constitutive of the reality of
the dual realm and are ways of thinking, interpreting and living it; 
5. Emotions such as love are not themselves actions. Emotions are motives, feelings,
the grounds for action, rather than action itself. They belong to the realm of the
non-actual real. Two things of great importance follow from this: the first thing is
that you cannot identify from an action alone … what the emotion behind the
action is. And secondly when you perform an action out of love or for that matter
out of any emotion such as sadness, then in performance of the action, you must
perform it so to speak, without ‘wobbling’… So to identify any of the stages in the
morphogenesis of an action such as will, intentionality, thought or the creativity
embedded in it, or emotion or the love which informs it with the ensuing action is
not just to make a category mistake, it is to make a practical error.
4.1.7.2 Re-enchantment and consciousness
It appears to me that there is no loving where enchantment is missing, a matter of perception
perhaps. Bhaskar writes (2002c:xxxvii), “To understand perception, as immediately non-dual
identification of the world, as meaningful, valuable etc. we need to critique the philosophy of
modernity,  which  generated  a  thesis  of  dis-enchantment.  So  what  does  re-enchantment
mean?” Bhaskar lists three major philosophical collapses: (1) Subject-object duality and the
semiotic triangle, 
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… so that we have the immediate identity of being and meaning, reality becomes
meaningful  … we have the displacement of meaning, signification onto reality
itself  so that things in the world mean things and are constituted semiotically and
interpreted  hermeneutically  in  a  multiplicity  of  ways.  The  world  becomes  a
meaningful text.
 (2) The fact-value distinction, “Values are not subjective classifications of the mind, they are
constitutive of reality itself, which becomes valuable, to be nourished, honoured and realized:
or false, consisting of blocks on the realization of what is truly valuable in being” ; (3) the
distinction between the sacred and profane, “everything is sacred, nothing is profane … we
can read  the  spiritual  into  the  structures  of  everyday life  … And the standpoint  of  self-
referentiality  implies  a  thorough-going  critique  of  heteronomy including  the  heteronomy
imposed by leaders, people in institutions who manipulate power, be they religious, political,
economic, or whatever”. 
Lest we accuse Bhaskar of a materialist reduction, he has this to say (Bhaskar 2002c:xxxix):
The most important philosophical features which enable us to sustain a robust
account  of  the  re-enchanted  realm  and  generate  in  its  wake  a  critique  of
materialism, can be most easily seen by looking at four aspects of consciousness
in form of mind (though the same analysis could be pursued in the case of the
emotions):
Irreducibility
Causal efficacy, including… creativity
Spontaneity
Directness or immediacy
Bhaskar (2002c:xxxii-xxxix) understands “mind” as a constant emergence:
… that is we have to understand sui generis emergent powers and properties of
mind as being real and capable of direct effects on other minds, and similarly in
the case of emotions…consciousness is the transcendental quality ingredient in
the first  moment or aspect of daily life;  and transcendental consciousness is
ingredient, though rarely exhaustive of all consciousness.
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In  the  first  phase  of  the  dialectic  of  learning  Bhaskar  (2002c:xxx-xxxi)  examines  the
phenomena of alethic understanding, the moment of “getting it”.
The important point in this first moment … is the moment of Platonic anamnesis, 
in which knowledge enfolded within the being is explicated in his consciousness, 
awakened, so to speak, by the pedagogical skill of the teacher or the ingenuity 
and endeavour of the student or both … Actually it would probably be better to 
call the first moment just the moment in which it was already implicitly enfolded,
then the second moment would be that in which the implicit or enfolded was 
made explicit or unfolded in consciousness, emerged into consciousness. In this 
moment … what is learnt has to be written down or held consciously in one’s 
mind because it is so easy for it to slip back into dormant or enfolded state. The 
third moment … is that in which the student has to shape, play, toy with that new 
idea or skill until he becomes thoroughly familiar with all its properties.
4.1.7.3 Meta-reality and ontology
Bhaskar (2002c:xviii-xix) notes:
Critical realism is well known for being the systematic attempt to think being
progressively, in greater depth, along five successive dimensions: 
Being as such
Being as processual
Being as totality or a whole
Being as incorporating transformative agency and reflexivity (or unity of theory
and practice)
Being as incorporating a spiritual dimension or aspect….
And  the  philosophy  of  meta-Reality  [adds]  two  new  strata  or  levels  of
understanding of being, namely:
Being as enchanted: and Being as non-dual.
As we should be aware, “being as non-dual” signifies Bhaskar’s seventh dimension of being,
represented as “awakening”:  
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… to call it an awakening does indicate a certain difference, that at this level 
ultimately we are not thinking being (indeed it could be said that in a sense we are
not thinking at all), but rather being being, a being of being, or rather, a 
becoming of our being, the becoming or realization of ourselves, self-realization.
It is this which is necessary to unify theory and practice in practice and satisfy the
criterion for reflexivity in philosophy … really what is required to bring out or 
complete our understanding of the fifth aspect [spirituality], which must lead to 
notions of enlightenment or self-realisation and emancipation, leading ultimately 
to universal self-realisation.
4.1.8 Practicing humanly
It follows syllogistically that in order to be a positive person, with positive effect we should
be intentionally engaging our ground state as often as possible and we should seek to live
from that centre or ground, the beginning lessons of both emotional intelligence theory and
positive psychology. Contemplative engagement with ground state in prayer, meditation and
other  spiritual  exercises,  especially  examinations  of  consciousness  is  thus  justified  as  a
personal responsibility, for the free flourishing of ourselves and others. This argument for
transcendence, ground-state and spirituality, is borne out of a generalised theory of ubiquitous
potential and possibility in every human being. Bhaskar (2002c:14) suggests:     
…another  feature of  Meta-Reality:  … is the commitment  of the enlightened
being, and proleptically of all beings who access their ground states (which we
must all do to an extent) … In fact some such commitment is a basic feature of
all  universalizing  systems  of  ethics,  and  is  a  tacit  presupposition  of  the
emancipatory project as such.
4.1.9 Bhaskar comments on meta-reality
Bhaskar (2002c:xx-xxviii) has this to say:
… the non-duality of being is essential to understanding of all the previous six-
levels of being, as their basis or ground … Furthermore the understanding of
being as re-enchanted, contrary to the thrust and explicit claims of modernity …
essential for the understanding of the most basic engagement with the world, in
perception,  in  action  and  intra-action  and  communication  with  our  fellow
human beings … One could say that if 6R designated not only the realm of the
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(as conventionally understood)  para-normal  or supernatural (itself  a category
mistake),  it  also  designates  the  typical  domain  of  religion,  whereas  7A
designates that of spirituality.  One of the claims of the philosophy of meta-
Reality is that not only are the two not the same, but that one can be spiritual
without a religious practice, just as one can observe religious rituals without
being spiritual  ...  Possibly the most  striking claim that  can be made for  the
content of the theory developed in the philosophy of meta-Reality is … that
whatever objective you set yourself in life will eventually lead you to a path of
self realization … That is to say that you will be inevitably committed to the
goal of universal self realization; and that commitment is implicit in whatever
desire, objective or wish … The minimum necessary unit for emancipation is
the whole human race … So we disinvest in our identifications with our egos,
our  minds,  our  attachments  and  aversions  and  the  social  forms  which  they
produce and reproduce and together  with characteristic  modes of  relating to
each other  and nature.  Then of  course all  this  has  a  biological  basis  in  our
specificity as human animals, in principle subject to even biological evolution.
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Chapter Five:  Final  argument  and conclusion  -  joining-up  critique  and knowledge:
making the implicit critique of religion explicit
5.1 The role of critique
This  dissertation  has  insisted  from  the  introductory  phase,  that  liberating  spirituality  in
ourselves  requires  a  critique  of  consciousness  because  without  it  no  transformation  is
possible.  Especially  in  the  critical-philosophical-anthropological  approach  to  secular
spirituality  this  critique  is  seen  to  be universalised  and extended to  the  range of  human
existence  within  the  social  cube.  In  the  recent  literature  and  this  dissertation  one  has
witnessed a critique of consciousness which is decidedly postmodern in character. We are
now  able  to  say  of  secular  spirituality,  regardless  of  the  problems  associated  with  the
appellation “secular”, that it is characteristically postmodern (du Toit & Mayson 2006:i-xvii;
du Toit 2006:59; Kourie 2006:77-78; Prozesky 2006:128). Not only is the critique justified
(Botha  2006:99)  but  Agnivesh  (2006:191)  citing  Berger  (1979)  encourages  its  “heretical
imperative”. Typically the critique is deployed against a number of societal,  religious and
epistemological relations. Targeted concerns included in the epistemological level are how to
account for; (1) ontology, epistemology and rational or moral judgement (Botha 2006:99-101;
Prozesky 2006:127), (2) theory-practice unity (Prozesky 2006:132) in order to  bridge the
gulf between “religious knowledge and social action” (Agnivesh 2006:193), (3) reductionism
(Kourie 2009:166-167; De Villiers 2006:102), (4) dualism and dichotomy (Bailey 2001:1-
3,26-27; Botha 2006:55-101). Du Toit (2006:67) points out the role of religious absolutism in
bolstering dichotomy:
The problem with relativising natural theology by invoking absolutes of faith,
revelation, divine sovereignity or whatever is that it does not account for the
relations  between  faith  and  rationality,  nature  and  supernature,  science  and
religion  and,  ultimately,  church  and  world.  Thus  it  leaves  believers  with  a
paradoxical world view.
The harmful effect is what Bhaskar would call a TINA formation or double-bind of which
Agnivesh is able to claim (2006:193): “Conventional religiosity preaches love but denies it”. 
Critique  of  society  on  the  other  hand  targets  capitalism,  hegemony  and  neo-Liberalism
(Prozesky 2006:128; Mayson 2006:20; Botha 2006:98; Kourie 2006:89-90). The critique of
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religion is a double critique in so far as religion has participated in the ills mentioned above.
Botha (2006:104) claims:
In contemporary criticism, Aers and Beckwith (2003:211) remind us, “religion
is apt to be seen as politics in another guise, and the task of political criticism
will be to deliver the medieval and early modern text from its own illusions…
Prozesky (2006:129) claims religion is not “ethically effective”. Agnivesh (2006:135-204)
says that religion is a “domain of power” filled with “ritualistic pollution” and that religion as
hegemony is a contrary movement to libertarian spirituality and the author recommends that
religion needs to become “rational and accountable”. Furthermore Agnivesh suggests what
needs to change is the idea of the parochial and personal “ownership” of God, adoption of an
ecumenical  attitude of  “inclusion” and an “incarnated” spirituality,  “radicalized” sense of
worship,  revision  of  “self  and  other’s  image” (Dutton  2011:155-170)  and  a  shift  from
“professing  and  confessing  to  practice”.  Agnivesh  diagnoses  the  following  problems  in
religious ideation: Ritualistic pollution,  fatalism, doctrines of sin,  punishment  and reward
after death, relative isolation of religious communities and an emphasis on personal salvation.
Agnivesh claims that what we desire is a “shift from surface to depth”, “listening”, and for
religions to become “movements not monuments”.
One  needs  to  mention  here  that  none  of  these  critiques  is  foreign  to  Bhaskar  and  that
therefore we would be severely impoverished if we were to undervalue his contribution to
the  secular  spirituality  debate.  Bhaskar  would  counter  any  irrealism  or  the  heuristic
manoeuvring required to clear the epistemic problems that Bhaskar, Kourie (2006:88-90) and
Botha (2006:102-104) seek to address and for which this dissertation has presented critical
realism, as cure. To rehearse these problems or absences in summary we need to mention
accounts of ontology (Botha 2006:105; Kourie 2006:78-80), epistemic fallacies and false
dichotomies, the fact-value taboo, theory to praxis dynamic which Bhaskar has,  to some
extent re-theorised. The reason for their importance is in delivering a workable trans-factual
or  “trans-traditional”  (Kourie,  2006:75)  theory  of  transformation  which  this  dissertation
suggests is  a necessary component  in any definition of spirituality and supported in  this
belief  by Heelas (2012:6,10-11,16-20 ) Botha (2006:102),  Prozesky (2006:134) Agnivesh
(2006:193) and without which I suggest du Toit (2006:63) could not believe that secular
spirituality  is  a  model  for  “post-secular”  or  postmodern  natural  theology  nor  Kourie
(2006:77)  discern  Tillich’s  “loss  of  depth”  nor  credence  given  to  Agnivesh’s  appeal
(2006:203) in this regard.       
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5.2 Fleshing out the critique: the battle for anthropology
What  is  attempted  in  this  section  is  to  broaden  and  deepen  the  critical  aspect  of  the
dissertation. Bhaskar would have us believe that human ability to participate in the intentional
enhancement of reflexivity and to examine consciousness self-consciously, are suspended in
our further ability to seek ground states and engage the non-dual alethia of being. We are able
to discern this factor when responding to crisis and which reveals that transcendence is a
necessary human act, not a special sign of holiness. Transcendence is what makes spirituality
a dimension of not just our experience,  but our  being.  Bhaskar’s theory of Spirituality is
established on a theory of being possessed of a thirst for truth and consistency, rewarded by
trust in the transcendent experience of non-dual alethic truth, which is so common as to often
evade consciousness itself. Needless to say his theory or philosophy of meta-reality is deeply
anthropological and continuous with the thoughts of numerous authors above.  
On the other hand from the religious tradition I am most familiar, Christian anthropology is
exactly that: a Christian extrapolation of anthropology whose elegant history (at least in non-
fundamentalist thought) is based on various interpretations of Thomistic metaphysics and has
been  associated  with  several  outstanding  thinkers:  Etienne  Gilson,  Bernard  Lonergan,
Jacques Maritain and Karl Rahner, to name a few in the catholic tradition. “Natural religion”
or  “natural  theology”,  have shared consistent  interest  in  the  natural religiosity of human
beings. In my opinion none of these, nor their more proximate intellectual counterparts could
or would disagree with Bailey’s (2001:31) suggestion from intra-religious perspective, that
Christian religiosity is “baptised” secular religion: the former pagan religiosity being over-
laid with Christian observance and partially deleted from time and place.  In the catholic
tradition this is widely accepted. As is the fact that Christianity might be a repackaging of
proto-religion with: theological explanation of hermeneutically traceable and contextualised
biblical  development,  re-invention and editorship.  Included is  a  history of praxis  to  faith
dynamic and elisions in tradition and doctrine and adoption of pre-existent holidays and rites
of Pagan and Jewish origin, all replete with reified conceptualisation of the Divine and a
dirempted mythology (humanity’s “fallen-ness”). The history of explanation it seems to have
progressively dichotomised levels of being, as Platonically couched explanation took hold. 
However remarkably unlike market-place “brands”,  the recurrent  repackaging of religion,
often  through a process  of  decline and fall  (Mayson 2006:8),  has  been a  long and slow
process  but nevertheless  held by Christians  to be,  an “evangelical”  and intentional  affair
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mostly  on  the  part  of  God.  It  may  be  argued  that  religious  traditions  exhibit  relative
endurance in history and society partly by owning the word (literacy) and the tools to produce
the word. The role of religion in cultural evolution makes spirituality and religion one of the
most well documented and edited epistemological traditions of being human. Anthropological
readings, though much edited and mediated are implicit. It seems religion has evolved within
the community and of the community to re-define that community in fundamental terms of
diremption  from  happiness  and  dichotomy  of  being,  and  yet  belonging  to  that  same
community is  presented as cure for  our  ills.  Consequently one may rightly assume there
comes a point of historical maturity when that community can no longer understand itself
without the ideational history of its own creation. People come to feel Christian, Muslim et
cetera. Whether we do so consistently (Heelas 2012) is not so important. These pronouns
feature then as shifting chimera of commitments in an ontological identity and perceived
existential reality. It is in the relative endurance of the community that internalisation happens
and the community self-perpetuates practice and ideology.
There are signs of course that all religions exhibit this evolution and diachronic emergence,
building  on the  religious  cultures  of  the  past  even  when  such development  is  explicitly
claimed as interruptive of the previous.  History also teaches that religions have excelled in
the hegemonic coercion of conversions, ubiquitously responsible for murder and mayhem.
However Botha (2006:98) is quick to remind us that the re-packaging of religion continues:
‘Religion’ has been re-packaged and commodified for consumption through the
idea of ‘spirituality’ and business has adopted the positive gloss of ‘spirituality’
to support its corporate interests and working practice. The attempt to model
social life in its totality upon the ideologies and practices of the market directs
the search for meaning and value towards the rather limited perspective of their
instrumental and monetary value.
The caveat  is  worth  taking seriously,  spirituality  may well  be  again  a  place  of  war  and
ownership for interests that are not truly liberating. 
5.3 Values and hegemony
It might not be naïve to pose a simple bottom-up stratified ontological model of mysticism as
asymmetrically  related  non-dual  ground  of  spirituality,  dualistically  held  in  all  limited
religion  and  diversified  into  particular  geo-historical  and  regional  religions.  Each  term
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categorically unlike the next, as Bhaskar has done for scientific realms of reality. However as
Bhaskar claims, such description is only possible from the higher order of intellection which
is implicitly woven into the social cube relations, of time and place. Simplifying the model as
above is not however consistent with the etymological origin of terms (McGinn 2001: ix-xx):
Historically, religion precedes mysticism which then preceded spirituality in our lexicon.  The
historical line of development adds an etymological justification for some epistemological
approaches which describe anthropological realities purely through a linear development of
religion, which masks the ontological priority of mysticism in the development of spirituality
and  religion.  This  is  perhaps  the  anthropological  and  philosophical  insight  which  drives
Troeltsch’s understanding (cf. McGinn 2001:266-290) of mysticism as religious a priori and
also Harnack’s phylogenic conception of “mysticism to rationality”, dynamic. Both of these
theologians and philosophers of religion in some respects, conceive of a spiritual grounding
and development within an ontological depth. 
However,  Troeltsch’s exposition takes  on a tri-dimensional  analysis  which seems to have
become a trend for many sociological-historical explanations including Bailey (2001) and
Waaijman (2002). Certainly this phenomenological triplicity is an artificial (epistemological)
shape  that  has  come  into  almost  ubiquitous  popularity  in  presentation  of  theory  in  the
twentieth century. It seems that anyone who can describe spirituality at three levels has a
“theory”. Methodologically speaking the socialisation of forms are indeed superficial to the
eye  and  require  superior  explanation  and  critique  as  we  learn  to  accommodate  deeper
dimensions  to  be  explored  (Agnivesh  2006:203).  Nevertheless,  what  this  methodological
concern demonstrates are the epistemological values which create hegemonic ideology (either
social, religious or epistemological) then come to be the preferred explanation for natural and
social events and accounts for a certain confessional preference for descriptions of forms,
movements and taxonomies in the socio-historical approach, now dominant in the study of
Spirituality, one may argue. The unintentional (?) consequences of an intentional agenda in
the rise of some sociology are arguably three-fold: (1) ontology and anthropology become
subject  to  “epistemic  fallacy”  via  truth  claims  and  (2)  the  relative  endurance  of  the
explanation sets up a surface “history” of interpretable “facts” and “acts” mimicking those
same explananda in the “actualist fallacy”: in which (3) the intransitive ontological depth of
implicit spiritual reality, is occluded. Regardless of their scholarly excellence and supremacy,
two  authors  (McGinn  1991;  Waaijman  2002)  have  presumed  in  like  fashion  that  the
Foundations of mysticism  and  Forms and foundations of spirituality,  respectively,  are; (a)
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religious, (b) theistic (c) Western and (d) Christian. It is noteworthy that McGinn (1991:xi-
xx) is explicitly aware of these geo-historical limitations and mediations amidst the “richness
of humanity’s spiritual heritage”.
In  the  development  of  the  dissertation,  as  indeed  was  made  explicit  in  the  introductory
section,  Bhaskar’s  conception  of  categorical  realism is  here  deployed  to  critique  certain
historical,  phenomenological  and  sociological  representations  of  spirituality.  This  has
required investigation of critical realism in the content. In the main therefore the character of
presentation has  been philosophical  and methodological.  However  as development  of  the
dissertation clearly shows the primary intention is bound-up with the concern for ideology
and hegemony which encases epistemology and present argument. The argument itself over
and above but not incidental to Bhaskar’s philosophy, is an explicitly critical anthropological
approach to spirituality and Spirituality study. Its hoped-for intention is to re-vindicate the
ontology and concrete singular depth of “implicit” spirituality in its dualistic diversity, away
from traditional  presentation  and  ascriptions  which  I  believe  have  produced  inadequate,
dichotomous  formalism  and  problematic  heurism  as  structurally  efficacious  (fallacy
preserving)  contributory factors  in  the  study of  Spirituality.  The  critique  then  is  general
(participating in meta-critique) and not a specific critique of any one presentation or author at
purely dialectical level of epistemology. The possibilities for the latter are then obvious. The
limitation is self-imposed purely in the face of management concerns. Therefore the very
noticeably  targeted,  implicit,  footnote  critique  of  Waaijman  (2002)  has  necessarily
encroached into the body of the dissertation. However it remains suggestive and incomplete.
The subliminal critique redolent in the begging questions in the dissertation here, are perhaps
then a somewhat unsatisfactorily attempt to set-up critical resonance.
5.4 Are religions brands?
To illustrate  the  point  to  be  made  here,  it  is  probably  easiest  after  reading  Goatham to
consider whether we can define religion as a brand of spirituality and faiths as brands of
religion? Can a brand analysis of religion, similar to Lindstrom (2008) (although it remains
superficial)  proffer  any  enlightenment  about  the  psychological  dimensions  of  religious
internalisation and the process to hegemony? There are sure to be interesting similarities and
differences no doubt. However in so far as sacramental religious observance and religious rite
mark  the gradual  cyclical  “absence to  presence” development  and “presence to  absence”
demise  of  human  life,  we  can  assert  that  formal  religious  expression  displaces  former
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historically  traceable,  anthropological  rites  of  passage.  In  this  way  the  individual  and
communal life cycle is “commodified” as “Christian”, for instance. It is not so much the point
that sacramentals are commodified by Indulgences (Luther’s argument), but that sacramental
life  commodifies  human  being  and  living.  Where  sacramental  life  is  ideologically
inapplicable  namely,  the  world  of  nature,  that  nature  is  marginalised,  unrecognised  and
discarded to the status of religious irrelevance. Brands don’t commodify in this way it seems,
although I wonder about monopolistic intentions exhibited by certain health and wellness
brands (“owning sperm to worm”37). However from the ownership of the “sacramented” life-
cycle, it is a short step to owning our emotions. In the larger definition of brands having both,
commodity and emotion, formal religion might be a brand. 
Indeed in both religious and cultural terms the individual life is branded by the laying on of
hands, oils and water. The natural need to mark our children with scarification, body paints,
tattoos and circumcision (to name a few phenomena) is alternatively ritualised by religion
and  the  natural  sacredness  of  the  occasion  occluded.  The  threads  are  there  for  a  brand
(especially if brands are regional?) analysis of religion. Could similar studies on cults, brain-
washing  shed  light  on  how  it  is  that  we  surrender  intellectual  and  moral  power  to  a
hegemonised ideology (whether those be scientific, cultural or religious), to such extent that
we no longer exercise rational judgement. 
I  should imagine that  all  of these would proffer an opportunity for critique of the social
consciousness. The very socialisation of our being mediates our reflexivity, our spirituality,
and our implicit religion always in the past whose history we carry as pre-interpreted beings.
However, Bhaskar’s point is that the reality of spirituality so “formed”, is not the complete
picture  nor  its  superficial  phenomenological  shell,  the  appropriate  target  for  knowledge
unless all  we want to  elucidate  are those pasts,  superficialities  and shells  in tiresome re-
production. The needful question from an authentically evaluative stance being, “how much
transformative  insight  do  these  really  proffer?”  Agnivesh  (2006:193)  is  convinced  that
“Spirituality  …  is  the  change  from what  is  to  what  might  be,  a  change  from the  real
[Bhaskars’  “actual”]  to  ideal  [Bhaskar’s  “real”].  Both  Bailey  and  Bhaskar  give  good
philosophical  grounds  to  believe  that  religion  hegemonises  an  ontologically  implicit
spirituality and that a blanket compliance with religion is not necessarily an equivalent of
37Overheard comment (2004):  from an unknown speaker in the context of a hospital-management tour.
152
spiritual fulfilment or transformation. The dichotomy is clear to see and the experience of the
marginalised is often testament to its effect.
In  this  presentation it  will  be noticed that  the necessarily and categorically differentiated
terms “mysticism”, “spirituality” and “implicit religion” have been elided in usage. Since the
usual studies in the social history of these have failed to come to any agreement on their exact
definitions,  it  might be useful to avoid the functional slip by conceiving of mysticism as
internal  to,  yet  exceeding  spirituality  and  spirituality  internal  to,  yet  exceeding  religion.
Conceptually each successive category inhabits larger space within the socio-historical matrix
yet,  are  inexorably reliant  on the  excessive emergence  of  the former.  Consequently each
category is available to sociological descriptions as social facts in regional contexts, geo-
histories and the like. Formalistic taxonomies differently, imply an epistemological reduction
and plethora dialectical alterities. These may therefore preserve the tendency amongst theistic
religion to see everywhere, “otherness” (“alterity”) as an implicit threat and in consequence,
we are successfully tempted to put our self-lauded Christian interests “against” other forms,
places  and  times,  involving  a  game of  Mayson’s  “apartheid  rules”  (2006:11).  In  contra-
distinction to this trend numerous authors note that secular spirituality embraces postmodern
holism (Mayson 2006:19; du Toit 2006:51-52; Kourie 2006:80; Prozesky 2006:129). 
5.5 The disease of dichotomy
The  problem  of  dichotomy  is  not  only  epistemologically,  scientifically,  culturally  and
religiously consequential,  the  dualities  preached by spiritual  hegemony might  be  seen as
dogmatically necessary by some who are convinced of its role in protecting a real Alterity
and religiously held “Ultimate Ontological Mystery” in supernaturalism (du Toit 2006:55). A
particular argument has it that doctrine mirrors Christian life but presents itself in koan-like
positivity which temporarily occludes the reality of the negative mystery.  No doubt  such
argument  attempts  to  represent  the  non-dual  aspect  of  doctrinal  spirituality,  for  some.
Implicitly the positive theology presents one side of a coin to an absence defined by believers
as ineffable presence. We are trapped into a language game. However I suspect our over-
usage of the term “ineffable” is epistemologically self-defeating. This is not to claim that
some retreat from analysis is inevitable in the mystical “moment” of ground-state experience,
but merely to point out that accepted vocabulary can contribute to occlusion of ontological
depth. It is easier said I suspect for some to forget the doctrine because “we just don’t know”.
Perhaps what we should be saying is forget the doctrine because it fails in explanation for a
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concretely materialised, un-theologised, “telluric” (Kourie 2006:79-80) transformation, here
understood (Heelas & Woodward 2005:12, cf. Kourie 2006:79-80) as “self understanding,
change and the true-life”. 
Numerous levels of disinterest in traditional ascription presently abound, however I think that
our history of alienation particularly abhors two philosophical positions namely, reduction
and dichotomy of  being.  Admission of our philosophical, epistemological, methodological
and spiritual diminishment in a fractured social cube once again threatened with extinction
(Anderson 2006) admittedly permits certain Biblical themes. The experience of exposing our
common guilt  as  epistemologists  (scribes?)  absolves  (unburdens)  and enlightens  but  will
require the personal responsibility and commitment and transformative transcendence “into
the world come of age” (Mayson 2006:8), newly delivered from “apartheid rules” in which a
re-writing of history, might also be required. The question might be raised that it may be time
for a little heretical “deuteronomising”. This to my mind more honest admission which may
proffer greater progress and transformation for epistemology and methodology, or so one
wishes to argue.
For  others  dichotomy  is  bridgeable  through  a  dialectical  language  game  of  redefining
tradition  and  yet  for  others  doctrinal  dichotomy  raises  the  importance  of  seeking  a
transcendentally satisfying ontological re-grounding. The fact that religious movements are
often born in the face of previous existential intransigence, hegemony and persecution affects
a religious identity, bound or “stitched-up” with being differentiated from the other in “being
other to the other”. However historical analysis might show greater evidence of incorporation
in religious development, than exclusivity. The point can be made in more negative terms
also. Heretical “threat”, is so called because of its historically internal proximity to official
doctrine  than  to  its  alterity.  The  distinctions  of  alterity  are  then  used  as  hegemonic
explanation of a political  anathema sit. I  presume then than numerous “Anathema’s” and
other “apophatised middles”, have sat, dusted their sandals, took up their crosses and said
“follow me”. The mind-set preference for alterity, exclusivity and separation in the mentality
of the “temple courtyard”, must consequently imply for us that secular faith, implicit religion
and  anthropological  spirituality  are  viewed  by  traditional  description  in  presumed  (and
derogated)  otherness  when  this  might  not  be  the  case  at  all,  at  practice  level.  Kourie
(2006:80)  is  quite  correct  to  claim that  what  secular  spirituality  requires  are  “alternative
thought-structures”.  This  too  has  important  consequences:  dichotomy may  be  held  as  a
politico-religious necessity, for some religious believers. 
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I suspect the real problem dichotomy poses is a moral one. In its heyday Christian hegemony
left moral agency behind and its congregation became passive audience to a church which
grew in corruption,  ruling and warring: indistinguishable from any other land-baron with
powers over life and death. Greater reflection on the history of the church I think brings
critical consciousness to the sin of dichotomy and its hegemonic demoralisation of the world.
The  insight  which  grounds  the  conceptual  turn  from  the  principle  of  “non-identity”  to
“transcendental  identification” in  Bhaskar  (2002a,  [2002b]2012,  2002c,  2002d)  is:  if  a
critique of consciousness is to be successful a certain attitude of non-identity with religion
needs to be processed in order to reclaim and re-identify with our natural emerging powers of
spiritual freedom. 
5.6 Hegemony of paranoid alterity
The lessons of social media are being absorbed by the church and I’m sure that insights from
branding experience are too.  Whether cynic or disciple  the mission to convert  and make
followers is open to hegemonic abuse or “religious imperialism” (Agnivesh 2006) and may
speak of  potential  converts  as  alterities  (“pagans”  and “secular”)  and  imposing  religious
licence to  behave like colonial  and enslaving despots,  undervaluing the marginalised and
remaining blinded to its marginalisation of sexuality and women. Yet it will still rely on the
generosity of those marginalised groups. The contradiction is glaring to the conscience. The
“wrongness” is alethic: it not only speaks of but is an ontologically real absence of the good.
To regain  evangelical  effect  the  church  has  had to  confront  its  self-harm its  sin  and the
consciousness which produced it.  Of no small  significance have been (a) the advent and
reversals of Vatican II, (b) the de-hegemonised seating of Spirituality in the academy, (c) the
rise  of  critique of  consciousness  in  high modernism,  and (d)  a  concurrent  postmodernist
moral apathy based on a permitted split between facts and values. Most telling of its fallacy
one suspects is the unavoidable and humiliating fact that by not valuing natural facts in our
acts,  we have enacted the ecological crisis  (Anderson 2006:21) which currently threatens
human sustainability.  If the signs of papal conversion within the church filling the social
media, are an attempt to gain footing in the social mediation of duality and not to merely
reflect back at us a status quo of irrealism in some self-justification, the church does so out of
a need to survive. 
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5.6.1 Churched possibilities?
For some the Church’s mission therefore is to re-vindicate the dignity of humanity and assure
us that we have the power to transform our social cube and redeem our personal, social and
ecological relations. It necessitates an affirmation of certain emergent powers in our being 38
and must adopt the consciousness of the marginalised and renounce all  paraphernalia of
dichotomising  triumphalism.  Certainly  this  could  take  a  minute  or  several  centuries
depending on how demoralised we’ve become and how sick the patient needs to get before
we  release  the  maddening  splits.  In  a  sense  Christianity  needs  a  descended  church  of
(downward, a-linear) transcending solidarity with a non-reified theory-in-praxis and attention
to what really matters. It should no longer harp the glory days of its hegemonic undoing. In
essence  the  process  demands  we  redress  the  practice-theory  dichotomy,  re-assess  the
traditional role (priority) of ontology and anthropology (Mayson 2006:7) in praxis and whose
“non-religious content” (Kourie 2006:79-80) is acknowledged, in theory. Collegiality of the
Bishops has a role to play as does the empowerment of regional liturgical expression and the
procedure for election to the Synod but apart from these we need a massive mobilisation to
save the planet from Mayson’s “apartheid”. 
None of the above is achievable if Christian identity remains a function of alterity. Yes brands
need identity and differentiation from competitors however we may ask,  is  the church to
brand in normal terms? However important the experience of existential intransigence and
alterity is in the formation of spiritual consciousness when “identity” is so much the issue in
young lives, a mature spirituality would suggest that we make identity at the very moment of
every transcendental act and which escapes analysis. Let us assume that the church faces
reality squarely and follows through in becoming ideologically less dichotomous. Surely such
process necessitates the transcendence of the church as we know it or to be more exact, the
church of the past. Certainly the discourse about the church will continue to feature, whilst
others will de-church their consciousness and jump into the mystery of an enchanted concrete
existence, midst growing “internationalism” (Mayson 2006:4). I believe that there exists in
secular  spirituality  a  discernible  utopian  axiology (Mayson  2006:12-14;  Kourie  2006:82;
Pozesky 2006:129-133; Agnivesh 2006:190) even when critiqued by du Toit (2006:68). Is not
38Cf.  Beyers Naude’s (1986) comment to the South African Council of Churches (cf.  Mayson  2006:17) :
“Something new is groaning to emerge which will challenge the whole church in South Africa to the depths of
its being. But why doesn’t it happen?”
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the anthropological resonance so palpable in the church not a call  to join-up and enact a
reversal of its own epistemic fallacy for a non-dichotomous redefinition of ontology in its-
self, the world and God? The muddle of Platonic thought in theology begs a Bhaskarian re-
interpretation of ontology, but considering the time frame the ontological living of spiritual
praxis  must  take  priority  to  any after  the  fact  re-interpretation  (Botha  2006:101-103).  I
suspect we cannot look at facts of crisis and beyond those the causal non-dual conditions of
life, whilst suffering the church’s usual discourse, interpretation or mythology of those facts.
To do so, is to legitimate a split intention. Achilles-heel techniques of critique are applicable
and we might propose a superior explanation of ontological spirituality for our time, such as I
believe Bhaskar and Bailey go a long way to establish. However if deliverance from our
crisis in ontology is to arise, it cannot be a mere intellectual exercise. 
5.6.2 Ontological cure to paranoid alterity
The cure is more likely to be found from a non-dual appreciation for the sacredness of all, a
question of anthropological values-based practice in the “re-enchantment” of being. In the
dual realm of dialectic there is plenty of ideation to go around: Bhaskar speaks of  cosmic
envelope and some in the church of Cosmic Christ, Bhaskar of spirit and the church of Holy
Spirit and  so  on,  but  both  participate  in  a  vocabulary  of  non-equal  terms.  Dialectical
engagement with religion is not truly possible without having to deal with the sometimes
existential intransigence and traditional explanation. In short I believe it is in  this time and
this place here and now to “do good by being good”: instilling the values of “integrity” and
“goodness” (Prozesky 2006:134). 
This I believe to have been the harnessing power of the first churches, the goodness of alethic
conviction, kindly service, and the existential intransigence which met with martyrdom. Any
number  of  historically  and  socially  derivable  contextual  themes  might  be  mentioned.
However I cannot discount the “praxis and theory” relationship nor that the experience of the
early church was grounded in emancipative ideals worthy of sons and daughters of God and
yet  whose  lives  were  surrounded  by  threat.  Nothing  much  has  changed  but  that  this
existential  reality  now extends  to  the  entirety of  humanity.  The  otherness  of  tightly-knit
cellular church community of the first centuries, no longer describes the global context. 
Nor  can  we  afford  to  address  our  problems  from  a  purely  theoretical  perspective  or
confessional allegiance (McGinn 2005:267). The pre-eminence of alterity as both epistemic
and moral value cannot co-exist with implications for  Jesus today: a spirituality of radical
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freedom (Nolan 2006) or the classist distinctions of freeman, slave, male, female and so forth.
Nor do we want the heteronomised “spiritual man” bound in a reified love which is sign of
someone else’s spirit. If we wonder at how the spiritualised package of religion Paul taught
came to hegemonise the naturally religious milieu, it is because the church trusted him and
esteemed him to the point of jealousy, perhaps fearing his intellect and history of fanaticism.
The other thing that the Apostles were to accomplish was preach to the slave, prisoner and
poor in terms of their own reality, the evangelists and letter writers were able to deliver a
critique of consciousness which explained the receiver’s experience and promised immanent
redemption,  they weren’t  lying  they believed it.  If  Paul’s  ideation  here  is  extended to  a
historically traceable hegemony of religion, it was perhaps John who accomplished a similar
“Logocentic” explication of unitive mysticism.
5.6.3 Aetiology and diagnosis
Isolation by terror, thinking better of one-self for the persecution, a profound spiritualised
connection in the community, sense of purpose and value for the development of spiritual
character are all naturally occurring constituents of loyalty. Here convinced of one’s place in
the  theological  drama and explained in  ready to  hand dichotomised concepts  suiting  the
experience of the underbelly of empire: the gospel appealed. Put simply the gospel appealed
to the spiritually thirsty and who suffered an alienated existence, in a language they could
understand and which resonated in them. If  being spiritually alive came to be associated
alone with “Life in the Spirit” and the Christian message we should not be surprised, wide-
spread existential  alienation remains a global motivator in the turn to spirituality (Kourie
2006:19).  Nor should the Christian advancement  of alienation,  its  interest  in  splitting-off
secularity where “secular” and “faith” are treated as officially distinct opposites and when
they are in fact “two sides of the same coin” (Bailey 2001:1-3), remain unchallenged.
5.7 Summary of the argument 
Speaking generally one reflects, as a project Christian Doctrine on Man (sic) reframes and
theologises humanity. Without overstepping the bounds of expertise, it might be argued that
many  if  not  all  theological  interests  over  the  past  seventy  years  have  highlighted  the
problematic of anthropology. A pattern begins to emerge, if there indeed is (an un-necessary)
war  between  the  faith  and  the  secular  it  is  a  war  about  the  ownership  of  humanity,
intentionality and agency constituting a struggle in the realm of the social cube relations of
anthro-polity, driven by an evangelical injunction to be fishers of men.
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The market place practice of branding might be a similar phenomenon. It could be argued
that  God  was  the  first  to  brand  producing  everything  a  corporate  would  desire,  in  His:
Longevity, loyalty, ready media coverage and rights to it: a brand that promises salvation and
delivers in the hagiographic blurb. Like all brands it relies on visibility on a marketable but
not necessarily unique product, trust and emotion. We trust brands to reflect our values and
social cube relations (attitudes). Amongst the appeal of successful brands religious trust is the
best type. In the comparative world of religion the church is merely one brand amongst a
plethora of religious brands, all of which have superficial factual resemblances and in the
face of which “forms”, some scholars stop and genuflect. 
If there is an indication that the church brand is not changeless, it is the historical removal of
the market-site from the church yard. Nevertheless the distance is now “virtual”. Despite its
geographical removal from everyday life religion evidences to the world that faith is real.
Whether or not one loses faith with the church, faith (trust) still exists at an existential level in
the implicitly secular and remains open to negotiation. The fact that trust is a human necessity
is indicated by its endurance even in the church. On the reverse side of people “leaving”
institutional religion many stay and continue a reasonably numbered congregation whilst, in
Africa and South America expressions of faith grow amidst adverts for penis enlargement.
People (mostly women) stay despite their wounding experiences received at the hands of a
patriarchy. The list of the church’s sins is endless. “The church is only human” or so the plea
goes. The point exactly! Yet the liturgical entertainment which interrupts the “rosary group”
at prayer is a multi-strata affair celebrating numerous anthropological based sequences and
transforming them into holy mysteries, promising not only salvation in the future when we
need it  now, but  something in the order  of an eternal dinner  party,  or so some believers
believe.  Religion  re-sacralises  a  reality already sacred.  In  the  sharing  of  communion the
dichotomisation of our joy and tragedy are materially consumed as one human condition
regardless of what the “cup” truly signifies. We need not reflect on the promises of religion
for too long, since no one really knows what they stand for or what to trust in them. Un-
natural (supernatural?) religion is sold to people as cure of their ills and fears (Marx is quite
correct)! One is free to suppose following Freud that religiosity is some comfort in our fear of
death. So on the superficial shell of the Christian-Church brand, certain elements resemble an
over-reach of brand building. Its product is communal “belonging” as cure for alienation but
presented  as  a  mental  and  physical  space  to  celebrate  faith/trust  and  religiosity.  In  this
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church-owned space in turn the clerical church gets to deliver its official message presented
for adoration and celebration, sometimes a good “show” replete with reverence. 
Speaking officially the local representative will explain that this reverence and this cure for
alienation is a gift of belonging to the brand being one of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, not the
Zeitgeist. A moment’s reflection on these gifts might strike us after reading Bhaskar that these
are  philosophically  derivable  human  necessities,  resident  in  the  fine  interior  of  deeply
stratified being. So all we really have for “doing” church is a celebration of the relocation of
what  we  had  in  the  first  place:  indeed  a  spiritual  place  of  valuable  re-enchantment and
inspiration namely, the world. However this communal relocation (anthropo-dis-location) has
not  in  any  way  diminished  the  isolationist  privatisation  of  spirituality,  implied  in  the
discourse of modernism.
However one has only to conduct a quick analysis to see how the results of catechesis and
Christian formation have appropriated ordinary life and sold it as a brand, a minor product in
the range of which is “Holy (sacramental) water”. Perhaps others would have us celebrate the
sacredness  of  water  and  waterways.  The  anthropological  basis  of  church  thinking  is
omnipresent yet occluded by the “Holy”, the “Sacred” which is suspended away from reach
and alienated from us, to be replaced by the mediation of the church itself subtly “denying
identity  [and  instilling]  conformity,  insincerity  and apathy”  (Bailey 2001:33).  Within  the
exercise of formation one is encouraged to distrust self and trust the brand. The ontological
rug is pulled from our feet. The coercive underlay exploits the anthropological fear of falling,
whilst  promising salvation from above and where,  the church is the only self proclaimed
helicopter: one starts doubting that it will ever come when needed.
However the official theological doctrine is quite entertaining in its opinions and has a lot to
say on the entire experience of living having descended from Abraham “our father in faith”
who many say is a spiritual proto-type of Paul’s “spiritual man”. In the publically held myth
of the brand is a value for proto-spirituality and the Christian extrapolation of anthropology
“in Christ”. What often escapes us is “the Christ” who hangs on the cross of duality, raised up
in the social cube of his day by the sectarian relations, actions, intentions which constituted a
grand power-play between hegemonies and brands of liberation. If we recognise doctrine as
ideology we see within the official heart of the church and its theological origin the Cross, the
“logo” interpreted for the masses as the sign of anti-hegemonic contradiction. However the
historical memory of the cross as threat of empire is still a rallying point set against the other
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and the secular,  ergo that which is implicit to Christianity itself. One could therefore argue
that the cross permits a dichotomised and inconsistent subliminal message on one hand the
dying Christ’s agonised prayer “forgive them, for they know not what they do”, is coupled by
the leadership’s “do as I say not as I do”. The subtlety of coercion in the brand is hardly likely
to be explicit nevertheless one got the message under Cardinal Ratzinger’s ascendency “don’t
mess with the Vicar even when he’s messed with you”. 
Some sociological facts about the church suggest it  fairs morally neither better (Finnegan
2010:27-37) nor  worse than our species and concrete  singularities  empower.  The sacred-
secular split or dichotomy is glaringly harmful to the implicit innocence of being and self-
integration. Religion in the official exercise of structural, political, liturgical and theological
hegemony has first  and foremost damaged its  representatives in a vicarious set  of power
relations, the injunction to do all good things without a value for eros. How then is agape (the
“fulfilment” of eros) sustained, but “up and away”? The subtleties of hegemony continue to
damage  ontology  and  seek  to  suspend  it  away  from  its  rightful  two-legged  stance  –
intellectual and existential slaughter, in my opinion. Inherent in the myth of the cross is the
message  of  suffering  “if  it’s  good  enough  for  God,  it  is  good  enough  for  you!”  Every
Christian is called to the Cross it explains for some the mystery of human suffering when it is
plain to see that all suffering is a condition of existence: it is neither thus far avoided, nor
applauded, it is plainly horrible when it happens and we would all like to be delivered of it.
Nevertheless we may ask “why the need to turn an anthropological and natural horror into a
mystery?” For others the cross is a sincere rallying point of human solidarity with the weak,
suffering and oppressed. Yet the generous spirit of humanity that “helps out”, has a history of
brands: Oxfam, Red-Cross, Red Crescent: to name a few. Owning the social pie is always
part of hegemonising brand war-fare. It is however interesting, that organisation titles like
Gift of the Givers contribute a plainly anthropological truth (“alethia”) to this mix. Of further
interest, this organisation of many givers is the inspiration of a Turkish holy man given to a
South African and devoted Muslim.    
Christianity is not alone in attempting to colonise the (essentially un-colonisable, but socially
available) consciousness of persons. One of the fundamental points Bailey (2001:4-9) wishes
us to consider is that the plural-diversity of religious practice within the church must indicate
the “potential religiosity of everyday life”. 
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5.8 The critical cure
No doubt in catholic circles earlier anthropological argument was couched in Thomist or neo-
Aristotelian  terms  now  a  somewhat  lonelier  discourse  amongst  the  conservative  branch.
However  the resonance is  anthropological,  amongst  broader  and more recent  embrace of
mitigated-naturalism. I suspect that critical naturalism will become of interest. There is within
the Catholic and some Protestant comfort here a place for natural religion and the philosophy
of religion in the formation of the thinkers, speakers and readers (du Toit 2006:66-69), for
instance. To these Bhaskar is to deliver a profoundly rewarding contemplation. So too, one
suspects for those interested in naturalism and natural religion in service of emancipation
from hegemonised  Spirituality.  Lest  we elide  Bailey’s  “implicit  religion”  with  Bhaskar’s
“practical mysticism” on account of anthropological interest alone (Bailey is not in favour of
such elision),  Bailey’s interest  is religious in the social  cube duality of religiosity,  whilst
Bhaskar’s is a trans-traditional grounding of spirituality into the necessities of being.  For
Bhaskar religion hegemonises spirituality,  Bailey agrees  but has a  value for the religious
mystery which both contradicts (as non-paranoid alterity) and is theologically co-opted into
the  religious  hegemony.  For  example  the  structure  of  the  church  is  cast  in  theologically
epitomised  “ideal  types”  (Bailey  2001:14)  which  lends  self-retreating  characteristic  to
dialectical engagement, thus providing what some have used as an existential safe-haven in
the face of scandal.
The hypostasis of Christian duty to grace un-avails or occludes a natural agency, ontological
depth  and social  responsibility into  a  reified theory of  ultimate agency of  God as  prime
mover. Consequently Bailey suggests, “The last third of the twentieth century was marked by
an increasing recognition of the reality of what is implicit”. Nevertheless both Bailey and
Bhaskar would agree with numerous others, that a thorough going critique of consciousness
characterises personal and public practice: (Bailey 2001:14) “… a growing of self awareness
–  and the  growing  awareness  of  such self-awareness”  pointedly suggests  contextualising
secular spirituality in a post-modernist frame. Nevertheless amongst Christian leadership, an
eccentric amongst “there is  no alternative” types  of intransigence,  has grown to old age.
Partly accountable for its resilience church structure has made a home for itself as institution,
culture,  morality,  spirituality,  mysticism,  politics,  trade  and academia,  a  poly-present  and
multi-layered intention. Western civilisation owes much of its worldview to the power of the
church. The church’s elevation of Zeitgeist to “Holy Ghost” midst resurrections, ascensions,
assumptions, transportations (Bailey 2001:32) in its message, has laid the foundation for a
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triumphalist  establishment.  It  should come as no surprise to (non-positivist)  naturalists to
discern  the  veneer  of  hegemony:  a  seduction into  complacency and the  strangely fearful
coercion of ideological power, which nevertheless counts on the generous spirit of naturally
spiritual and “implicitly religious” people who donate their social cube to it. Often they do so
in the belief that in so doing betterment of that same social cube (which hasn’t changed much
over two thousand years of preaching the beatitudes) is afforded. Also afforded is the comfort
of knowing that they are “doing” but not always “being” their best. It is often remarked that
people don’t think most of the time but even hegemonised and “reduced” beings act, love,
free and create.
There is no doubt that the Christian experience is also bi-furcated at its ground. God exists
but also doesn’t exist as a category, unless categories require the magical numbers of one and
three. Religion carries within it, its own irrealism.
Bailey (2001:25) explains thus:
Thus the belief itself follows the object of that belief in being sui-generis and,
therefore, simultaneously inevitably unprovable except through the witness of
‘religion’ and of life itself. For his [the Buddha’s] and our, silence is otherwise
ambiguous. It could be a mark of respect for his [God’s] ubiquitous presence of
the consequence of his unreality. It could signify reverence or denial.
Bhaskar simply refuses to enter into this sort of fray except to lay down some interesting
methodological limitations of theological discourse ([2002b] 2012:145-164). Convinced as he
is that the absence of (negativity) of being in no way signifies or necessarily moves towards
presence, the existence of “god” must presuppose god’s non-existence. If then, one god can
exist why not a pantheon and such multiplicity of god as category must necessarily have the
ability of merging with the cosmic envelope.  
It is both Bhaskar’s and Bailey’s conception and forming a particular religious interest in the
latter, that disempowering dualities in expression and experience are “fought shy of” in the
practice  of  the  practitioners.  Both  authors  for  instance  have  noted  the  dichotomous
assumption  in  religion:  Bailey  (2001:25)  says  “that  the  experience  of  transcendence  is
restricted  to  the  exception  … such a  ‘theology’ would  leave  most  religious  practitioners
dumbstruck. They thought their belief was primarily to do with the ordinary, the usual”. Does
church attendance have to be usual? Bailey seems to suggest that this has for some centuries,
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not been the case (in The United Kingdom and United States of America). Yet despite the
myth of secularisation the hegemonised values of society have not changed much: the same
controversies abound in the dialectic, including emancipative ones. This raises the question:
If the “implicit secular religion” were to be explicated what would we find? Bailey suggests
nothing much different from what we have now as regionalised practitioners because and in
particular Christian practitioners already make explicit their natural religiosity. This would
not surprise Bhaskar, who understands that practice mediates ontology.
At the epistemological level (Bailey 2001:27) dualisms produce problems, the student “runs
the  two-fold  danger:  either  the  religious  or  the  secular  becomes  the  merely  automated
consequence of the other”. In answer to Kourie’s (2006:88) questions about the longevity or
sustainability of secular spirituality in the future, perhaps Bailey would suggest that secular
spirituality has never,  not had a future. Critical to the Bailey/Bhaskar project is the idea of
emancipation. In  order  to  fulfil  our  interconnected  and  flourishing,  we  are  required  to
overcome our own personal dualisms and heteromomy. Bailey (2001:26) sees these dualisms
as harmful to life, religious life, and to (dialectical) engagement between the two:
The sense of moral compulsion, starting as a ‘divine inspiration’ but sliding into
ethical imperialism, inspires an equal and opposite moral reaction, which slides
into  moral  negativism.  If  conscience  itself  is  ‘deified’,  then  the  opposing
conscious  is  ‘atheised’ [if  not  demonised]  and  moral  ‘compulsion’ becomes
mechanistic  ‘causation’  [not  Bhaskar’s  rational  causation].  If  freedom  is
threatened by belief, free will is denied by disbelief, or so believers believe. If
divine revelation is claimed as self justification, then all revelation is denied in
self-defence. The position of Religious Studies is not dissimilar. A sui generis
religiosity may be seen as either dominant or as irrelevant. An epiphenomenal
religion may be seen as either subservient or insignificant. The need is for a
model  of  religion  which  allows  the  phenomenon  itself  sufficient  reality  to
interact with the secular, neither as dictator nor as toady but in the unrelaxed,
creative partnership of dialectical dialogue. 
I do not anticipate that we encounter any obstacles in seeing how in Bhaskar’s notion of
TINA formations which here breed discontent in religion do so under the same conditions
that can lead to their dissolution. Their truth factor is set free to engage its dialectical opposite
in critique. Secular spirituality’s critical resonance is very much concerned with the defeat of
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chimerical irrealism, whose ability to monopolise the ground of some Spirituality language
games  with  slippery  dualisms  and  denial  of  ontological  freedom,  reflexivity  and
transformation.  Contrary  to  usual  claims  this  type  of  talk  a-moralises  and  demoralises:
perverting alethia or non-dual and ground state conviction, that doing good by being good in
the  realm  of  natural  virtue  can  transform  the  natural,  social,  inter-  and  intra-personal
dimensions of our social cube. Some comment is necessary by way of a question firstly: Is
Bhaskar’s non-duality of practical mysticism any recourse to the problem? The answer is
complex. Not only do TINA’s, hegemonies, ideologies and dualities dance in Bailey’s, du
Toit’s and Botha’s world, but they occlude the implicit religion of secularity that is set against
a traditional battle-field over the booty of being. However despite Bailey’s concern for reality
it might easily be surmised that what Bailey lacks is Bhaskar’s elucidation of social cube
which may negate the need or want to examine religion in terms of sociologically explicit and
Platonically reminiscent tripartite schemata (“leader, scholar, practitioner”). I know that this
is  difficult  to  imagine  when  studying  a  social  phenomenon  whose  hierarchies,  power
structures  and  other  historical  facts,  suggest  such  a  scheme  (e.g.  the  church  as  Priest,
Religious, Lay or alternately Waaijman’s “forms”). Certain categorical lacunae make it easy
to elide these features into sociological taxonomies as though these forms were inherent and
incorrigible,  and  not  the  superficialities  of  history  exposed  in  the  Bhaskar’s  critique  of
actualist  fallacy.  Church  self-description  of  religious  options  might  have  a  completely
different intention: to express a theological value in a view of itself imitating the Christian
“Tri-une” of ultimate reality.
It is fine and well to read the doctrine, documents, pastoral letters and synod minutes to find
in  there  some  intentional  interior  to  the  organisational  spirituality  of  a  leadership  caste.
However two problems necessarily arise. The first is that these official articles gain exclusive
voice when the silent religiosity of the practitioner is implicit in the person who is bishop,
priest, professional religious and scholar. Furthermore it is spirituality at a more fundamental
level that holds the entire religious structure together. The fine structure of being spiritual or
“spiritual beings” remain somewhat opaque to us. However in consequence, not only is the
secular religion deprived of a voice but the religious depth of officially religious persons is
derogated, by such deprivation. Both Bhaskar and Bailey are very nervous about obvious
taxonomies  for  good  reason  because  these  tend  to  miss  the  intention  and  meaning  of
practitioners,  whilst  busily  hunting  down  sociological/phenomenological  “facts”  and
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“constants”39. Bhaskar admits that taxonomies do act as causal categories in the social realm
by exhibiting a relatively enduring ontology.  Above and beyond the tendencies of causal
ontologies in the natural realm, social causality is ontologically inter-dependent: never acting
as an atomistic individual in the cube of relations.
5.8.1 Epistemology and methodologies: “fact-u-lying” society?
Bhaskars suspicion of taxonomy is not based on doubt in the value of its epistemologically
available ontology: categorical realism holds that we need more categories, not fewer. If this
philosopher holds that we can no longer rely on an uncritical and naïve interpretation of the
epistemological truism, that a discipline takes after its object in innocent and certain fashion
and from which evidence we then conduct research analysis and so on. To re-explain those
facts  heuristically  or  taxonomically  means  that  so  doing,  blithely  enacts  an  uncritical
actualism: we enter into the bind of epistemic fallacy. In other words we tend to emphasise
the contingent, time-dependent reality of social targets in epistemology and ignore to their
alethic intransitivity. Social targets do not only endure against socially dialectical critique,
they are  partly  and relatively ontologically  contingent  of  the  past.  From epistemological
39Despite Waaijman’s protestations and championing of the phenomenological-dialogical approach, one may
ask whether the formal phenomenology presented there actually allows for dialogue and in what sense? If there,
the dialogue is between the hermeneutical and the formal, what is elicited? Apart from one level mirroring the
other and again, what does this illicit but an ‘echo’, not even the most superficial type of dialectic. My suspicion
of  Waaijman’s reduction to spirituality as “the Divine-Human relational process” (2002:427) binds him to the
overwhelming realm of the supernatural transcendent which limits dialogue in the public realm of dialectic
where one movement challenges another but always with in a singular paradigm. Here even the public arena is
taken to be reduced or extremely controlled by the censors, imprimaturs etc. Waaijman’s characterisation of
spirituality, its forms and foundations must, I think should be read as operative in a Christian, religiously closed
description  of  social  systems,  unlike  natural  open  human  society.  In  short,  Waaijman’s  ‘sin’ is  to  reduce
spirituality to a confessional taxonomy. Waaijman is quite correct in valuing the dialogical method, however of
what sort? Is it a superficial dialoguing with the past, purely to entrench a taxonomical hegemony, and would
any such  thing possibly be conceived to  exist,  if  there  was  no active  and  intentional  ontological  depth  to
interpret, underlying the epistemic surface, thus derived. The strong determinism attributed by Waaijman to the
past,  in historicist  reduction, must at  some point  be acknowledged for  the inherent epistemic and actualist
fallacy. For clarity, I must declare that I do appreciate the role of historical-sociological study, I am cautious of
its hegemonic ascendency in post-Kantian tradition. Near encyclopedic insight and rigour of scholarship, not
discounted, should not be expected to deliver more than a patchwork of guess-work and description.
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perspective  they are  always  “in  the  past”,  presenting  themselves  into  the  present  by our
reproduction in the “here and now”. At the relative level of epistemology our constructions
often occlude this ontological relatively enduring, being in the past. A purely Kantian view of
pre-interpretation or the reality of our history “with us” imposes ready-made denial of our
constant “presenting” or being present in the present-making of the past, in such fashion as to
deny the ontological being which does all this but may enact alternatives. As a result the
present  mimics  a  distortion  of  the  past’s  presumption  and  opinion  of  itself.  The  social
consequences  thus  become existentially  intransitive  to  change or  rather  they give  us  the
existentially palpable “there is no alternative finger-wag” of closure. What Bhaskar suggests
we need and want is to develop our categorical realism to appreciate the depth of being, its
capacity for change, and thereby liberate our axiology of emancipation from the realm of
irrealism (or Baudrillard’s “hyper-realism”?), inherent in the discourse of modernism.
The  empowerment  of  our practical  mysticism  and  our  exercise  of  ground-state
transcendence, make inter-dependent flourishing possible in the duality of the social realm,
by  derivable  co-presence and  effect  of  envelopment in  the  non-dual  being.  In  their
epistemological  reflections  our  emancipations  lie  in;  (a)  a  critique  of  consciousness,  (b)
dialectical  critique  of  hegemony,  acknowledging  that  many  subtle  and  categorical
differentiations between facts and causes must be discerned and considered, (c) developing a
methodology where the realities of emergent powers (materially) into our reality and where-
upon the realms of the empirical, the actual and the real are conceived to expand whilst the
progress of the epistemologically transitive dimension may be said to advance toward the
intransitive,  in  an  intelligible  plumbing  of  ontological  depth  and  advancement  towards
cosmic totality (also Kourie’s insight, 2006:79-80). Along the way anything can happen. Who
knows perhaps we can “put the toothpaste back in the tube” (Bourdain 2013) or in this case,
put reflexive and agenting ontology back into the conceptual frame. A purely social-centred
and tacitly past-bound taxonomic explanation of spirituality must be inadequate. 
Even if the causes in the social dimension of spirituality are themselves socially produced,
discernment  and interpretation of  those causes should never  be reduced to  either,  “social
patterns, historical lines nor a combination”. The unseen causally transformative intention in
our agency does not lie in such obvious superficialities of history (McGinn 2005: xi-xx, 291-
326).
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Interpretation  must  fundamentally  require  a  moment  of  transcendence  in  which  the  co-
presence of text in the interpreter, grounds that moment of inter-subjectivity in the anamnesis
of a “now” state of alethic (emergent) knowing. Perhaps one might say, a moment of self-
revelation  in  a  moment  of  transcendental  identification  with  that  text.  In  other  words
objectivity must be fundamentally and logically available to our subjectivity. What I have
described  must  be  the  condition  of  possibilities  for  any  intelligible  epistemological
advancement for it signifies the interior cohesion of the moment of will and intellect, in the
rational  and  ontological  conditions  for  truth  and  consistency  essential  for  science.  Our
sociologically based constructs should perhaps take a de-centred or non-localised role, set
against  a  conceptual  re-totalising  of  ontology  and  with  it  the  intentional  emancipative
axiology implicit in our rational needs and wants. 
I  would  suggest  (perhaps  entirely  wrongly),  that  what  Waaijman’s  phenomenological-
sociology provides instead is socio-historical dialectic between historically justified social
movements  within  a  narrowly  regional  reality  wherein  agency  is  limited  (despite  the
hermeneutical content) and undeniably set in the past. The dialogical exposition of intentions,
reasons and causes is I think a totally differing reality. How to plumb these is in no way easily
obtained and I must admit that I do not possess a solution, critical realist considerations are
many,  yet  not  one  of  them suggests  stasis.  Rather  what  Benedikter  and Molz  (2012:59)
intimate is “a new phase of development of (neo-) integrative thought ... a third way” beyond
modernist and postmodernist discourses.   
This is not to deny that religious life takes on readily expressible forms of life in the social
realm. In any team one is likely to find the leader, the follower and the anti-task group. In the
history of the church it is a well documented fact that the prophetic anti-hegemonic voice has
been successively and successfully co-opted into manageable cloistered life. How else was
the church to manage un-attached women and bothersome mendicants like the Beguines and
former heretics? The successful corporation and religious hegemony alike, co-opts or at least
attempts  to  co-opt  its  own  critical  voice.  The  emergent  and  implicit  in  the  subject  are
occluded and that is why we scholars involve ourselves in the red herrings and other heuristic
devices pretending to some understanding of  intentions as usually empirically evidenced in
sociological  phenomenon.  We often get  away with the charade (however  unintentionally)
because our findings mirror an archived self-agreement in which our ideology of science tells
us “this is how we do things”. We reproduce reams of representations with none to represent.
Thus  we  layer  our  subject  with  veneer  and  opacity  preserving  a  specialised  brand  of
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spirituality  and  miss  the  alethia of  spiritual  being.  We  unconsciously  participate  in  the
hegemony and render a  pastiche of  its  life.   Erudition trumps truth,  or so it  seems. Also
noteworthy is the fact that within this tri-partite conception of religious forms (there being a
Bailean similarity, with Waaijman (2002) and Heelas (2012)) a paradigmatic effect is at play:
the injunction of the theological “as-above-so-below” conception, and as one might say of it
despite the protest  of “unity” does not  concur  with Bailey’s conclusions.  Analysis  of the
account (Bailey 2001: 27-28) is revealing:
I was wanting to show how ‘secular’ life might receive additional illumination
(additional to all the other ways in which we regard it, from the perspectives of
economics,  politics,  history,  psychology,  and  so  on),  if  we  regard  it  as
sometimes putatively containing within itself something like its own religion…
it  served  the  purpose  of  revealing,  even  though  in  this  case  [of  a  reported
conversation] it took some ‘ordinary’ forms. Indeed his [the reported] account
revealed three different implicit religions, and whether they expressed or fitted
in with traditional Christian shapes was hard to say and (from our then point of
view) was not the question. 
Religiosity  is  perhaps  best  conceived  as  the  ritualistic  and  social  mediation/aspect  of
spirituality is a multi-faceted and (relatively enduring) ontologically stratified phenomenon,
open to the usual dualistic chimera in the relations which produce social being. The morally
conscious point being: religion veneers and glosses us with a wounded heart and unhappy
soul in need of a happy homecoming. I would merely comment that the son of man has no
such home but in the here and now. As Bhaskar would have it, this is not atheism it is indeed
alethia undergirded  by  a  non-duality  of  being,  truth,  theory=practice,  in  the  reflexively
actionable expression of our freedom and flourishing wishes. Kourie notes (2009:167) the
Pauline social impact of “dynamic union with the Risen Christ”:
This  union has social  implications and is  inextricably linked to  [social  cube
relations?]  the  church  and  thus  has  collective  and  cosmic  meaning  … The
mystical initiative come from God; it is both an act of grace and also effected in
historical actuality of Christ… 
The social cube or world is subject to some hot theological debate. Some wish to ground it in
the  cosmic,  others  to  suspend it  in  the  cosmic,  however  the  point  is  taken  that  cosmic
significance  is  “in”  (Kourie  2006:79-80).  For  some the  top-down cosmic  dimension  has
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priority mediated by the church as divine representative in the world of relations. Essentially
the subliminal message is that outside of the church there exists no salvation and this message
licenses  hegemony which  is  heteronomously  received,  in  reified  and  pacified  notions  of
transformation. On the other hand one has the liberationist critical conception that the church
is all that exists in creation but still in sacramental practice and preaching, I would claim the
church still sees its object: Divine Subject of union, God who pops into and out of existence,
and on record as such, is “on High” (Heelas 2012:11), Alone (in three Persons), the truly
Merciful, reconciling all things to Himself in Christ. In other words “making better”, whilst
we devote our social cube and concrete singular energies to giving witness to either a cosmic-
centred  Christ  or  cosmically  enveloped  Christ  in  some  Teilhardian  mysticism,  but  more
ordinarily for Bailey (2001) building trustworthy relations of practicality. However lest we
overplay the dichotomy we should not forget that de Chardin’s (1961) Hymn of the Universe
demonstrates  a  pietistic  and dated  but  nevertheless  profoundly prayerful  monologue of  a
naked “I – Thou” encounter in a non-dual sacredness of all.
Bhaskar vindicates the experience of ground-state in his own way. In the practice of one’s
mysticism or  religiosity,  dualism is  transcended at  the  very ordinary level.  This  level  of
practical mysticism is so implied in everything we do that we barely reflect on it, or look for
it  in  our  study.  In  the  light  of  which  obviousness  we might  critically  consider  Berling’s
(2006:40, cf. Kourie 2009:160) claim for the comparative study of religions hoping to add a
necessary  dimension  to  the  anthropologic  approach  in  study  of  Spirituality.  We  might
conclude that there is an implicit religion in every moment of theory-practice unity in the
practice of everyday life. Even so for Christians whose rationale might or might not fit into
Christian or indeed, Bhaskar’s or Bailey’s description. 
Here then is the methodological problem which has in this dissertation stared us in the face:
since the (transitive) method follows the (intransitive) target,  the causal target eludes and
extends beyond mere facts of its indication and phenomenology and defies induction and
taxonomy. In a bi-furcated (sometimes tri-furcated/triangulated) hegemonic world, regarding
people  holistically  is  regarded as  an  attempt  at  everything.  The taboos  against  perennial
philosophy come to mind, yet our scholarly community still exhibits a penchant for socially
owned perennials  and constants  as though our reams and footnotes add veracity,  to  their
much reduced causality. The worry is that spirituality represented purely as a societal pattern
of events actually further derogates its ontologically transformative power. Yet we wonder
why it is that hegemonies fund institutes and universities. Is it not time for a good step back
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into a balcony view, to view the patterns and recognise the emergence of things undreamt of?
Or as Bailey (2001:29) rightly suggests: “in particular to understand them [people] from the
particular perspective of whatever goes to make up their intentionality”. Obviously Bhaskar if
he met Bailey would not be considered an irrelevance, in the meeting. However two things
which have remained elusive to  epistemology:  intentionality and  experience may become
more available in the dialogical attempt of interpretation. However, such dialogue has little
chance in a dirempted present: if dialogue happens not in the “now”, it happens not at all.
Reports of conversations are not the same thing: the text has changed from the creator to the
created, from the real to the epistemic. Dimensionality and depth are lost to us, unless the
dialogue is extended into the present. Picking up on an old conversation is unavoidable as are
encounters with logo-centric representations, in the formative stages of learning however the
transformative affect of dialogue such learning hopes to inspire, penetrates a depth of being in
the self-forgetful ground of creative experience. It seems to this author, abundantly clear that
it is from the ground of being from which our inspirations, insights and alternative thought
structures  emerge.  Does  the  balcony view of  meditation  make  us  more  intelligent?  The
epistemological problems do not immediately dissolve: language is deceptive, dualistic, even
intentionally deceiving. Perhaps what the value of categorical realism suggests is that it is
time to call a spade a “spade” and a shovel, a “shovel” to begin with. Such an approach needs
a discernment of the novel ways of loving, creating, and freeing at a deeper level. In the
realm of epistemology and methodology I take Kourie’s point that, we should avoid the trap
of re-inventing our discipline. However to put it somewhat crassly, we must do better than
extracting the scummy surface at the top of the soup whilst continuing to scorch the “stock”.
5.8.2 Being and seeing through    
Whether  one  belongs  to  an  extra-,  intra-  or  inter-denominational  camp or  neither  is  not
primarily the point. Interest and some pre-occupation with the subject of the implicit: be it in
implicit  religion,  primordial-proto-spirituality  or  indeed anthropological  reflexivity  within
academic  Spirituality,  attests  to  secular  spirituality’s  sometimes  epistemologically  yet
incompletely  apophaticised  emergence  amongst  us  –  a  palpable  absence  for  some,  yet
growing resonance for others, thus far. I believe this ontological spirituality which dares not
speak its name in this instance, yet whose communications are clear contemplates itself in the
mirror of consciousness and in a context where that epistemological mirror is much critiqued
for  its  “transformational”  absence.   A preverbal  spirituality  doesn’t  give  us  room  for
description but I believe that its philosophical derivability opens to us the spiritual dimension
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in the ground of being along with its potential and longed for possibility, as a sacred space of
transformation. What point, the experience of dark night without the full moon and the break
of day? I feel the resonance effect, its temporary impotency and its ultimate possibility in the
recognition of our common flourishing needs and wants from a de-centred position against a
totality which is utterly enchanted and mysterious. Within this conception what evaluation of
formalism,  paradigmatic  taxonomies  can  be  made?  Surely  they  (and  the  forms  of  those
forms) must fail on grounds of a superior explanation of (a) ontological depth, (b) unity as
diversity, (c) theory-practice unity in practice, and above (d) the emancipative intention in all
reality.   
There are further considerations in the diagnosis of a truly contemporary spirituality apart
from critical realism’s categories and theories. Despite the debates on naming (already an
academic resonance) for instance: “new spirituality”, “new mysticism”, “secular spirituality”,
“atheist  spirituality”,  “meta-reality”,  “natural  religion”,  “natural  theology”,  “post-secular
spirituality”, “implicit religion”, “emergent spirituality” or whatever other family names are
available,  the  reality  beyond  the  name  needs  to  resist  all  coercion  and  one  suspects  is
enjoying the game of hide and seek amidst the dialectical bun-fight. The social character of
such partying displays the positivist and alienating split in our politics of identity. I suspect
the subject of a conjoined myopia here is exposed as the “something there” (Hay 2006) and
“behind the eyes” (Benedikter 2007). Bhaskar delivers for me something like anamnesis or
“un-forgetting” of reality and more profoundly an un-forgetting of spirituality. Perhaps most
appreciated in the innocence from pre-emptive ascription but not lacking a priori argument in
our  analysis.  From simple  beginnings  of  a  philosophical  question  spirituality  once  again
reveals itself at the ground-zero of  being and  consciousness. The problem for atomists and
monists is their tendency to look for the implicit spirituality of humanity in one thing, an
identifiable  and  deniable  form in  dualistic  social  matrix.  Encased  as  we  are  in  an  open
expanding system of consciousness the reality of spirituality basically outstrips epistemic,
after the fact neatness. Causality thus represented is not consistently nor hardly (if we imply,
by this “most often”) occurring in the singularity of an epistemic target which to remind
ourselves is spirituality. In this sense spiritual emancipation is a reflexive and transformative
process diversified in the realm of duality, open to the hegemony-building power relations,
self justifications and TINA blindness of social life and whose naturally transcending quality
is intransitive and irresistible in its quest for relations in a totality beyond duality. 
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A naturalist spirituality is not reducible from its plural-diversity in a multitude of concrete
singularities which are all  connected in the totality of non-dual being.  Whatever the new
spirituality of  profound goodness  reveals  of  itself  (perhaps  as the  practical  mysticism of
universalised  human  solidarity  and  transformation)  it  does  much  to  enhance  the  value,
wonder  and  enchantment  of  being  seeking  and  seeing  to  its  own  seeking,  reflexively,
everywhere and ordinarily scouring for truth and consistency (phronesis) in which to trust
and act upon, in a ubiquitous stream of transcending and non-coercive (but possibly militant)
creative response. It is not merely a utopian ideal but a necessity for our survival and hoped
for flourishing. So whatever we end up calling this spirituality with its possible forms (one
hopes not) and taxonomy (even less) and (ordinary) phenomena, whatever is described in the
epistemological realm will be far less than its facts in the world and far short of its non-dual
reality. The world of epistemology and barely teenaged Spirituality departments in academia
need not fear the scandal of an out-of-wedlock pregnancy here. The neonate is long in the
meadows and cities and what we talk about will be very much like gossip after the fact.
Hence the urgency felt by some to find a name, perhaps. 
To be expected of such a time within epistemological context a lot of teasing and some too-
close  carnivorous  interest  are  sure  to  attend.  Certainly  in  our  post-fact  realm  of
epistemological discernment no one could or should contain ontic swelling. If we are to play
the  name-game  a  suggested  route  is  that  we  do  not  deny ontology,  depth,  process,  and
emergence.  Perhaps  one  should  merely  note  for  the  moment  the  critically  active
emancipative-anthropological ground-swell.  Indications are that amongst the protectors’ of
this spiritual reality are to be found the contemplative arts of self-critique and the conscious
reflexivity grounded in inter-connective relations of compassion for the ground states and
actionable conditions for all. This a-morphic “wonder” Bhaskar reveals as ordinary and the
“alethic-ground-truth” of all being. This spirituality of the ordinary is the non-dual condition
under which all spirituality diversifies, comes to concrete singularities, hegemonises social
cube relations and which possible heteronymous effects, nevertheless speak its name and the
truth that without this silent figure, they would not play. So ordinary is practical mysticism
that midst upheavals sometimes the baby is lost under our noses.
If we consider Bhaskar’s analysis of the discourse of modernity, we cannot deny the possible
anger of emergent spirituality set against Western triumphal denialism and hegemonic hurdles
of dichotomy. The phenomena of violence are no strangers to the student of Spirituality and
the world.  However, set against the self-implosive aspects of oppression and greed, random
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acts of violence might do little more than harden attitudes. Although after reading Goatham it
is  difficult  to  see  how  some  attitudes  are  to  get  any  harder.  A critical  and  existential
intransigence in the ground-swell movements of massive numbers is a very powerful force.
The history of revolution cannot be ignored (Mayson 2006:12) and any person wishing for
the flourishing for all,  cannot legitimately imagine them-selves to be alone.  However the
route of non-violent resistance as we have witnessed in the “Occupy Wall Street” campaign
most  recently,  is  profoundly  consciousness-raising  by  exponential  potential:  Ghandi
continues to inspire. If the empowerment of basic spirituality is too weakly felt, more than the
first quivers of a resonance effect are audible in the academy and the world. The real moral
enemy is the despair, apathy, denial and the illusion of irrealism projected by hegemony and
heteronomy.   
Remaining enchanted and in good faith with the reality of deep existence is difficult if all we
discern around us are the chariots and horses of decrepit empires. Bhaskar and other mystics
have long understood that the workings of ego-illusory TINA formations must be dissolved
from within their  half  attractions  and the places  we key into them. The first  step in  our
disengagement is to occupy ourselves at the real-centre of ground-state, non-duality and non-
attachment,  or  so  I  believe  this  Spirituality  paradigm holds.  If  traditionally  this  state  is
mystical there is no magic to it: it is available to all at the very ground of being, rationality
and will: from which, love, creativity and freedom naturally emerge. The inescapable fact of
their  emergence  is  represented  in  epistemology  quite  clearly  in  Mayson’s  (2006:1-23)
description  of  “a World  come of  age”  indicating  a  critical  maturation  within  Spirituality
theory (du Toit 2006:xiv-xv): 
Major  secular  developments  are  occurring  in  political,  social,  economic,
cultural and religious relationships. These can succeed only through the spiritual
powers  of  generosity  not  greed,  honesty  not  corruption,  compassion  not
compulsion, and temerity not terrorism … Spirituality on the other hand, freed
from religious prison, enables us to experience ourselves as part of a deeper
reality in the whole world. Spirituality embraces truth from all quarters in the
quest for the well being of all, a truth that sometimes reveals the “preposterous
illusions to error” in some religions. The quest for ethical wholeness includes
not  only the  good of  people,  but  social  and environmental  concerns.  Rapid
developments outrun conservative approaches and demand new experiments in
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goodness … We need a new view of spirituality and ethics – a confederation of
conscience,  knowledge,  love  and spirit  committed  to  the  well  being  of  our
secular world. This, then, is the concern of secular spirituality.
As presented by du Toit & Mayson (2006): (1) Anderson (2006:25-47) in his contribution
recognises the hegemonic partnership of “religion, capitalism, jurisprudence, democracy and
nationalism”  in  driving  the  “Sixth  Extinction”.  (2)  Cornell  Du  Toit  (2006:49-73)  claims
spirituality is  a  “dimension” of all  human experience.  Experience is  derivable only from
ontology,  Bhaskar  would  remind  du  Toit.  (3)  Kourie  (2006:75-94)  speaks  of  “post-
patriarchal”,  “telluric”  spirituality  in  a  sense  reminiscent  of  spiritual  eco-feminism  and
critiques  reductive  philosophy.  Bhaskar  would  agree.  (4)  Pieter  Botha  (2006:95-126)
recognises discontent with usual and traditional religious discourse. (5) Prozesky however is
highly critical of religion, posing ethical critique and exhibiting a deeply anthropological and
emancipative bent very similar in attitude to Bhaskar and Bailey (Prozesky 2006:127-138).
Abrahams  (2006:139-152)  discerns  “deeper  wisdom”  in  his  “new  spirituality”,  while
Mndende (2006:153-174) and Manley (2006:175-183) see African cultural  and communal
spirituality  as  distinct  from  the  secular  which  in  their  opinion  erodes  a  sense  of  the
metaphysical. On categorical definitions of the “secular” or the “metaphysical” from within a
Western  epistemology  Bhaskar  might  wish  to  disagree,  but  not  with  these  contributors
general point which is to expose the fallacy of “individualistic” spirituality.
5.9 Concluding the deal on worldview?
Perhaps it is helpful, retiring from the fray of dissertational discourse and in the concluding
moments  of  balcony  view contemplation  and  summation,  to  appropriate  Benedikter  and
Molz’s (2012:29-73) overview of neo-integralist worldviews and ideology for more rounded
context. For these authors, the “common core aspiration” of neo integrative worldviews seek
to  reconcile  “spirituality  and  rationality  ...  transcendence  and  secularism ...  realism  and
nominalism” (:29) the resolution of which amongst social presentations are pluriform and
patchy,  yet  “integrative  worldviews  may  provide  at  least  potentially  useful  'layers  of
stratification’  ...  to  facilitate  the  build  up  to  a  more  balanced  civilizational  paradigm
appropriate to the needs of the upcoming first ‘planetary civilization’” (:29-30): the over-
coming  of  modernism  which  “was  shaped  primarily  by  big  overarching  ideological
blueprints” (:30): 
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An ideology is by definition a normative set of ideas with suggestive value that
claims to legitimate the social political and sometimes the economic life of a
given society in a given historical period for a given time. Its legitimacy ... is
usually  asserted  on  the  assumption  of  ‘scientifically  proven’...  view  of  the
whole  ...  ‘instilling  habits  or  beliefs  in  people’ by ‘providing the  capacities
needed  for  the  maintenance  of  a  given  culture  and  its  institutions’ ...  to
constitute  a  unifying  complete  ‘sociopolitical  program’...  Ideologies  have
claimed ... to be the integrative theory par excellence, integrating or subsuming
all other theories of their time [into a] single point of view”.   
Ideologies have holistic  and integrative pretentions.  Unlike ideologies,  so Benedikter  and
Molz (2012:33) claim, neo-integrative worldviews are now plethora and paradigmatically,
“‘post-national’,  ‘post-ideological’  or  even  ‘a-spectival’  ...  ‘multi-positional’,  ‘pluri-
ideological  or  ‘inter-  and  trans-perspectival’”.  Epistemologically,  neo-intergrationalism  is
contextualised  by:  “awareness  of  the  productivity  and  relative  advantage  of  multiple
positions” (:33), a “search for inclusion for the largest number possible viewpoints on one
and the same issue or question” (:34) in which, ‘“subversive’ patterns of legitimation and
distribution are slowly, but continuously ascending to become co-decisive pre-political and/
or contextual political tools” (:34), and driven by “applicability to reality ... that no nation, no
country,  no culture and no political  actor  ‘can meet  the worlds  challenges  alone’”  (:34),
constituting a search for a “new kind of integration” (:35). In the world, multi-paradigms
“remain ambiguous” (:36) amidst which context, epistemology attempts to “create a ‘unity in
diversity’ or ‘diversity in unity’ paradigm” and “multi-dimensional research endeavours”(:36-
37) with which to meet “the contemporary state of the world” (:37), needing to balance the
“nomalistic remnants of postmodernity”, “re-balance nominalism with realism, the particular
with the whole, the subjective with the objective, as well as rationality with the – unavoidable
and irreducible – existential and metaphysical uncertainty and precariousness of life” (:46),
in  order  to  speak of  transformation,  “or  practice  orientated  experiential  spirituality”.  The
characteristic  resonance or “philosophical  mood” (:38)  (of “meta-inclusivity”(:45)) moves
beyond  “Kant’s  antimony”(:38)  noting:  “intense  intertwinement  of  ‘societal  software’...
hardware, technology and demographics” (:38-39), the rise of “public reason” (:39) and a
“new  alliance  between  theory  and  practice”,  here  seeking  “sustainable  ...  collective
development of social activism [and] spiritually founded patterns of value.” (:44). 
176
In critique of contemporary epistemology, Benedikter and Molz (2012:49), note:
[T]he  great  questions  of  freedom  and  community,  value  and  purpose,
knowledge and action in an integrative way – questions that were (and are)
otherwise  often  diluted,  concealed  or  forgotten  by  the  hyper-specialized
discourses  that  dominate  the  academy,  as  well  as  by  the  over-simplified
discourses that dominate the mass media and political  arena ...  simultaneous
amidst “partial  attempts to establish worldviews crossing the divide between
science, wholeness, integration and spirituality. 
What is required, they suggest (2012:51) are:
more encompassing cognitive position[s] ... across different types and levels of
knowledge  ...  to  contribute  a  meta-rational  understanding  of  how  they  can
peacefully co-exist ... able to withstand oppressive forces ... crossing all manner
of boundaries ... grasping and shaping connective patterns between rationality
and spirituality ...  This is partly due to the fact that in our age of a ‘global
renaissance of religions’ or more precisely,  of ‘globalized religions’,  the ties
between value development and concepts of wholeness, on the one hand, and
spirituality, on the other, tend to be strengthened to re-emerge in powerful re-
alignments that are sometimes regressive and sometimes progressive in form. 
In the  social  life  of  neo-integralism,  Benedikter  and Molz  (2012:54-55)  note  a  declining
number of the population who live in, “a life split between traditionalist religious dogmas in
private  and  compliance  with  secular  requirements  in  professional  and  public  life.”  (:54)
(Waaijman’s  “laity”?)  While  others  reconcile,  “private  and  public  [life]  through  atheistic
positions or through the rational reinterpretation or reduction of transcendence and wholeness
to  mental  processes,  mechanisms and needs”(:55).  Two other  trends  grow:  “a new,  non-
dogmatic openness towards ‘non-local’ correlations between the individual and the whole’,
engaging  in  multiple  forms  of  highly  individualized  and  patchwork  beliefs  or  hybrid
worldviews, which often tend to be transient” (:55)and another section of society who are
“open to empirically and personally integrating both dimensions in order to effect deep, life-
changing transformations and whose worldview is based on first-hand experience in rational
as well as in ‘meta-psychological’ engagement” (:55).
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Postmodernism in exceeding insights of positivist and objectivist paradigms valued diversity,
“championing the role of culture, discourse and power in the social construction of world-
views”. Taking sides with the oppressed and marginalised, “genealogical and deconstructive
techniques”  were  deployed  against  “a  huge  varieties  of  issues  (including  research  into
balancing social issues in general)”. Benedikter and Molz (2012:56) claim:
Reality  beyond  discursive  formations  was,  however,  negated  or  at  least
neglected by postmodern theory building; and ... increasing performative as well
as  logical  contradictions  appeared.  Common  ground  among  competing
discourses ... was rendered impossible because everything as the mere construct
of contextual and situational factors. Therefore, no particular reason could be
given  for  preferring  such  a  postmodern  stance  over  pre-modern  or  mature
modern  stances.  Integration  and  ‘balance’ became  increasingly  impossible,
because if everything was a contextual construct, paradigmatic balance between
nominalism and any alleged objective essentialism was no longer feasible. 
In  coming  to  conclusion  this  dissertation  holds  that  du  Toit’s  (2006:50-68)  insight  that
Spirituality is imbricated or concerned with cultural problems which in turn set themselves up
in the current worldview, is  correct.  In this sense it  might be claimed Bhaskar wishes to
institute a new  Gestalt  or worldview which is confluential by providing a philosophically
derivable basis for postmodern holism in which  transformation is vindicated. A worldview
(Schoeman  2004:181-183),  essentially  vocalises  the  bond  of  trust by  which  we  live:
practically, morally and epistemologically. It is a contract of trust based on the alethically
known existential  “goods” far  more critical  than a betting or  word-gaming handshake.  A
worldview though mediated and open to revolutionary upheaval, emerges out of need. This
dissertation’s critical engagement with Spirituality may bring to some an anamnesis of what
we need and truly desire. A worldview is distinctive in so far as it describes the things and
phenomena and values in which we place our trust as opposed to things we do not trust or
have come not to trust. The fallacies and dichotomies of modernism and traditional religion
have become recognised as undesirable.
“Postmodern holism”, might be an apt blanket description of what it is that we want and need
in our newer worldview. To trust  and have faith in a worldview requires that we have a
degree of “gut-felt” certainty about ontologies and realities even if that experience is found in
the most dire and desperate of times. What unifies a worldview is a resonance about its values
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as distinct from others’, normally, but not necessarily: otherness alone is never a clear-cut or
reliable measure. What it is that in the social cube of things our relations and relationships
rely on is the discernment of where to put our attitudes of realism and what things, concepts
and categories are worthy to re-vindicate reality and ontology. Worldviews exude an attitude
about the reality and importance of things and the hierarchy of values we wish our cultural
world to express and live by. In this sense spirituality is about living in a deep relationship
with things we trust.  The things we trust in postmodern holism are well described in the
contributions presented above, for instance Kourie’s delineations (2006:82). 
Postmodern  (post-secular)  holism,  if  that  be  our  world  view  is  distinct  from  that  of
modernism, by way of our contemporary negative attitude to dualism and reduction or to a
world of separation wanting replacement by a superior attitude to (value for) connectivity. As
Kourie notes (2006:89), “… postmodern spirituality … exhibits a willingness to engage in the
totality  of  existence”.  What  changes  worldviews  is  a  new  attitude  and  discernment  of
causality with which, we seek to trust and unite. It would be ludicrous to insinuate that our
notions of causality and connectivity do not expand or alter, over time. Where we deploy our
attitudes  of  realism may be  personally,  colloquially  and  regionally,  inconsistent  within  a
greater worldview in which we are accommodated.
Furthermore, worldview values or attitudes of realism or trust-as-held in cultural ultimata are
only relatively enduring.  Sometimes we are tempted along with Kourie (2006:88) to  beg
impossible  questions  about  the  possibilities  of  the  future.  We  simply  cannot  predict  the
mediations  and  items  of  the  future:  we  have  to  make them  with  words,  relations  and
agreements. To clothe this process in suspicion is to foreclose the possibilities of cosmology,
physics, biology, naturalism and theology, not to mention survival itself. Thus to claim that
these things are  relative and of deniable value is  to deny Glynn’s  (1997:139, cf.  du Toit
2006:58) understanding of the fundamentals of a new worldview - where “the very logic of
the  human enquiry is  compelling  a  rediscovery of  the realm of  spirit”.  What  every new
worldview invents is the categorical realism that will suit its values and truths and needs.
Bhaskar would have it  that  in order to accommodate the values of postmodern holism a
whole new set of realised thought structures, attitudes, categories and refinements are in order
even as he presents them, to start with. I think this goes someway to explain why it is that
thinkers  have  without  this  sense  of  categorical  realism had  difficulty  in  elucidating  the
ontology of secular spirituality. Our conceptualisation however is on the way from dualism to
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ontological holism in diverse neo-integral worldviews. The subject (epistemological object)
here requires a new philosophy or rather the fulfilment of the Copernican insight: it cannot be
negotiated with a split intention induced by the mire of old debated dichotomy. Rather what
this dissertation recommends for the immediate future are the Bhaskarian resolutions as a
more than tentative, ontological provisional step to joining-up knowledge in order to attain, a
“joined-up world”.
If  not  much mistaken this  might  account  for  du Toit's  (2006:88)  adamant  vindication  of
naturalism:  “… it  is  a  case  of  deepening human self-understanding through contact  with
nature  and natural  sciences.  There  can  be  no  true  self-knowledge without  knowledge  of
nature”. One suspects that Botha (2006:101) is of the opinion that secular spirituality bears
the burden of dualism. There seems to be here an indication that secular spirituality as a
“model for post-secular holism” (du Toit 2006:49-73) requires some philosophical clearing
and that Bhaskar’s insistence that more and varied categories or greater categorical realism is
needed, might well further the cause. 
180
Bibliography
Abrahams, I 2006. The birth of a new spirituality on deeper wisdom: The role of groups and individuals
inside  and  outside  religious  structures,  in:  Du  Toit,  C  &  Mayson,  C  (eds.)  Secular  spirituality  as
contextual critique of religion. Pretoria: Research Institute for Theology and Religion, Unisa: 139 - 152. 
Adorno,  T  &  Horkheimer,  M  1944.  Dialectic  of  enlightenment:  Philosophical  fragments.  Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Agnivesh 2006. A spiritual vision for the dialogue of religions, in: Du Toit, C & Mayson, C (eds.) Secular
spirituality  as  contextual  critique  of  religion.  Pretoria:  Research  Institute  for  Theology and  Religion,
Unisa: 185 - 208.
Allen, J 2002. The rise of Benedict XVI: the inside story of how the Pope was elected and where he will
take the Catholic Church. London: Random House.
Alston, W 1999. Perceiving God: The epistemology of religious experience. New York: Cornell University
Press.
Anderson, J 2006. Humanity and the sixth extinction of life on earth, in: Du Toit, C & Mayson, C (eds.)
Secular  spirituality  as  contextual  critique  of  religion.  Pretoria:  Research  Institute  for  Theology  and
Religion, Unisa: 25 – 47
Anscombe, G 1958. Modern moral philosophy, in: Philosophy (33) 124: 1 - 19.
Anscombe, G 2000 Intention (2nd edition). Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Appleby, J, Covington, E, Hoyt, D, Latham, M & Sneider, A (eds.) 1996. Knowledge and postmodernism
in historical perspective. New York: Routledge.
Archer,  M,  Bhaskar,  R,  Collier,  A,  Lawson,  T,  &  Norrie,  A (eds.)  1998.  Critical  realism:  Essential
readings. London: Routledge.
Archer,  M 1998. Realism in the social sciences,  in: Archer,  M, Bhaskar,  R, Collier,  A, Lawson, T, &
Norrie, A (eds.) Critical realism: Essential readings. London: Routledge: 189 – 205.
Archer, M, Bhaskar, R, Collier, A, Lawson, T, & Norrie, A (eds.)  Routledge studies in critical realism.
London: Routledge.
Archer, M 2003. The private life of the social agent: what difference does it make? In: Cruikshank, J (ed.)
Critical realism: The difference that it makes. London: Routledge: 17 - 29.
Astell, A (ed.) 1994. Divine representations: postmodernism & spirituality. New York: Paulist Press.
Astell, A 1994. Introduction, in:  Astell, A (ed.). Divine Representations: Postmodernism & spirituality.
New York: Paulist Press: 1 - 18.
181
Assiter, A 2001. Descarte’s individualistic epistemology – a critique, in: López, J & Potter, G (eds.) After
postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism. London: Athlone Press: 240 - 250.
Bailey, E 2001. The secular faith controversy: Religion in three dimensions. New York: Continuum.
Bailey, E (ed.) 2002. The secular quest for meaning in life, in: Bailey, E (ed.) Denton papers on implicit
religion. New York: Edwin Mellen Press.
Barnes, M 2005a. Spirituality and the dialogue of religions, in: Sheldrake, P (ed.) The new SCM dictionary
of Christian spirituality. London: SCM Press: 32.
Barnes,  M 2005b. Zen and Christianity,  in:  Sheldrake,  P (ed.) The new SCM dictionary of  Christian
spirituality. London: SCM Press: 655.
Baudrillard, J 1981. Simulacra and simulation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Beattie, T 2007. The new atheists: The twilight of reason & the war on religion. London: Darton Longman
and Todd.
Benedikter, R 2007. Postmodern spirituality: A dialogue in five parts in: Integral review (May).
http://www.integralworld.net/benedikter5.html [Accessed 19 September 2009]
Benedikter, R & Molz, M 2012. The rise of neo-integrative worldviews: towards a rational spirituality for
the coming planetary civilization? In: Hartwig, M & Morgan, J (eds.)  Critical realism and spirituality.
Oxon: Routledge: 29 – 74. 
Benton, T 2001. Why are sociologists naturephobes? In: López, G & Potter, G (eds.) After postmodernism:
An introduction to critical realism. London: Athlone Press: 133 - 145.
Berger, P 1977. Secular theology and the rejection of the supernatural: Reflections on recent trends, in:
Theological studies (38): 39 - 56.
Berger, P 1979. Heretical imperative. Garden City: Anchor Doubleday.
Berling, J 2006. Christian spirituality.  Intrinsically interdisciplinary, in: Lescher, H & Liebert, E (eds.)
Exploring Christian spirituality:  Essays in  honor of  Sandra M Schneiders,  IHM.  New Jersey:  Paulist
Press: 35 - 52.
Berry, P & Wernick, A (eds.) 1992. Shadow of spirit: Postmodernism and religion. New York: Routledge.
Bhaskar, R [1975] 2008. A realist theory of science (2nd edition). London: Routledge. 
Bhaskar, R [1979] 1998. The possibility of naturalism: A philosophical critique of contemporary human
sciences. London: Routledge.
Bhaskar, R 1980. Scientific explanation and human emancipation, in: Radical philosophy (26): 16 - 28.
182
Bhaskar, R 1989. Reclaiming reality: A critical introduction to contemporary philosophy. London: Verso.
Bhaskar, R 1991.  Philosophy and the eclipse of reason: Towards a meta-critique of the philosophical
tradition. Volume One: Philosophy and the idea of freedom .Oxford: Blackwell.
Bhaskar, R 1993. Dialectic: The pulse of freedom. New York: Routledge.
Bhaskar, R 1997. On the ontological status of ideas, in: Journal of theory of social behavior (27) 2 – 3:
139 – 147.
Bhaskar, R & Collier, A 1998. Explanatory critiques, in: Archer, M, Bhaskar, R, Collier, A, Lawson T &
Norrie, A (eds.) 1998. Critical realism: Essential readings. London: Routledge: 385 – 394.
Bhaskar, R 1998. The logic of scientific discovery, in: Archer M, Bhaskar, R, Collier, A, Lawson, T, &
Norrie, A (eds.) Critical realism: Essential readings. London: Routledge: 48 – 103.
Bhaskar,  R, and Norrie,  A 1998. Dialectic and dialectical  critical  realism, in:  Archer M, Bhaskar,  R,
Collier, A, Lawson, T, & Norrie, A (eds.) Critical realism: Essential readings. London: Routledge:  561 –
640.
Bhaskar, R 2000. From East to West. New York: Routledge.
Bhaskar, R & Harré, R 2001. How to change reality: Story vs. structure, in: López, G & Potter, G (eds.)
After postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism. London: Athlone Press: 22-39.
Bhaskar, R 2002a. Reflections on meta-reality: transcendence, emancipation, and everyday life.  London:
Sage.
Bhaskar, R [2002b] 2012. From science to emancipation: Alienation and the actuality of enlightenment.
London: Routledge.
Bhaskar, R [2002b] 2012. Critical realism, transcendence and God, in: From science to emancipation:
Alienation and the actuality of enlightenment. London: Routledge: 145 – 164.
Bhaskar, R 2002c.  The philosophy of meta-reality. Volume 1, meta-reality: Creativity, love and freedom.
London: Sage.
Bhaskar, R 2002d. The philosophy of meta-Reality, part 2: Agency, perfectibility, novelty. Interview by
Mervyn Hartwig, Journal of critical realism 1 (1): 67 - 93.
Bhaskar, R with Harwig, M 2010. The formation of critical realism: A personal perspective , in: Archer, M,
Bhaskar,  R,  Collier,  A,  Lawson,  T,  & Norrie,  A (eds.)  Routledge studies  in  critical  realism.  London:
Routledge.
Bhaskar, R, Frank, C, Hoyer, K, Naess, P & Parker, J (eds.) 2010. Interdisciplinarity and climate change:
Transforming knowledge and practice for our global future. New York: Routledge.
183
Bianchi, E 1997.Trans-traditional spirituality: Priest/ minister as spiritual seeker, guide, healer, in: Corpus
reports (September – October): 1 - 8.
Blackwell,  C  2003.  “Apophasis  (Special  Investigations)”,  in:  Blackwell,  C  (ed.)  Demos:  classical
Athenian  democracy.  The  Stoa:  A  consortium  for  electronic  publications  in  the  humanities.
[www.stoa.org]. Accessed 12 August 2012.
Blommestijn, H, Maas, F & Waaijman, K (eds.) Studies in spirituality (Supplement 22). Nijmegen: Titus
Brandsma Institute.
Bloesch, D 2001. Lost in the mystical myths: Current religious thought, in: Christianity today (35) 9: 22.
Borchert, B 1994. Mysticism: Its history and challenge. Maine: Samuel Weisner Inc.
Botha, P 2006. Secular spirituality as virtue ethics: Actualizing the Judeo-Christian tradition today, in: Du
Toit,  C & Mayson,  C (eds.).  Secular spirituality as contextual critique of  religion.  Pretoria:  Research
Institute for Theology and Religion, Unisa: 95 - 126.
Bourdain, A (2013). “Myanmar”, in: Unknown parts (Cable News Network), Viewed: 20 April 2013. 
Bricmont, J 2001. Sociology and epistemology, in: López, G & Potter, G (eds.) After postmodernism: An
introduction to critical realism. London: Athlone Press: 100 - 115.
Brock, S & Mares, E 2007. Realism and anti-realism. Stocksfield: Acumen.
Brookfield,  S  2000.  Transformative  learning  as  ideology  critique,  in:  Merizow  J  (ed.)  Learning  as
transformation: Critical perspectives on a theory in progress. San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass: 125 - 149.
Brown, W 2009. The emergence of causally efficacious mental function, in: Murphy, N & Stoeger, W
(eds.) Evolution & emergence: Systems, organisms, persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 198 - 226.
Burns, R & Rayment-Pickard, H 2000.  Philosophies in history: From enlightenment to postmodernity.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Burton-Christie, D 2006. The weight of the world: The heaviness of nature in spiritual experience, in:
Lescher, H & Liebert, E (eds.) Exploring Christian spirituality: Essays in honor of Sandra M Schneiders,
IHM. New Jersey: Paulist Press: 142 - 160.
Clayton, P 2009. Toward a constructive Christian theology of emergence, in: Murphy, N & Stoeger, W
(eds.) Evolution & emergence: Systems, organisms, persons Oxford: Oxford University Press: 315 - 344.
Corkery, J 2005. Spirituality and culture,  in: Sheldrake, P (ed.) The new SCM dictionary of Christian
spirituality. London: SCM Press: 26.
Cousins,  E  2005.  Global  spirituality,  in:  Sheldrake,  P  (ed.) The  new  SCM  dictionary  of  Christian
spirituality. London: SCM Press: 321.
184
Collier, A 2001. On real and nominal absences, in: López, J & Potter, G (eds.) After postmodernism: An
introduction to critical realism. London: Athlone Press: 299 - 310.
Cruikshank, J (ed.) 2003. Critical realism: The difference that it makes, in: Archer, M, Bhaskar, R, Collier,
A, Lawson, T, & Norrie, A (eds.) Routledge studies in critical realism. London: Routledge.
Cunningham, L 1999.  Thomas  Merton and the  monastic  vision.  Cambridge,  Grand Rapids  Michigan:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
Cupitt, D 1998. The religion of being. London: SCM Press.
Dahill, L 2006. The genre of gender: Gender and the academic study of Christian Spirituality, in: Lescher,
H & Liebert, E (eds.)  Exploring Christian spirituality: Essays in honor of Sandra M Schneiders, IHM.
New Jersey: Paulist Press: 98 - 118.
Davis, L 1990.  The first seven ecumenical councils (325-787): Their history and theology.  Collegeville:
The Liturgical Press.
Deacon, T 2009. Three levels of emergent phenomena, in: Murphy, N & Stoeger, W (eds.)  Evolution &
emergence: Systems, organisms, persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 88 - 110.
De Chardin, T 1965. Hymn of the universe. London: Harper & Row.
Derrida, J 1995. On the name. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
De Villiers, PGR, Kourie, CET & Lombaard, C (eds.) 2006. The Spirit that moves: Orientation and issues
in spirituality, Acta Theologica (Supplementum 8). Bloemfontein: University of Free State Press.
De Villiers, PGR, Kourie, CET & Lombaard, C (eds.) 2008.  The Spirit that empowers. Perspectives on
spirituality, Acta Theologica (Supplementum 11). Bloemfontein: University of the Free State Press.
De Villiers, PGR 2006. Spirituality, theology and the critical mind, in: De Villiers, PGR, Kourie, CET &
Lombaard,  C  (eds.) The  Spirit  that  Moves:  Orientation  and  issues  in  spirituality,  Acta  Theologica
(Supplementum 8). Bloemfontein: University of the Free State Press: 99 - 121. 
Diener,  E  &  Ryan,  K  2011.  National  accounts  of  well-being  for  public  policy,  in:  Donaldson  S,
Csikszetmihalyi, M, & Nakamura, J, (eds.) Applied positive psychology: Improving everyday life, health,
schools, work, and society. New York: Taylor-Frances: 15 - 34.
Dillon, M (ed.)  2003.  Handbook of  the sociology of  religion.  Cambridge:  Cambidge University Press
Syndicate.
Donaldson, S, Csikszetmihalyi, M, & Nakamura J, (eds.) 2011.  Applied positive psychology: Improving
everyday life, health, schools, work, and society. New York: Taylor and Frances.
Dostal, R (ed.) 2002. The Cambridge companion to Gadamer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
185
Dreyer, EA & Burrows, MS (eds.) 2005. Minding the spirit. The study of Christian spirituality. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
du Toit, C & Mayson, C (eds.) 2006.  Secular spirituality as a contextual critique of religion.  Pretoria:
Research Institute for Theology and Religion, Unisa.
du Toit, C 2006. Secular spirituality versus secular dualism: Towards post-secular holism as model for a
natural theology, in: Du Toit, C & Mayson, C (eds.) Secular spirituality as contextual critique of religion.
Pretoria: Research Institute for Theology and Religion: 49 – 73.
Dutton,  J  2011.  Prosocial  practices,  positive  identity,  and  flourishing  at  work,  in:  Donaldson  S,
Csikszetmihalyi, M, & Nakamura, J, (eds.) Applied positive psychology: Improving everyday life, health,
schools, work, and society. New York: Taylor-Frances: 155-170.
Edgeley, R 1976. Reason as dialectic, in: Radical philosophy (15): 2 – 7.
Edgeley, R 1998. Reason as dialectic: science, social science and socialist science, in: Archer M, Bhaskar,
R, Collier, A, Lawson, T, & Norrie, A (eds.) Critical realism: Essential readings. London: Routledge: 395
– 408.
Eagleton, T 2012. Realism, literature and spirituality, in: Hartwig, M & Morgan, J (eds.) Critical realism
and spirituality. Oxon: Routeldge: 90 – 98. 
Emmons, R 1999. The psychology of ultimate concerns. New York: The Guilford Press.
Endean, P 2005. Spirituality and theology, in: Sheldrake, P (ed.) The new SCM dictionary of Christian
spirituality. London: SCM Press: 74.
Finn, G 1992. Politics of spirituality: Spirituality of politics, in: Berry, P & Wernick, A (eds.) Shadow of
spirit: Postmodernism and religion. New York: Routledge: 111 – 122.
Finnegan,  J  2010.  The challenge  of  the  new spirituality in  postmodern  Ireland,  in:  Flannery,  A (ed.)
Doctrine and life (60) 2: 27-37.
Foucault, M, 1977. Discipline and punish: Birth of the prison. New York: Vintage.
Franke, W 2006. Apophasis and the turn in philosophy of religion from neo-Platonic negative theology to
postmodern negation of theology, in: International journal of philosophy of religion (60): 61 - 76.
Frankl, V 1946. Man’s search for meaning. New York: Washington Square Books.
Freud, S 1994. The interpretation of dreams. London: Barnes and Noble.
Frohlich, M 1993. The inter-subjectivity of the mystic: A study of Teresa of Avila’s interior castle. Atlanta
Georgia: Scholars Press.
186
Gadamer, HG 1986.  The relevance of the beautiful and other essays.  Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Garcia-Riviera A, 2006.  Interfaith aesthetics:  Where theology and spirituality meet,  in:  Lescher,  H &
Liebert, E (eds.)  Exploring Christian spirituality: Essays in honor of Sandra M Schneiders, IHM.  New
Jersey: Paulist Press: 178-195.
Gebser, J, Barstad, N, Mickunas, A, 1984. The ever present origin. Athens: Ohio University Press.
Gelman,  A  (ed.)  2008.  Mysticism,  in:  Zalta,  N  (ed.)  Stanford  encyclopedia  of  philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries [Accessed 12 December 2011]
Gilson, E 1952. Being and some philosophers. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies.
Goatham,  J  2014.  The  Sleep  of  reason:  The crisis  in  capitalism,  the  crisis  in  banking,  the  crisis  in
branding. Johannesburg: Goatham.
Grainger, R 2002. Notes on the religiosity of ‘scientific’ methods of psychotherapy, in: Bailey, E (ed.) The
secular quest for meaning in life. New York: Edwin Mellen Press: 337 - 346.
Gregerson, N 2009. Reduction and emergence in artificial life: A theological appropriation, in: Murphy, N
& Stoeger,  W (eds.)  Evolution & emergence: Systems, organisms, persons.  Oxford: Oxford University
Press: 284 – 314. 
Griffin, D 1990. Redefining the divine: an interview with David Ray Griffin by Alan AtKissson, in: Earth
spirit (winter): 20. 
Groff, R (ed.) 2008. Revitalizing causality: Realism about causality in philosophy and social science, in:
Archer, M, Bhaskar, R, Collier, A, Lawson, T, & Norrie, A (eds.)  Routledge studies in critical realism.
London: Routledge.
Grondin, J 2003. The philosophy of Gadamer. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.
Gutting,  G (ed.)  2005.  The Cambridge  companion to  Foucault.  Cambridge:  University of  Cambridge
Press.
Gutting, G 2005. Foucault: a very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Haught,  J  2009.  Emergence,  scientific  naturalism,  and  theology,  in:  Murphy,  N  & Stoeger,  W (eds.)
Evolution & emergence: Systems, organisms, persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 248 - 266.
Hahn, L (ed.) 1997. The philosophy of Hans George Gadamer. Illinois: Open Court.
Hartwig M, Morgan, J (eds.) 2012.  Critical realism and spirituality, in: Hartwig, M & Morgan, J (eds.)
New studies in critical realism and spirituality. Oxon: Routledge.
Hay, D 2006. Something there: The biology of the human spirit. London: Darton Longman and Todd.
187
Healey, C 1998. Christian spirituality: An introduction to the heritage. London: St. Paul’s Press.
Heelas, P 2002. Implicit religion: Ineffability, in: Bailey, E (ed.)  The secular quest for meaning in life.
New York: Edwin Mellen Press: 215 - 232.
Heelas, P 2012. Spirituality in the modern world: Within religious tradition and beyond, in: Heelas P (ed.)
Critical  concepts in religious studies -  overview: spirituality.  The perennial  and the zoned, Volume 1.
London: Routledge.
Heidegger, M 1962. Being and time. New York: Harper and Row.
Heidegger, M 1976. Poetry language thought. New York: Harper Perennial.
Hense E & Maas F (eds.) 2011. Towards a theory of spirituality, in: Blommestijn, H, Maas, F & Waaijman,
K (eds.). Studies in spirituality (Supplement 22). Nijmegen: Titus Brandsma Institute.
Hense  E,  2011.  The  quest  for  interdisciplinary  theories  on  spirituality,  in  Blommestijn,  H,  Maas,  F
Waaijman, K (ed.) Towards a theory of spirituality. Nijmegen: Titus Brandsma Institute: 5 – 14.
Howard, D 2009. Reduction and emergence in physical sciences: Some lessons from the particle physics
and condensed matter debate,  in: Murphy, N & Stoeger, W (eds.)  Evolution and emergence: Systems,
organisms, persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 141 – 157.
Howells,  E 2005. Apophatic  spirituality,  in:  Sheldrake,  P (ed.) The new SCM dictionary of  Christian
spirituality. London: SCM Press: 117.
Hoy, D (ed.) 1986. Foucault: A critical reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hudgins, E 2001. Secular spirituality. http:///www.objectivistcenter.org [Accessed September 2009]
Hvolbek, R 1998. Mysticism and experience. Maryland: University of America Press.
Jacobs,  J  2009.  Non-duality  in  Ken Wilber’s  integral philosophy: A critical  appraisal  and alternative
physicalist perspective of mystical consciousness. (unpublished DTh dissertation). Pretoria: University of
South Africa.
Joas, H 2000. Comment on Göran Therborn, in: Schelke, W & Krauth (eds.) Paradigms of social change:
Modernization, development, transformation, evolution. New York: St Martin’s Press: 73-76.
Johnston, W 2000. “Arise my love…” Mysticism for a new era. New York: Orbis.
Joseph, J & Roberts, J (eds.) 2004.  Realism discourse and deconstruction,  in: Archer, M, Bhaskar,  R,
Collier, A, Lawson, T, & Norrie, A (eds.) Routledge studies in critical realism. London: Routledge.
Kee, A 2002. The experience of transcendence in contemporary culture, in: Bailey, E (ed.)  The secular
quest for meaning in life. New York: Edwin Mellen Press: 121-136.
188
Keenen, J 2005. Buddhism and Christianity, in: Sheldrake, P (ed.) The new SCM dictionary of Christian
spirituality. London: SCM Press: 157
Kourie, C 2006. Postmodern spirituality in secular society, in: Du Toit, C & Mayson, C (eds.)  Secular
spirituality as contextual critique of religion. Pretoria: Research Institute for Theology and religion, Unisa:
75 - 94.
Kourie, C 2006b. The ‘turn’ to spirituality, in: De Villiers, PGR, Kourie, CET & Lombaard, C (eds.) The
Spirit  that  Moves:  Orientation  and  issues  in  spirituality.  Acta  Theologica  (Supplementum  8).
Bloemfontein: University of the Free State Press: 19 - 39.
Kourie, C & Kretschmar, L (eds.) 2008.  Christian spirituality in South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster
Publications.
Kourie, C 2009. Spirituality and the university, in: Verbum et Ecclesia 30 (1):  148 - 173.
Kourie,  C & Ruthenberg, T 2010. “Contemporary Christian spirituality and postmodernism: A fruitful
conversation?” in: Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap (3de & 4de Kwartaal): 103 – 121.
Kriegelstein, W 2006. The truth beneath the skin: A foundation for a secular spirituality, in: Dialogue and
Universalism (16) 5–6: 11.
Krishnamurti, J 1954. The first and last freedom. San Fransisco: Harper Collins.
Kruger, J 2006. Sounding unsound: Orientation into mysticism. Wierda Park: Aurora Press.
Kuhn, T [1962] 1996. The stucture of scientific revolutions (3rd edition).  Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Kuntz, P 2004. The ten commandments in history: Mosaic paradigms for a well-ordered society. Michigan:
William B Eerdmans Publishing.
Lane, B 2006. Writing in spirituality as a self-implicating act: Reflections on authorial disclosure and the
hiddenness of the self, in: Lescher, H & Liebert, E (eds.) Exploring Christian spirituality: Essays in honor
of Sandra M Schneiders, IHM. New Jersey: Paulist Press: 53 - 69.
Lawson, C, Latsis J & Martins, N (eds.) 2007. Contributions to social ontology, in: Archer, M, Bhaskar, R,
Collier, A, Lawson, T, & Norrie, A (eds.) Routledge studies in critical realism. London: Routledge.
Le Roux, J 1993. The nature of historical understanding, in: Studia Historica Ecclesia XIX (1): 35-63.
Lescher,  B & Liebert,  E (eds.)  2006.  Exploring Christian spirituality:  Essays in  honor of  Sandra M
Schneiders, IHM. New Jersey: Paulist Press.
Lesniak, V 2005. Contemporary spirituality, in: Sheldrake, P (ed.) The new SCM dictionary of Christian
spirituality. London: SCM Press: 7.
189
Lindstrom, M 2008. Buyology – truth and lies about why we buy. New York: Doubleday.
Lombaard,  C 2013.  Discernment:  Context,  orientation,  definition.  Paper  read  at  the  Annual  General
Meeting of: The Spirituality Association of South Africa. Publication forthcoming: Acta Theologica 2013.
López, J & Potter, G 2001. After postmodernism: An introduction to critical realism. New York: Athlone
Press – Continuum.
López, J 2001. Metaphors of social complexity, in: Lopez, J & Potter, G (eds.) After postmodernism: An
introduction to critical realism. London. Athlone Press: 86 - 93.
López, J 2003. Critical realism: the difference it makes, in theory, in: Cruikshank, J (ed.) Critical realism:
The difference that it makes. London: Routledge: 75 - 88.
Loux, M 1998. Metaphysics: A contemporary introduction. London: Routledge.
Lyotard,  J  1984.  The  postmodern  condition:  A  report  on  knowledge.  Manchester,  UK:  Manchester
University Press.
Makrides, V 2002. On the possibilities of naturalistic religions, in: Bailey, E (ed.)  The secular quest for
meaning in life. New York: Edwin Mellen Press: 149 - 176.
Marx, K 1876. Capital volume 1.London: Penguin.
Mayson, C 2006.  Into the world come of age, in: Du Toit, C & Mayson, C (eds.) Secular spirituality as
contextual critique of religion. Pretoria: Research Institute for Theology and Religion, Unisa: 1 - 23.
McGinn, B 2001. The foundations of mysticism: Origins to the Fifth Century, in : Mc Ginn, B (ed.). The
presence of God: A history of Western Christian mysticism (volume 1). New York: Crossroads.
McGinn, B 2001b. The mystical thought of Meister Eckhart. New York: Crossroads.
McGinn, B 5005. Mysticism, in: Sheldrake, P (ed.) The new SCM dictionary of Christian spirituality.
London: SCM Press: 19.
Merton, T 2003. The inner experience: Notes on contemplation. San Fransisco: Harper Collins.
Mezirow,  J  2000.  Learning  as  transformation:  Critical  perspectives  on  a  theory  in  progress.  San
Fransisco: Jossey-Bass.
Mezirow, J 2000. Learning to think like an adult: Core concepts of transformation theory, in: Mezirow, J
(ed.)  Learning as transformation: Critical perspectives on a theory in progress.  San Fransisco: Jossey-
Bass: 3 – 34.
Moore,  P  2005.  Christian  humanism,  in:  Sheldrake,  P  (ed.) The  new  SCM  dictionary  of  Christian
spirituality. London: SCM Press: 19.
190
Mouton, J  2001.  How to succeed in your Masters’ and Doctoral studies:  A South African guide and
resource book. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
Murphy,  N & Stoeger,  W (eds.)  2009.  Evolution & emergence: Systems,  organisms, persons. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Murphy, N 2009. Reductionism: How did we fall into it and can we emerge from it? In: Murphy, N &
Stoeger, W (eds.) Evolution & emergence: Systems, organisms, persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press:
19 - 39.
 Nietzsche, F 1961. Thus spake Zarathrustra: A book for all and none. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Nolan, A 1976. Jesus before Christianity. Claremont: David Phillip.
Nolan, A 2006.  Jesus today: A spirituality of radical freedom. Cape Town: Double Story.
O’Meara, T 1997.  Thomas Aquinas: Theologian.  South Bend: Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press.
O’Toole, J 2005. Creating the good life: How to apply the wisdom of Aristotle to the pursuit of happiness
the midlife and beyond. London: Rodale.
Pannikar, R 1989. The silence of God: The answer of the Buddah. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis.
Parks-Daloz, L 2000. Transformative learning for the common good, in: Merizow J (ed.).  Learning as
transformation: Critical perspectives on a theory in progress. San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass: 103 - 125.
Peeters, J 1963. Metaphysics: A systematic survey. New York. AD Press.
Peters,  M 2005.  Tradition,  in:  Sheldrake,  P (ed.) The  new  SCM dictionary  of  Christian  spirituality.
London: SCM Press: 622.
Petrolle, J 2007.  Religion without Belief: Contemporary allegory and the search for postmodern faith .
New York: University of New York Press.
Pieper, J 1967. The four cardinal virtues. Chicago: Notre Dame Press.
Pokorný, P 2001. Hermeneutics as a theory of understanding. Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans. 
Portalié, E 1960. A guide to the thought of St. Augustine. London: Burns and Oates 
Prozesky,  M 2006.  Ethics,  spirituality  and  the  secular,  in:  Du  Toit,  C  & Mayson,  C  (eds.)  Secular
spirituality  as  contextual  critique  of  religion.  Pretoria:  Research  Institute  for  Theology and  Religion,
Unisa: 127 - 138.
Rahner, K 1967. The Christian of the future. New York: Herder & Herder.
Rorty, R 1983. Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Boston: Princeton University Press.
191
Rose, G 1992. Diremption of spirit, in: Berry, P & Wernick, A (eds.).  Shadow of spirit: Postmodernism
and religion. New York: Routledge: 45 - 56.
Russel, R 2005. Spirituality and science, in: Sheldrake, P (ed.) The new SCM dictionary of Christian
spirituality. London: SCM Press: 55.
Russel,  R  2006.  The  contributions  of  the  natural  sciences  to  the  academic  discipline  of  Christian
spirituality, in: Lescher, H & Liebert, E (eds.) Exploring Christian spirituality: Essays in honor of Sandra
M Schneiders, IHM. New Jersey: Paulist Press: 119 - 141.
Schelkle, W, Krauth, W, Kohli, M & Elwert, G (eds.) 2000. Paradigms of social change: Modernization,
development, evolution. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Schneiders, S 2005. Christian spirituality: Definition, methods and types, in: Sheldrake, P (ed.) The new
SCM dictionary of Christian spirituality. London: SCM Press: 1.
Schneiders,  S  2006.  The  discipline  of  Christian  spirituality  and  Catholic  theology,  in:  Lescher,  H  &
Liebert, E (eds.)  Exploring Christian spirituality: Essays in honor of Sandra M Schneiders, IHM.  New
Jersey: Paulist Press: 196 - 212.
Schoeman, P 2004. Thoughts as to the location of ideology within the sphere of “belief systems”, in:
Tydskrif vir Christelike wetenskap (3rde &4de Kwartaal): 171-197.
Schreiber, D 2012. On the epistemology of postmodern spirituality, in: Verbum et Ecclesia 33(1): 1 - 8.
Schumpeter, J 1954. History of economic analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Scott,  J  2001.  Where  is  social  structure?  in:  López,  J  &  Potter,  G  (eds.)  After  postmodernism:  An
introduction to critical realism. London: Athlone Press: 77 - 85.
Sells, M 1994. Mystical languages of unsaying. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Shaw, J 2005. A pathway to spirituality, in: Psychiatry, 68 (4): 350 – 361.
Shea, J 2005. Spirituality, psychology and psychotherapy, in: Sheldrake, P (ed.) The new SCM dictionary
of Christian spirituality. London: SCM Press: 49.
Sheldrake, P (ed.) 2005. The new SCM dictionary of Christian spirituality. London: SCM Press.
Sheldrake, P 2005b. Spirituality and history, in: Sheldrake, P (ed.) The new SCM dictionary of Christian
spirituality. London: SCM Press: 38.
Sheldrake, P 2006. Spirituality and its critical methodology, in: Lescher, H & Liebert, E (eds.) Exploring
Christian spirituality: Essays in honor of Sandra M Schneiders, IHM. New Jersey: Paulist Press: 15-34.
Sheldrake, P 2007. A brief history of spirituality. Oxford: Blackwell.
192
Shepherd, A 2008. God is communion: A spirituality of being.
http://www.www.prodigal.typepad.com/prodicalkiwi [Accessed 20 September 2009]
Slife,  D & Scott-Richards,  P 2001.  How separable are spirituality and theology in psychotherapy,  in:
Counselling and values (45): 190 - 205.    
Sorrenson, R 2004. Minding spirituality. Hillsdale, New Jersey: The Analytic Press. 
Spidlík T 1986. The spirituality of the Christian East. Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications
Stoeger, W 2009. Reductionism and emergence: Implications for interaction of theology with the natural
sciences,  in:  Murphy,  N  & Stoeger,  W (eds.)  Evolution  & emergence:  Systems,  organisms,  persons.
Oxford: Oxford University Press: 229 - 247.
Stoeger,  W 2009.  Postscript,  in:  Murphy,  N  &  Stoeger,  W (eds.)  Evolution  & emergence:  Systems,
organisms, persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 345 – 349.
Stanford, J 1993.  Mystical Christianity: A psychological commentary on the gospel of John.  New York:
Crossroads.
Strauss, D 2012. The dialectical unity of Greek philosophy, in: Phronimon (13) 1: 55 – 75. 
Strauss, D 2011. “Normativity I - The dialectical legacy”, in: The South African journal of philosophy (30)
2: 207 - 217.
Tassi, A 1994. Spirituality as a stage of being, in: Astell (ed.)  Divine representations: postmodernism &
spirituality. New York. Paulist Press: 21-33.
Therborn, G 2000. “Modernization” discourses, their limitations, and their alternatives, in: Schelke,W &
Krauth (eds.)  Paradigms of social change: Modernization, development, transformation, evolution. New
York: St Martin’s Press: 49 - 72.
Tilby,  A 2005.  Cosmology in:  Sheldrake,  P (ed.) The  new  SCM dictionary  of  Christian  spirituality.
London: SCM Press: 218.
Torrance, R 1994. The spiritual quest: Transcendence in myth, religion & science. Berkley: University of
California Press.
Van Ness,  P (ed.) 1996. Spirituality and the secular  quest,  in:  Cousins,  E (ed.)  World spirituality:  An
encyclopedic history of the religious quest (Volume 22). New York: Crossroad.
Van Gulick, R 2009. Reduction, emergence, and the mind/body problem: A philosophic overview, in:
Murphy, N & Stoeger, W (eds.)  Evolution & emergence: Systems, organisms, persons.  Oxford: Oxford
University Press: 40 - 73.
Waaijman K, 2001. Theoretical approaches in spirituality, in: Hense, E & Maas, F (eds.) Towards a theory
of spirituality. Nijmegen: Titus Brandsma Institute: 123 – 140.
193
Waaijman, K 2002. Spirituality: forms, foundations, methods. Dudley, Mass: Peeters.
Waaijman, K 2006. Spirituality and contextuality, in: De Villiers, PGR, Kourie, C, Lombaard, C (eds.) The
Spirit  that  moves.  Orientation  and  issues  in  Spirituality.  Acta  Theologica (Supplementum  8):
Bloemfontein: University of the Free State Press: 54 - 62. 
Waaijman, K 2010. Primordial spirituality, in: HTS Teologiese studies / Theological studies (66) 1:849. Art
# 849, 5 pages. DOI: 10.4102/hts.v66.1. 849 [Accessed  13 November 2012].
Wallerstein, I, Juma, C, Fox Keller, E, Kocka, J, Lecourt, D, Mudimbe, V, Mushakoji, K, Prigogine, I,
Taylor, P, Trouillot, M. 1996.  Open the social sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the
restructuring of the social sciences. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Wilber, K [1995] 2000. Sex, ecology, spirituality: The spirit of evolution, in: The collected works of Ken
Wilber (volume 6). Boston: Shambala.
Wilber, K 2008. Kosmos trilogy. http://integralinstitute.com/kenwilber [Accessed 12 September 2009].
Wilson, N 2012. Review of Bhaskar, R & Hartwig, M (2010) in: Journal of critical realism (1)1.2: 247 -
254. 
Wittgenstein, L 1956. Remarks on the foundations of mathematics .Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, A 2012. Beyond fundamentalism: spiritual realism, spiritual literacy and education, in: Hartwig, M
& Morgan, J (eds.) Critical realism and spirituality. Oxon: Routledge: 75 – 89.
Zalta, N (ed.) 2008. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. 
Zimmerman, M 1989. Introduction to deep ecology: An interview with Michael E Zimmerman by Alan
AtKisson in: Global climate change, (Summer) 24. 
Zohar, D & Marshall, I 1990.  The quantum self: Human nature and consciousness defined by the new
physics. New York. William Morrow.
Zohar, D & Marshall, I 2000. SQ – Spiritual intelligence: The ultimate intelligence. London: Bloomsbury.
Zohar, D & Marshall, I 2005. Spiritual capital: Wealth we can live by. New York: Bloomsbury.
194
